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to extend my thanks to Franziska Hünekes, Corinna Hartung, Anne Niedermaier,
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Preface
Without data, you’re just another person
with an opinion.
W. Edwards Deming
The overarching theme and objective of my dissertation is to furnish empirical
evidence through the careful and sophisticated analysis of data. The research de-
scribed in the following four chapters addresses and answers questions in the fields of
development, labor and organizational economics by developing insights grounded in
rigorous empirical research. Especially in a time of frequent challenges of empirical
evidence by opinions reflecting ideology, partisanship or populism, researchers must
remain steadfast in relying on empirical evidence to inform arguments. I strive to
derive recommendations for economic policy from the research papers presented in
this dissertation that reflect arguments built on observed data rather than opinions
about facts.1
The research laid out in this dissertation reflects on the one hand a personal and
academic interest in the economics of low-income and developing countries, and,
on the other hand, a keen interest in the methods of applied economics themselves.
Low-income countries face myriad of challenges and obstacles, and my research works
towards informing economic policy, in particular in the domains of youth labor and
human capital policy. My work cautions policymakers to ponder the effects minimum
wage policy may have on human capital investment, and offers insights on how
entrepreneurship can empower young generations in the Global South. I also offer
a perspective on how the Global North channels donations to the Global South in
order to help it cope with the human toll and economic repercussions of increasingly
1 The introductory quote’s author, W. Edwards Deming (1900-1993), was an American scholar
trained as an electrical engineer, mathematician and physicist. His academic contributions also
included writings in statistics, psychology and management science. His consulting role in rebuilding
the Japanese economy after World War II is widely acclaimed and earned him national honors in
Japan. In the U.S. his contribution to the sampling techniques of the census are widely recognized.
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frequent natural disasters. These insights are based on classic tools of empirical
economics, and yet machine learning has recently been enriching our discipline with
exciting and powerful methods that profoundly expand the realm of possibilities for
research. In the last chapter, I present an application of unsupervised learning in
organizational economics, and discuss research results that show how firms adapting
a more flexible management style can better weather times of economic hardship.
The work and results in the present text build on more than a century of Math-
ematicians, Statisticians and Economists developing ever-more potent analysis tech-
niques. These powerful tools and methods, in combination with widespread availabil-
ity of data and growing computing power, now enable researchers to provide detailed
recommendations to policymakers across a wide range of settings and applications.
My dissertation is testament to this versatility, and illustrates four distinct combi-
nations of data source and technique in different fields of economics. In doing so,
this work also bespeaks the protean nature of economics as a discipline entertaining
multifarious scientific inquiry.
The overwhelming share of empirical work in Economics is concerned with estab-
lishing and quantifying a causal relationship between two quantities (Imai, Keele,
Tingley, and Yamamoto, 2011, p.1).2 Practitioners of empirical research routinely
distinguish between two paths to drawing causal conclusions, an endeavor always
complicated by the fact that one is unable to witness an individual make the exact
same decisions more than once. On the one hand, there are experimental methods
which allow researchers to shape specific parameters of individuals’ decision environ-
ments. On the other hand, quasi-experimental methods exploit naturally occurring
variation in individuals’ decision spaces. More recently, data-driven empirical meth-
ods whose end is not necessarily causal inference have expanded researchers’ toolkits,
and bestowed upon them the opportunity to delve into new questions. In economics,
2 At this point I would like to point the reader to a book which has been indispensable to this
dissertation. Mostly Harmless Econometrics: An Empiricist’s Companion by Joshua Angrist and
Jörn-Steffen Pischke has exactly been to me what its title claims, a companion. It provides a




these methods are commonly referred to as machine learning.3 In contrast to causal
inference, machine learning helps us to make accurate predictions from or find natu-
ral groupings in observed data. My thesis draws on and combines tools from all these
spectra, thereby highlighting their adaptability, complementarity and potential, in
four distinct settings.
Oftentimes there appears to be a subtle dissonance in the perception of machine
learning by practitioners of causal inference. By relying on and combining methods
from both paradigms, I endeavor to demonstrate that this tension is illusory. I begin
from an apprehension that machine learning has little to add to the identification of
causal effects; its fundamental goal is different. Rather than pinning down a causal
effect of one variable on another, machine learning is most commonly concerned with
finding the best possible prediction of a variable given a set of predictors. With this
in mind, machine learning would not offer answers to those questions I pose in Chap-
ters 1-3. Instead, I rely on identification strategies which exploit exogenous variation
to quantify causal effects.4 However, some questions in economics, and in the social
sciences more generally, are not fundamentally questions of causal inference; rather,
they can be characterized as prediction problems, and, as such, lend themselves to
be answered with the help of machine learning (Kleinberg, Ludwig, Mullainathan,
and Obermeyer, 2015). Chapter 2, for instance, provides a brief perspective on how
machine learning can complement causal inference by comparing the predictive per-
formance of various models. In Chapter 4, my co-authors and I leverage a powerful
machine learning algorithm to develop a new source of data; something methods of
causal inference would not have allowed us to accomplish. It is by the realization that
traditional methods of causal inference and machine learning address fundamentally
different objectives, but can complement one another occasionally, that empirical
research produces the most reliable and robust answers to questions of our time.
3 Today, the term machine learning is almost omnipresent. Therefore, I feel compelled to provide
the reader with a general but powerful definition, courtesy of Mitchell (1997). He postulates that
in order to be understood as machine learning, a program (algorithm) learns from experience E
with respect to some class of tasks T and performance measure P if its performance at tasks in
T, as measured by P, improves with experience in E. In a typical machine learning application, an
algorithm’s prediction of an object based on data improves if it is provided with more instances
from which it can learn about the mapping of data to the object.
4 The term identification strategy was coined by two pioneers of empirical economics, Joshua
Angrist, of MIT, and the late Alan Krueger, formerly of Princeton University, who describe a “clearly
labeled source of identifying variation in a causal variable and the use of a particular econometric
technique to exploit this information” (Angrist and Krueger, 1999, p.8). They stress the distinction




The sequence of chapters in this dissertation chronologically follows the creation
of the linchpins of the empirical researcher’s toolkit. While some of these methods
date back centuries, they remain the most popular and powerful tools of empirical
economics to this day (The Economist, 2016). The first chapter uses a difference-
in-difference design—a concept dating back to the 1850s—to establish a causal link
between minimum wage legislation and individuals’ human capital investment. The
second chapter draws on instrumental variable techniques—a notion conceived in the
1920—to estimate how much more natural disaster relief could be raised if online
platforms were to wholly embrace their potential and uprooted barriers to fundrais-
ing and giving. The third chapter describes a currently ongoing Randomized Control
Trial (RCT)—pioneered in Medicine in the 1940s, and in Economics in the 1960s—
in Uganda which seeks to provide robust causal evidence for whether high-skilled
youths can act as job creators through innovative entrepreneurship training. The
fourth and final chapter blends unsupervised learning—a family of tools that have
entered applied economics no more than 20 years ago—with an extensive firm survey
and describes how firms’ management correlates with their ability to weather times
of economic upheaval.
Chapter 1 implements a difference-in-difference estimation framework. Intu-
itively, one compares the difference in an outcome of interest over time for different
subgroups, and an early written account of such a framework can be found in Snow
(1855). He compared Cholera-related deaths in different boroughs of London, and
ascribed changes in death rates to different suppliers of water. The technique has
since been applied to myriad of questions with the goal of establishing and quan-
tifying a causal effect. A leading application has been the study of the effects of
minimum wage legislation, dating back to Obenauer and von der Nienburg (1915).
Arguably the most famous application is David Card and Alan Krueger’s (1994)
study of the effects of minimum wages on employment by observing changes in fast
food employment in New Jersey and Pennsylvania around 1992, where the former
raised the minimum wage but the latter did not. Today, the study is widely cred-
ited with changing economists’ perceptions about consequences of minimum wage
legislation.
My study of the German federal minimum wage of 2015 is comparable in spirit
but veers in its objective. I exploit regional variation in the gap between the pre-
vailing local wage in 2014 and the uniform minimum wage—the bite—to estimate
the causal effect of the bite on high school dropout rates. Since the minimum wage
4
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raises the wage individuals, especially low-skilled ones, can expect to earn in the la-
bor market, it may incentivize them to forego further investments in education. My
findings are consistent with this channel, for I estimate that dropout rates increased
by five percent comparing counties at the inter-quartile range of minimum wage bite.
These results point to a possibly unintended side effect of minimum wage legislation.
As an increasing number of countries implement or start to enforce such legislation,
my study provides an additional lens through which policymakers ought to ponder
its possible effects.
The main finding of Chapter 2 is the product of instrumental variable (IV) esti-
mation. While its origins can clearly be traced back to a book on agriculture, the
question of who deserves intellectual credit is debated among economists and histo-
rians (Wright, 1928; Stock and Trebbi, 2003).5 In the book, IV is used to solve the
problem that demand and supply are jointly determined in equilibrium and exploits
external factors (read: exogenous variation) to estimate coefficients on an endoge-
nous variable. The name instrumental variable only came about in the 1940s, and
has become a mainstay of econometric analysis ever since (Aldrich, 1993). Today,
IV methods are still used to solve simultaneous equation models, yet a thriving liter-
ature applies the logic to address bias from endogenous regressors more generally, or
evaluate local average treatment effects (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2001;
Imbens and Angrist, 1994).
The analysis of Chapter 2 is comparable in character to the early rationale for
using IV techniques. My co-authors and I study whether an online platform for
charitable giving can help channel funds to the countless natural disasters that tend
to be neglected by charities and donors. We match 680,000 time-stamped individ-
ual charitable donations made through a German online platform to 1720 natural
disasters that occurred from 2013-2017, which cost over 86,000 lives and affected
nearly a billion people around the globe. We utilize an IV approach that relies on
exogenous variation in charities’ cost of providing disaster relief to overcome the fact
that the demand for and supply of disaster relief are jointly determined in equilib-
rium. We estimate that charities could raise twice the median current relief volume
on the platform if they were to solicit funds for currently neglected marginal natural
5 The treatment of what later became known as instrumental variable estimation is “buried” in
Appendix B of said book. The fact that the appendix is a mathematical derivation, while the rest
of the book is an extensive treatment of animal and vegetable oils, has lead academics to doubt that
Philip G. Wright penned Appendix B himself. Some historians credit his son, Sewall, accidentally




disasters. In additional results, we show that giving to disaster relief does not crowd
out giving to other charitable causes, and provide systematic evidence that charities
and donors tire of fundraising for and donating to natural disasters in the wake of
large disasters.
In Chapter 3, I present work that takes another approach to credible causal iden-
tification. Rather than relying on naturally occurring variation, my co-authors and
I randomly vary exposure to a treatment and estimate its causal effect. Commonly
termed a RCT, this has become the gold standard of causal inference and policy
evaluation. While the use of experiments in other disciplines dates back centuries—
clinical trials can be traced back to at least Lind (1772)—the science of economics is
a much younger consumer of credible causal evidence by virtue of RCTs. Jamison,
Searle, Galda, and Heyneman (1981) are generally credited with pioneering them in
development economics. To this date, RCTs are most widespread in the economics
of development and education, a fact bespoken by 2019 Nobel Memorial Prize in
Economic Sciences for Esther Duflo, Abhijit Banerjee and Michael Kremer.
The randomized experiment I present in Chapter 3 traverses development and
education economics.6 We randomly offer admission to an entrepreneurship train-
ing to university students in Uganda, and track employment outcomes—focusing on
self-employment—for up to three years after the training. The project contributes
evidence to a nascent research paradigm focusing on the psychology of entrepreneur-
ship to equip individuals in the Global South with the tools to earn a livelihood
and create businesses that provide employment opportunities. At the time of writ-
ing, we have implemented two of three waves of the training program—including
baseline and implementation check surveys of the first two waves—and expect to
continue collecting data in 2021 and 2022. Due to the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic,
implementation of the third wave has been postponed to at least the spring of 2021.
The fourth and final chapter of this dissertation offers an application of machine
learning in the realm of organizational economics. In contrast to the previously dis-
cussed methods, economists have only started to explore and benefit from machine
6 The RCT is currently ongoing, and we are expecting to collect the first wave of outcome data
in the fall of 2020. My co-authors and I have produced a detailed pre-analysis plan published on




learning in the last 20 years (Athey, 2019).7 Advances in statistics and computational
power have spurred the development of increasingly powerful algorithms. Practition-
ers typically distinguish between supervised—using a set of features to predict an
outcome—and unsupervised—finding clusters of similarities in the data—algorithms
(Athey and Imbens, 2019). Especially the latter presents researchers with the op-
portunity to develop inputs for econometric analysis from abstract high-dimensional
and unstructured objects, such as text, speech or images (Mullainathan and Spiess,
2017).
The analysis of Chapter 4 leverages unsupervised learning to build a scalar-valued
representation of firms’ management practices from an extensive survey conducted in
Spain in 2006. My co-authors and I apply a probabilistic clustering algorithm, Latent
Dirichlet Allocation, to more than 270 indicators which describe a firm’s human re-
source policies. Specifically, the algorithm projects management styles onto a space
enclosed by two extremes which we interpret as informal vs structured management.
We proceed by showing management geared more intensely towards the latter al-
lowed firms to prosper during the economic expansion from 2001-2006. Interestingly
however, this correlation reverses its sign in the economic downturn of 2007-2010.
This suggests that by remaining flexible and adaptable firms sacrificed performance
during the expansion but were able to better weather the Great Recession.8
The chapters of this dissertation carry implications for policymakers in labor and
development economics, as well as for practitioners of organizational design. The
final chapter also illustrates how unsupervised learning can be used to develop new
data sources—something that holds great promise in economic research.
Chapters 1 and 3 seek to inform youth labor market policy, especially in the
Global South, where youth unemployment is a pervasive and imperative issue. “Gen-
eration jobless” is how The Economist (2013, 2020a) termed the 300m 15- to 24-
years-olds around the world—and especially in Africa—who are unemployed. Chap-
ter 3 evaluates labor market outcomes of high-skilled youths in Uganda after pro-
7 In this paper, Susan Athey—one of the researchers at the forefront of applying machine learning
in Economics—puts forward a narrower and arguably less abstract (than the one given above) defini-
tion of machine learning. She defines machine learning as the “field that develops algorithms designed
to be applied to datasets, with the main areas of focus being prediction (regression), classification,
and clustering or grouping tasks (Athey, 2019, p.3).
8 The use of the world correlation is intentional and seeks to convey that we abstain from drawing
causal conclusions in this setting. We are unable to exploit exogenous variation in firms’ choice
of management style; rather, management style, as we observe it, is the product of past firm
performance which in turns affects current and future firm performance.
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viding them with entrepreneurial capital. The study assesses a targeted intervention
that could easily be replicated and, more importantly, scaled up and deployed nation-
wide. With a majority in the Global South working in subsistence self-employment,
this study aims to provide novel insights by explicitly targeting high-skilled youths
prior to entering the labor market.9
The findings in Chapter 1 provide another perspective on labor market policy
and its potential effects on the youth. Minimum wage policy is a prominent and
wide-spread policy, with 90 percent of countries having some form of statutory wage
floor in place (The Economist, 2020b). Enforcement varies widely, and is typically
low in countries of the Global South. My study addresses possibly unintended side
effects of minimum wage legislation, and uncovers a causal relationship between
minimum wage policy and individuals’ education outcomes. Policymakers in the
Global South should thus ponder effects on youths’ education when they choose to
impose or enforce minimum wages more stringently.
More generally, economic growth in the Global South is frequently impeded by
natural disasters destroying physical and social infrastructure.10 Through humani-
tarian aid, the Global North can alleviate the consequences and foster reconstruction.
However, the donor community typically only reacts a few major events; yet, a large
number of smaller-scale disasters, that attract little attention and no donations,
wreck the Lion’s share of havoc. The findings in Chapter 2 provide a perspective on
a novel tool, online platforms, for soliciting donations to disaster relief. I explore rea-
sons for why disaster relief is typically deficient after smaller-scale disasters, even in
relative terms. The study also points out that online platforms could solicit greater
disaster relief, and thus play a more prominent role in smoothing effects of natural
hazards.
While the last chapter does not dovetail thematically with the previous three
chapters, it offers methodological insights and a topical perspective on organizational
policy. The analysis showcases unsupervised learning, a novel tool in empirical
9 With few opportunities in the labor market, self-employment is often the only way for individuals
to earn a living. The overwhelming majority of these business fail to grow beyond subsistence and do
not contribute to economic growth or provide jobs. Entrepreneurship education has been hailed as a
solution by providing the human and managerial capital necessary to establish innovative businesses.
Yet, World Bank lead economist David McKenzie and Chris Woodruff of Oxford University (2014)
note that the body of work on business and entrepreneurship training in low-income training focuses
on middle-aged, existing business owners, and results only show meager impacts.
10 The U.S. National Academy of Sciences (2019) notes that in the wake of climate change, natural
disasters are likely to become more frequent and that their prevalence has broadened.
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economics, and how it can be used to reduce the dimensionality of high-dimensional
objects. Our specific application analyzes how firms’ management style affects their
ability to absorb shocks, a highly topical question in light of the ongoing Covid-
19 pandemic. Our results show that firms whose management was less rigid and
more flexible forewent profits in times of economic expansion but weathered time of
economic hardship profoundly better.
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1. Minimum Wage Policy and Human Capital Investment
Abstract
Does the introduction of a minimum wage affect students’ schooling decisions?
Using county-level data from Germany, I show that high school dropout rates in-
creased more in places where the federal minimum wage introduced in 2015 had
greater bite. Specifically, I identify the causal effect by exploiting regional variation
in pre-2015 wage levels. The difference in minimum wage bite between the county at
the 25th and 75th percentile results in a roughly 5 percent increase in dropout rates
relative to 2014 levels. The timing of the effect suggests an immediate response in
2015 and 2016, and the effect starts to fade out in 2017. The effect is predominantly
driven by male students in rural areas. Permutation tests further corroborate the
finding of the minimum wage having affected youths’ schooling decisions.
Chapter 1 – Minimum Wages & Education
1.1 Introduction
Across an ever-increasing number of nations around the world, minimum wage
legislation has become an indispensable tool of economic and welfare policy. The
Economist (2020b) recently published a piece on minimum wages, which noted that
90% of countries have some form of statutory wage floor in place but also cautioned
that enforcement varies widely. The article, and indeed much of economic research,
focuses on understanding employment and wage effects of such minimum wage leg-
islation. Yet, wages play an outsize role in economic thinking, and minimum wage
effects likely extend beyond employment outcomes. A nascent recent literature, for
instance, links increased household income from minimum wages to improvements in
birth weight and child health (Komro, Livingston, Markowitz, and Wagenaar, 2016;
Wehby, Lyu, Kaestner, and Dhaval, 2020).
Wages are also central in how economists think about human capital investment.
Put simply, the wage individuals could earn in the labor market constitutes the
opportunity cost of investing in human capital. By raising the wage individuals could
expect to earn in the market, minimum wage legislation may affect individuals’ level
of human capital investment. Indeed, Card and Krueger (1995, p. 214) state in their
seminal book on the economics of minimum wages that “school enrollment should be
treated as outcome measure that is possibly influenced by the minimum wage”.
I focus on precisely this dimension of minimum wage policy and seek to answer
the following question: what effect does the introduction of a minimum wage have
on students’ schooling decisions? I analyze this question in the context of the in-
troduction of the federal minimum wage in Germany in 2015. At its introduction,
4 million people, roughly 10 percent of the labor force, earned less than the min-
imum wage, albeit there was profound regional variation (Mindestlohnkommission
der Bundesregierung, 2016). I combine different sources of publicly available data
and assemble a county (ger: Landkreis) panel dataset in order to test whether the
reform led students to drop out of high school. This setting allows for precisely
quantifying the minimum wage’s effects on human capital investment at teen age.
The conclusions of this paper are based on exploiting the distance between a
county’s wage level and the uniform federal minimum wage—the bite of the minimum
wage. The minimum wage is said to bite or bind more in counties with lower wage
levels in 2014. When setting a uniform minimum wage, a policymaker is unable
to account for individual counties’ economic conditions. The resulting, plausibly
exogenous, variation in the bite allows me to identify the causal effect of the minimum
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wage introduction on individuals’ human capital investment. I measure students’
human capital investment using counties’ dropout rates, that is, the proportion of
students who drop out of high school each year without a diploma. Finally, I draw
on the theory of permutation tests to provide exact p-values for the hypothesis that
the minimum wage had no effect on dropout rates.
The minimum wage may directly influence individuals’ schooling decisions by
triggering expectations of higher wages for low-skilled labor. Consider a marginal
individual whose productivity would only slightly increase with one more year of
education: to the extent that this slight increase does not raise productivity above the
level of the minimum wage, there is little incentive to pursue such education. Another
possibility is that individuals anticipate the minimum wage destroying low-skilled
jobs, and thus they invest more into education. I provide reduced-form estimates
which can be understood as an assessment of which channel plays a more prominent
role.1
By analyzing dropout rates, I study the education decisions of individuals of
about 16 years of age.2 The minimum wage does not legally apply to underage
minors—details on the institutional context in Section 1.2—and those who drop out
of high school are not covered by the minimum wage. Thus, dropping out of the
school does not immediately lead to remuneration under the minimum wage but
only at such time when the individual turns 18. This should lower the incentive to
respond to the minimum wage law by dropping out of school. Students may still
anticipate that their hourly earnings never fall below the minimum, and adjust their
education decision ahead of time.
Yet despite the fact that the minimum wage does not normally cover students
right after they drop out of school, I do find that the minimum wage introduction
caused dropout rates to increase. I estimate that the dropout rate increased by 1.14
percentage points on a base of 5.7 percent, an effect of 20 percent, when comparing
the counties with the least and most minimum bite. The implied effect when com-
1 The German economy was in an expansionary period around 2015—the setting of the present
study. Therefore, it is unlikely that young individuals—those who can adjust their schooling
decisions—would think that the minimum wage impedes their chances of finding work. For com-
pleteness it should also be noted that the minimum wage could give rise to an income effect. To
the extent that education is a normal good, the increase of future earnings (assuming a constant
probability of finding a job) would lead an individual to consume more education.
2 I would like to note that I do not use any individual-level data. All data analyzed in this work
is aggregated data that does not allow for tracking individuals, and was published by official sources
of the German government.
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paring counties at the first and third quartile is 0.3 percentage points, or 5.3 percent
of 2014 levels. Effects are precisely estimated and statistically significant at the 5 or
1 percent level.
The results suggest a non-permanent short run response as the effect is concen-
trated in the first two years after the reform. In 2017, the effect size is no longer
statistically significant, and the point estimates for 2018 suggest that the effect dis-
appeared. In the immediate aftermath of its implementation, the minimum wage
was most salient and thus most likely to feature in individuals’ decision making.
Moreover, as marginal jobs began to disappear individuals may have updated their
beliefs about the minimum wage’s effect on their labor market prospects (Caliendo,
Fedorets, Preuss, Schröder, and Wittbrodt, 2018; Garloff, 2019).
The second set of findings uncovers relevant socio-economic margins of effect
heterogeneity. First, the effect is largely driven by male students. Moving from 25th
to the 75th of minimum wage bite implies a 6.3 percent effect on male students’
dropout rates (base = 6.7 percent). This is about twice times the effect on female
students’ dropout rate (base = 4.5 percent). The effect for male students is significant
at the 1 percent level while the effect for female students is marginally insignificant
(p = 0.15). Theoretically, one would only expect that only those marginal individuals
described earlier would adjust their education decisions. If more men than women
are in the group of such individuals, then the “complier” group of men is larger.
Research has shown that this is likely to be the case. First, young female have
higher cognitive ability compared to their male counterparts (Becker, Hubbard, and
Murphy, 2010; Fortin, Oreopoulos, and Phipps, 2015). Second, young females are
likely to have more elaborate educational expectations (Bertrand and Pan, 2013).
I further address two margins of spatial heterogeneity that are of interest to
policymakers. First, I show that the effect is driven in equal parts by urban and
rural areas. Second, I evaluate whether the effect is different in those states that
formed the German Democratic Republic (GDR) until 1990, and I am unable to
reject that the effects are equal.
To further corroborate the finding of a link between the minimum wage intro-
duction and educational investment, I conduct permutation tests. Permutation tests
are an established statistical method that have gained increasing attention in Eco-
nomics, and allow the researcher to test the null hypothesis of no individual effect
(Fisher, 1935; Young, 2019). The tests are based on a large number of random
permutations of the “treatment”-vector— the minimum wage bite—to construct a
randomization distribution of effect sizes under the null hypothesis of no effect. I
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obtain exact p-values below 0.01 based on 999 permutations. These results serve to
corroborate the existence of a link between the minimum wage reform and dropout
rates.
This study contributes to the literature on understanding minimum wage effects
beyond first-order employment effects. In doing so, I build on sparse and geograph-
ically concentrated evidence on a link between minimum wage legislation and skill
acquisition by the youth. Research exploiting cross-state variation in the US suggests
a link between minimum wages and educational attainment (Neumark and Wascher,
2003; Chaplin, Turner, and Pape, 2003; Sutch, 2010).3 Similarly, evidence points to
an inverse link between minimum wages and school enrollment among teenagers in
New Zealand (Pacheco and Cruickshank, 2007; Hyslop and Stillman, 2007). In con-
trast, Campolieti, Fang, and Gunderson (2005) find no robust association between
school enrollment and minimum wages using Canadian data.
The contribution of the present paper is to extend the evidence to a setting
outside the Anglo-Saxon context in which an unambiguous measure of teenage skill
acquisition is available. While much of the related literature is complicated by
enrollment measures depending on labor force participation, the structure of the
German high school system permits precise measurement of high school completion
rates. Clemens, Khan, and Meer (2018) shows that employers “upskill”—substitute
towards higher-skilled labor—following minimum wage increases in the US. If in-
dividuals simultaneously reduce human capital investment the ensuing wedge be-
tween employers desired and workers acquired human capital reduces employment
prospects for those individuals. Thus an understanding of possibly unintended and
unanticipated effects of minimum wage legislation on education carries policy rele-
vance.
My setting allows me to exploit finely grained variation in minimum wage bite—
within states—for identification of the effect of dropout rates of students who are
exposed to the same educational policies. In contrast, in US settings the effect is
usually identified from variation of minimum wage and dropout rates across states
where labor market and educational policies also differ across states.
This research further contributes to understanding short-term effects of the fed-
eral minimum wage in Germany. Early research suggests that the minimum wage
3 Neumark and Wascher (2003) builds on an earlier article that examined data of the 1970s and
1980s (Neumark and Wascher, 1995). The latter version updates the data to include the Current
Population Surveys (US) conducted in the 1990s. The results in the earlier study mirror those in
the later one.
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only had marginal effects on employment (Bossler and Gerner, 2019; Caliendo, Fe-
dorets, Preuss, Schröder, and Wittbrodt, 2018). Caliendo, Schröder, and Wittbrodt
(2019) provide an overview of short-term effects but do not discuss effects on hu-
man capital acquisition. Dustmann, Lindner, Schönberg, Umkehrer, and Vom Berge
(2019) find that the reform led to significant wage gains at the lower end of the distri-
bution while not reducing employment prospects for low-skilled individuals. I extend
this literature by analyzing the short-term educational response. If individuals re-
duce human capital investment in response to the reform, it may have adverse effects
on their medium and long term career prospects, particularly in light of increasing
skill requirements in the labor market (Autor and Handel, 2013).
Significant regional variation in wage levels and dropout rates renders Germany
an ideal setting for this study. The maps in Figure 1.1 demonstrate this variation.
First, the left hand panel shows profound variation in average wages across counties
in 2014. Crucially, this variation also exists within states, and is key to the iden-
tification strategy which relies on state fixed effects. Second, the right-hand panel
similarly illustrates variation in the change in dropout rates. Education policy is ad-
ministered at the state level, but panel (b) suggests that there is ample within-state
variation in dropout rates. Further, the maps illustrate the fact that wages tend to
be lower in East Germany—the former (GDR), roughly the north-east of Germany.4
Visual inspection suggests that dropping out is less frequently observed in those
states. Socio-economic discrepancies persist to this day to the extent that there was
discussion of different minimum wages for East and West Germany at the time of
policy deliberation (Bellmann, Bossler, Gerner, and Hübler, 2015). My results do
not suggest a strongly heterogeneous effect, albeit the effect in East Germany is
smaller in size and less precisely estimated.
The results presented in this paper are of interest to policymakers as they point to
possibly unintended side effects of minimum page policy. As noted above, minimum
wage legislation is becoming an increasingly popular tool. While many countries have
statutory minimums in place, few countries in the Global South enforce them, or
possess the capacity necessary for enforcement. The results presented in the current
study carry over to a setting in which a country starts to enforce a minimum wage
which it has had in place. My results stress that policymakers may have to take into
account that (enforcing) minimum wage policy can have adverse and unintended
4 The latter states are also sometimes called the “new” states while the former are called “old”
states. I will use this terminology interchangeably. In the analysis, I will include state by year fixed
effects which accounts for time-invariant underlying differences between East and West Germany.
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effects on human capital investment.
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1.2 Institutional background
This section briefly provides background on the minimum wage legislation and
the education system. First, how was the federal minimum wage introduced and
which part of the labor force is covered? Second, I discuss the hierarchical structure
of the German education system.
1.2.1 Federal minimum wage
Germany introduced a federal minimum wage on January 1st, 2015, establishing
a wage floor at e 8.50 gross per hour. The minimum wage has since been raised four
times and is currently set at e 9.35 as of January 1st, 2020. Prior to 2015, wage
floors were established by collective bargaining or voluntary agreements which could
have stipulated wages higher than e 8.50 in some cases. Moreover, a number of
sectors (e.g., construction, hairdressing or security services) had sector specific min-
imum wages prior to 2015. Fitzenberger and Doerr (2016) present a comprehensive
overview of sector-specific minimum wages.
Several employment relationships and individuals were exempt from the min-
imum wage. Self-employed, trainees, specific interns, minors without vocational
training, volunteers, inmates and long-term unemployed (exempt for six months)
were not covered by the wage floor (Caliendo, Fedorets, Preuss, Schröder, and Wit-
tbrodt, 2018). Despite these arrangements, the minimum wage bound for roughly 4
million (≈10 percent of the labor force) out of the 5.5 million employees who earned
less than e 8.50 in 2014 (Mindestlohnkommission der Bundesregierung, 2016).
A federally binding minimum wage was put forward after the federal elections
in the fall of 2013. The incoming government under chancellor Merkel endorsed a
federal minimum wage in its coalition treaty. The government’s proposal passed
both houses of parliament in July 2014 and went into effect five months later. This
timeline suggests that anticipation effects may have played a role, but in Section
1.5.1 I show that there is no evidence of such effects.
1.2.2 Education system
States rather than the federal government are responsible for education. Yet,
across all states the high school system can be divided into three tiers. This stands in
contrast to, for instance the US, where there is generally one type of high school. The
top tier of the German high school system, called Gymnasium, is meant to prepare
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students for tertiary education, and students graduate with a university entry qual-
ification. The middle tier, most commonly called Realschule, historically prepares
students for vocational training in office jobs and skilled manufacturing occupations.
In recent years, the system has become more fluid in that it allows students from
Realschule to pursue university education, by attending an intermediate school type
upon graduation. Finally, the lowest tier of the school system prepares students
for low-skilled occupations. This tier is commonly called Hauptschule. There are
differences in terminology, and details on how students can move between tiers differ
across states; importantly however, this general type of academic hierarchy holds
across states.
Crucially, leaving school without any degree is a well-defined concept across all
states. This event is defined as leaving school without a Hauptschulabschluss, i.e., a
passing grade in the final year of the lowest tier of the high school system. Should a
student not finish the last year of Hauptschule, commonly the ninth grade, with at
least a passing grade, she is considered a dropout. Students are typically between
15 and 17 years of age when they drop out of school.
Broadly speaking, there are three scenarios that result in a student becoming a
dropout. First, a student simply fails to complete the last year of Hauptschule and
decides against another try. Second, she completes the mandatory years (see below)
of high school education prior to reaching the last year of high school. This occurs
if a student has to repeat a year because of a failing grade point average. In that
case, she can decide to leave high school. Finally, a student may be prevented from
trying to complete the last year for disciplinary reasons if she has completed the
mandatory years of schooling already.
Different mandatory schooling laws are in place across states but they share
important parallels. All states stipulate that individuals must complete nine or ten
years of primary and high school.5 In most cases those nine or ten years must be
followed by two or three years of vocational school. Mandatory schooling laws no
longer apply when an individual turns 18 (or 17 in some states). Depending on the
number of repeated attempts at a particular grade, students may turn 18 without
ever having attended vocational school.
Students who finish (or drop out of) high school without having abode with
mandatory schooling laws ought to attend vocational school. This is structured
5 The German media outlet Süddeutsche Zeitung pubslishes an overview of state-specific regula-
tions regarding the minimum number of years across states under https://bildung.sueddeutsche.
de/schulpflicht/ (in German).
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through apprenticeships where students split their time between working in a firm
and attending school studying occupation-specific content. Having finished high
school, students would typically apply to apprenticeships (based on personal pref-
erence) to start job training. Dropouts have access to the same type of system but
lack any formal high school qualification. Should they be unable to acquire an ap-
prenticeship, special tracks at vocational schools exist in order for them to be able
to complete mandatory years of schooling. Upon completion, they are considered
part of the labor force but lack any official education or job certificate. Thus, leav-
ing without a Hauptschulabschluss is not a dead end in the education system. It is
considered an adverse signal that restricts an individual’s labor market choice set
since formal requirements prevent dropouts from applying for a range of jobs.
1.3 Data sources
1.3.1 Schooling data
The Federal Statistical Office publishes completion rates for all tiers of high
schools in Germany. The data also contains the number of students who left the
high school system without having completed the lowest tier. The data is available
for all 399 counties that are part of the analysis, and the observation period runs
from 2013 to 2018.6
Figure 1.2 summarizes the composition of school leavers across years. About five
to six percent of students leave high school without a formal degree. This proportion
has been growing from 5.6 to 6.8 percent from 2013 to 2018. The modal student
(about 45 percent) graduates with the middle tier degree. About one third of stu-
dents acquire university entry qualification via the top high school tier, while 17
percent of students successfully complete Hauptschule. The share of students com-
pleting Hauptschule decreases over time, comparable in magnitude to the increase in
the dropout rate. Dropping out is more common among male students (7.4 percent)
than among female students (4.7 percent).
Appendix Table 1.A.1 reports summary statistics of dropout rates over time. The
spread between counties is about 14 percentage points. The distribution of dropout
6 There are 401 counties in Germany but two counties are dropped from the analysis sample. The
county of Göttingen is excluded since it is the only county with incomplete schooling records. The
county of Heidelberg is excluded as it shows an increase from 24 (out of 1491, 1.6 percent) in 2016
to 127 (out of 1568, 8.1 percent) dropouts. This exceeds all other year-to-year changes in the data
by an order of magnitude.
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Figure 1.2: Composition of school leavers across years. Notes. This figure shows the average
dropout rate and type-specific completion rates across counties in Germany. The number of dropouts and
the number of graduates of the respective school type is divided by the total number of school leavers in a
given year. The labels above the columns indicate the numerical value.
rates appears well-behaved with the inter-quartile range being equally spaced around
the median. In absolute numbers 46,733 students dropped out of the high school
system in 2014. On average, 117 individuals dropped out of school in each county
in 2014.
1.3.2 Hours worked
Data about hours worked is a necessary ingredient to calculating hourly wages
from monthly earnings. This data comes from the Structure of Labor Earnings
Survey 2014 (ger: Verdienststrukturerhebung, VSE) which is conducted by the Ger-
man Federal Statistical Agency and is representative at the state level (Statistisches
Bundesamt, 2014). The VSE is a comprehensive survey regarding employment rates,
earnings and non-pecuniary benefits and, crucially, hours worked. The data reports
average weekly hours in April 2014 for 19 sectors across all German states. Appendix
Figure 1.A.2 shows the average as well as the minimum and maximum (that is, the
number of hours worked in the least and most intensive sector) across all states.
This data is only available at the state level. There is little variation in hours across
states; on average individuals work between 39 and 40 hours a week. At the up-
per end employees in Sachsen-Anhalt work 40.32 hours while employees in Saarland
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work only 39.23 hours.
1.3.3 Counties’ economic indicators
The minimum wage’s bite is a function of the pre-reform average prevailing wage
level. A lower wage causes the minimum wage to bite more, and vice versa. If few
people are directly affected by the new wage floor, the consequences for the local
labor market are unlikely to be economically meaningful. In order to construct a
measure of minimum wage bite, I employ data from the “INKAR” database which
is maintained by the Federal Ministry of the Interior, Construction and Homeland,
and provides county level data on gross earnings (ger: Bruttoverdienst) and median
earnings (ger: Medianeinkommen) (BBSR Bonn, 2019). I combine gross income
and median earnings with the labor hours data from the previous section to con-
struct counties’ implied average hourly wages. Note that this results in two separate
measures of counties’ implied hourly earnings.7
Gross income reflects average monthly earnings of employees in a county. For this
measure, all individuals in working relationships (employees, civil servants, soldiers,
trainees, etc.) are counted, including individuals in minor employment (ger: ger-
ingfügig Beschäftigte). Self-employed individuals are not included for the construc-
tion of this indicator. The gross wage is then the sum of salary, employer-provided
perks and social welfare contributions made by the employer. Only payments by do-
mestic organizations are considered, and hence income received from foreign entities
would not show up in this measurement.
Median earnings (ger: Monatsentgelte der Vollzeitbeschäftigten) measures the
median level of gross labor earnings for full time employees reported to the Federal
Agency for Employment (ger: Bundesagentur für Arbeit). Unlike gross income, this
variable is only available from 2014 onward. Median earnings are about 20 percent
higher than gross income. The fact that only full time employees’ earnings are
included in the former accounts for this fact.
I then calculate hourly wages implied by both measures of earnings assuming four
weeks per month. Thus monthly earnings are divided by weekly hours times four,
and Table 1.1 shows summary statistics across states. Average wages based on gross
income tend to be highest in Hamburg and Hessen while Baden-Württemberg has
7 Through the presentation of the results I provide estimates based on both approaches to con-
structing minimum wage bit. The results are quantitatively similar. The estimates based on median
income tend to be larger in magnitude but with the spread in the underlying Kaitz-ratio being
smaller, the implied effect sizes relative to 2014 are almost identical.
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the second highest implied wage based on median income. Thus there are rank dif-
ferences depending on the underlying quantity used to construct wages. Throughout
the analysis, I will present estimates based on using both versions of implied hourly
wages. Column 8 in Table 1.1 reports the number of counties in each state. The
states of Hamburg and Berlin only consist of a single homonymous county. Fore-
shadowing the analysis, these will be absorbed by a state fixed effect.
The key explanatory variable in the analysis will be the bite of the minimum
wage as measured by the Kaitz-ratio. This ratio is a non-linear transformation of
the average prevailing wage relative to the nominal minimum wage. The Kaitz-ratio
is given by 8.50wi,2014 . A larger value implies a stronger bite of the minimum wage.
Note that the non-linearity of the transformation implies increasing marginal bite as
wages decrease. Appendix Figure 1.A.3 shows a histogram of observed Kaitz-ratios
in the data. Using wages implied by gross earnings the range is about 0.3 to 0.7 with
a mean (median) of 0.55 (0.55) and a standard deviation of 0.076. The distribution
based on median earnings is highly comparable with a mean (median) of 0.48 (0.46)
and a standard deviation of 0.080.
A necessary assumption for the Kaitz-ratio to be valid measure of minimum wage
bite is that it (rank) correlates with the fraction of individuals who earned below
e 8.50 in 2014. Suppose that wage dispersion is larger in counties with higher average
wages; in this case, the Kaitz-ratio may be low (high wages) and indicate little bite
when in fact there is a significant number of individuals earning below minimum.
While I cannot empirically test this assumption, comparing states with low implied
wages in Table 1.1 and those identified to host a larger share of enterprises affected
by the minimum wage in Bellmann, Bossler, Gerner, and Hübler (2015) suggests
that they correlate.8
Appendix Figure 1.A.1 illustrates the correlation between Kaitz-ratios based on
the two measurements of labor income. It plots the quantities’ ranks against each
other and compares them to the 45◦-line which would indicate perfect rank correla-
tion. The figure suggests high, albeit imperfect, rank correlation. The correlation is
lowest in the middle portion of the distribution. The coefficient of correlation is 0.88
and indicates high linear dependence. Spearman’s ρ of 0.92 further indicates high
8 An alternative measure for the minimum wage bite would be a county’s fraction of employees
who earn below e8.50 in 2014. Yet, also this measure requires additional assumption as it does not
take into account the distance between an employee’s wage in 2014, and the minimum. The fraction
would be equally affected by employees earning e8 or e6. Caliendo, Fedorets, Preuss, Schröder, and
Wittbrodt (2018) find comparable effects on employment when they use both measures of minimum
wage bite in an analysis of 2015 minimum wage reform in Germany.
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Statistic Mean St. Dev. Median Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Min Max N
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Wages implied by gross income [e ]
Baden-Württemberg 17.15 1.61 16.82 16.04 18.16 14.68 21.84 43
Bayern 16.38 2.05 15.88 15.03 16.96 13.36 24.34 96
Berlin 16.50 0 16.50 16.50 16.50 16.50 16.50 1
Brandenburg 13.46 0.86 13.48 12.89 14.11 11.70 15.24 18
Bremen 16.80 0.39 16.80 16.43 17.18 16.43 17.18 2
Hamburg 20.15 0 20.15 20.15 20.15 20.15 20.15 1
Hessen 17.41 1.81 16.74 16.12 18.81 14.81 22.53 26
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 12.89 0.97 12.57 12.07 13.31 11.99 14.53 8
Niedersachsen 14.49 2.40 13.88 13.30 15.02 12.00 26.50 44
Nordrhein-Westfalen 16.48 1.77 16.22 15.25 17.29 13.75 21.64 53
Rheinland-Pfalz 15.15 2.23 14.40 13.90 15.73 12.45 23.33 36
Saarland 15.48 1.30 15.33 14.50 16.79 13.67 17.25 6
Sachsen 13.13 0.88 12.74 12.53 13.58 11.84 15.17 13
Sachsen-Anhalt 13.09 0.61 12.99 12.61 13.80 12.06 14.00 14
Schleswig-Holstein 14.28 1.02 14.14 13.76 15.20 12.54 16.08 15
Thüringen 13.25 0.82 13.19 12.61 13.64 12.28 15.74 23
Wages implied by median earnings [e ]
Baden-Württemberg 20.72 1.77 20.18 19.38 21.75 18.33 27.11 43
Bayern 18.96 2.27 18.64 17.50 19.83 15.74 28.04 96
Berlin 18.36 0 18.36 18.36 18.36 18.36 18.36 1
Brandenburg 14.27 1.25 14.28 13.15 14.73 12.47 17.21 18
Bremen 20.19 0.96 20.19 19.27 21.11 19.27 21.11 2
Hamburg 21.79 0 21.79 21.79 21.79 21.79 21.79 1
Hessen 20.07 2.43 19.26 18.04 21.71 17.03 25.07 26
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 13.79 1.45 13.07 12.75 14.63 12.36 16.25 8
Niedersachsen 17.99 2.30 17.29 16.82 18.66 15.68 28.43 44
Nordrhein-Westfalen 19.61 1.48 19.43 18.45 20.11 17.37 24.97 53
Rheinland-Pfalz 18.63 2.11 17.86 17.30 19.88 15.58 27.23 36
Saarland 19.53 1.14 19.34 18.53 20.77 18.04 21.16 6
Sachsen 13.71 1.48 12.94 12.69 14.22 12.22 17.32 13
Sachsen-Anhalt 13.97 1.06 13.77 13.07 14.48 12.69 16.25 14
Schleswig-Holstein 17.30 0.98 17.40 16.41 17.96 15.53 19.60 15
Thüringen 13.91 1.28 13.58 13.06 14.28 12.45 17.54 23
Table 1.1: Implied hourly earnings by state. Notes: This table reports summary statistics of
both measures of implied hourly wages across counties in states. “Pctl(25)” and “Pctl(75)” indicate the 25th
and 75th percentile, respectively. The last column indicates the number of observations in a state which is
equivalent to the number of counties in a state. Note that the states of Berlin and Hamburg only have one
county each.
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rank correlation.
Time-varying controls
In order to control for time-invariant factors, I include county fixed effects in the
analysis. While this is likely to absorb significant variation—especially in addition to
the state by year fixed effects—time-varying county characteristics may still influence
individuals’ education decisions. To address this concern, I control for counties’
socio-economic situation using several socio-economic indicators measured annually.
These indicators describe the equilibrium of labor demand and supply, and thus the
signal about employment opportunities students receive. Different measures break
vacancies down by skill group, as the aggregate unemployment rate may obscure low-
skilled individuals’ labor market situation. In addition, controlling for population
inflows addresses the fact that individuals may feel compelled to invest more into
education in order to remain employable.
Specifically, I include the following time-varying variables: i) the unemployment
rate measured as a percentage of the labor force, ii) vacancies, divided into two
classes; “helper” and “skilled” using a definition of the German Employment Agency,
iii) inward (outward) migration, measured as the number of immigrants (emigrants)
in a given year per 1,000 inhabitants in the county in the same year, iv) employment
in the first (agriculture, forestry and fishing) and second (manufacturing, mining,
construction, etc.) sector, measured as the percentage of total employment in the
county in the same year respectively, v) gross local product which reflects the value
of goods and services per inhabitant (rather than worker) in a locality, vi) transfers,
as the sum of payments from state governments to municipalities in a county per
inhabitant per year, and finally, vi) the fraction of the population under the age of
65 that receives social welfare payments.
Table 1.A.2 summarizes these covariates using their averages across the years
2013 to 2017.9 There is ample variation in economic conditions across counties; the
minimum local unemployment rate is 1.4 percent while the maximum is 14.5 percent.
Similarly, counties are exposed to asylum seekers in varying ways. Finally, there are
counties with 23.5 percent social security recipients, while other counties have as few
as 1.2 percent.
9 Data on all covariates is not available for the year 2018 as of August 2020.
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1.4 Estimating the causal effect of the minimum wage implementation
1.4.1 Estimation setup
The objective is to identify the causal effect of the federal minimum wage on
students’ human capital investment measured by the fraction that completes at least
basic high school. The level of observation is a county indexed by i ∈ {1, 2, ..., 399}.
Observations are further indexed by state s ∈ {1, 2, ..., 16}.10 The panel dimension
is denoted by year t ∈ {2013, ..., 2018}. I then estimate the following equation:
yi,s,t = β11[t ≥ 2015]t + β21[t ≥ 2015]t ∗ bitei +Xi,t−1φ+ αi + αs,t + εi,s,t (1.1)
The dependent variable is a county’s i dropout rate in year t, that is, the ratio of
students leaving school without any degree to the total number of students leaving
school. The indicator variable 1[t ≥ 2015] identifies the years 2015, 2016, 2017 and
2018. The minimum wage went into effect on January 1st, 2015, and thus the student
cohort (supposed) to graduate in 2015 was the first to graduate when the minimum
wage was in effect. I show that there do not seem to be anticipation effects at the
end of Section 1.5.1.
The time-invariant variable bitei is the measure of treatment intensity, that is, a
measure of minimum wage bite in county i. The treatment measure is based on the
Kaitz-ratio constructed from the average hourly wage level in 2014 and the nominal
minimum wage of e 8.50. The coefficient of interest, β2, multiplies the interaction
between the post-reform indicator and the continuous measure of minimum wage
bite. This specification assumes a linear effect of bite on dropout rates. I relax this
assumption by supplementing said “linear-in-Kaitz” specification with a specification
in which treatment is measured using quartile indicators for the Kaitz-ratio in 2014.
Thus there are three interaction terms of indicators for quartiles 2, 3 and 4 with
the post-reform dummy. The first quartile, the 25 percent of counties where the
minimum wage bound the least, is the omitted group.
All specifications include county, αi, and state by year, αs,t, fixed effects. The
vector Xi,t−1 includes the first lag of time-varying county characteristics. Across
states, the school year for those in graduation year classes finishes between late
April and June, and prevailing economic conditions around that time are better
10 Counties are perfectly subsumed in states. That is, there are no counties whose borders stretch
across state lines.
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captured by the preceding year’s economic measurements.11 Not all indicators are
available for the year 2018 at the time of this analysis, and thus using the first lag
also ensures that control variables can be included when the outcome measurement
runs through 2018.
I distinguish between a basic and an extended set of time-varying covariates. The
former is comprised by the unemployment rate; vacancies classified as unskilled or
semi-skilled; and asylum seekers as well as a county’s immigration and emigration
numbers relative to population. The extended set of covariates additionally includes
the share of employment in the primary or secondary sector; transfer payments
from the state government to the county; social security recipients; and a county’s
economic output in terms of gross local product per inhabitant.
I cluster standard errors at the county level and thus allow for arbitrary auto-
correlation in the error terms within a county (Abadie, Athey, Imbens, and Wooldridge,
2020). I discuss rationales for alternative ways of clustering based on a recent liter-
ature on inference in Section 1.5.4, and show that results are robust.
1.4.2 Identification
Identification of the causal effect relies on parallel trends of dropout rates over
time. In the present context this means dropout rates have to evolve in a parallel
fashion across counties irrespective of their 2014 wage level. The coefficient of interest
is β2 which captures the causal effect of differential minimum wage bite on dropout
rates after 2015.12
Key to this argument is the fact that the minimum wage was set at a uniform
level of e 8.50 for all counties. This rules out concerns that the level of the minimum
wage was endogenous to an imaginary county i’s economic idiosyncrasies. Therefore,
the relationship between a county’s wage in 2014 and the minimum wage is plausibly
exogenous.
As described in Section 1.2, education policy in Germany is administered by
states. If states pursued different education policies around 2015 in ways systemati-
cally correlated with the average prevailing wage level in 2014, or economic conditions
more generally, β2 would not identify the causal effect of the minimum wage reform.
11 In Section 1.5.4, I also estimate specifications in which either the contemporaneous value of the
covariates, or their second lag, is included. The results are virtually unchanged.
12 When minimum wage bite is measured using quartiles, β2 is a coefficient vector of length
three. The three elements capture the effect of quantiles two, three and four relative to the first,
respectively.
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To address this concern, I include state by year fixed effects, αs,t, in the analysis.
This relaxes the parallel trends assumption in the sense that one only needs to as-
sume that counties within a state would have seen parallel developments in dropout
rates, regardless of their wage level in 2014 (Stephens Jr and Yang, 2014). Alterna-
tive specifications demonstrating robustness include state specific linear time trends,
or state by post-reform fixed effects. Counties have no power in setting education
policy which further establishes the credibility of the argument that education policy
is not set in response to wage levels.
Figure 1.3 assess the plausibility of trends in dropout rates being independent of
2014 wage levels. Counties are grouped into quartiles based on their 2014 Kaitz-ratio.
Dropout rates have steadily decreased from about eight percent in 2004 to about
five percent in 2012. This decrease is highly comparable across groups. From 2012
onwards dropout rates were initially stable and then started to climb in 2014. While
the first three quartiles demonstrate plausibly parallel trends in dropout rates, the
trend prior to the observation window differs in those counties where the minimum
wage bit hardest. Crucially, the development just prior to the reform is comparable.
The specification with quartile dummies implicity takes this into account; the results
point to an effect that is not driven by a comparison of the first and fourth quartile.
Appendix Figure 1.A.4 motivates controlling for differential time effects across
states. There are pronounced differences in the development of dropout rates over
time and space; compare for instance Bayern, Nordrhein-Westfalen and Schleswig-
Holstein. The former shows a clear downward trajectory while the latter two show
a less distinctive pattern.13
Another possible source of bias in this type of design stems from changes in
the population’s composition. Suppose that in counties where the minimum wage
binds the most, families selectively emigrate since they fear losing employment op-
portunities. Assuming a positive correlation between family income and emigration
opportunities as well as a positive correlation between family income and offspring’s
education, families whose members are unlikely to drop out of school are more likely
to emigrate. That would tend to decrease the denominator of dropout rates but
leave the numerator unchanged, thus increasing the dropout rate. In the analysis,
I control for lagged values of in- and out-migration (both, domestic and foreign) to
account for this possibility.
13 Some panels show incomplete time series figures. In some cases this is an artifact of incomplete
records in some years prior to the period of observation. In other cases, this is the result of using
state-level quartiles to split the data, which can result in unpopulated quartile cells.
28
Chapter 1 – Minimum Wages & Education












































Kaitz−ratio quartile in 2014
Least binding   2    3  Most binding
Figure 1.3: Trends in dropout rates by minimum wage bite. Notes. This figure shows
the average Kaitz-ratio across counties from 2003 to 2017. The sample observation period (2013-2018) is
shaded grey and the introduction of the minimum wage in 2015 is marked by a vertical line. Counties are
placed into quartiles depending on the value of the prevailing Kaitz-ratio in 2014. The counties where the
minimum wage was least binding are in the first quartile (i.e., bottom 25 percent, solid line with dots) while
the counties with the most binding minimum (i.e., top 25 percent) wage are displayed by the dashed line
with crosses. The left (right) panel shows the trend based on Kaitz-ratio constructed from gross earnings
(median income).
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Finally, the influx of asylum seekers whose educational status is difficult to es-
tablish may affect dropout rates. Teen asylum seekers may enter the school system,
thus increasing the denominator of the dropout rate and location patterns may cor-
relate with minimum wage bite. Appendix Figure 1.A.5 shows that immigration is
unlikely to confound the effect of the minimum wage reform on dropout rates. It
shows that a possible increase in counties’ population through migration does not
systematically correlate with the dropout rate. I do include the lagged number of
asylum seekers as a control variable in the analysis.
1.5 Empirical results
This section first reports the results from the preferred specifications. In the
next step, I present insights into the composition of the effect, and discuss margins
of heterogeneity. Robustness checks conclude the section.
1.5.1 Benchmark results
This section presents estimates of Equation (1.1) that differ in i) whether the
continuous measure or the quartile-based measure of minimum wage bite is used,
and ii) whether the implied hourly wage is constructed from counties’ average gross
earnings or median income.
Table 1.2 reports the main estimates. Columns 1 (4) to 3 (6) use wages implied
by gross earnings (median income). The coefficient of interest is the interaction
term reported in the second row of the table. The causal effect of the minimum
wage on dropout rates is positive and precisely estimated across all specifications.
Time-varying controls result in more precise estimates, and generally larger point
estimates. Point estimates are smaller in cases when wages implied by gross earn-
ings are used to construct Kaitz-ratios. Overall, time-varying covariates have little
explanatory power which is unsurprising in light of county fixed effects. The loss of
4 (12) observations in column 2 (3) stems from non-systemically missing information
on time-varying economic conditions in some years for different counties.
Column 3 is the preferred specification, implying a 2.8 percentage point increase
in the dropout rate for a one point difference in the Kaitz-ratio. Yet, there are no
two counties whose Kaitz-ratios are one point apart; in fact, the maximum distance
is 0.41 (0.40) when gross earnings (median income) is considered. These distances
imply a causal effect of 1.14 (1.17) percentage points of minimum wage bite on
dropout rates. This effect is roughly 20 percent of the average dropout rate in 2014.
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95 percent confidence intervals are reported in parentheses and these suggest that
more sizable effects cannot be ruled out. Moving from the 25th to the 75th percentile
of the Kaitz-ratio’s distribution results in a change of 0.11 (0.08); this implies an
effect equal to approximately 5.2 (4.1) percent of 2014 dropout rates. The estimate
in column 3 is statistically significant at one percent (p = 0.0070), while the estimate
in column 6 is significant at five percent (p = 0.018).
One may be concerned that the linear specification presented above is unable to
capture the nature of the causal effect of minimum wages on dropout rates. Figure 1.4
presents estimates that are based on grouping counties into quartiles based on their
2014 minimum wage bite. The first quartile corresponds to the 25 percent of counties
with the highest average implied wage in 2014. These counties are also the base
category, and all estimates ought to be interpreted relative to this group.
Figure 1.4 suggests that the effect size is proportional to counties’ bite quartiles.
The effect is driven in almost equal parts by counties in the third and fourth quartile;
since the minimum wage has less bite in counties of the first and second quartile,
the result is conform with economic intuition as a largely non-binding wage floor
is unlikely to affect education decisions. The effects in fourth are of comparable
magnitude to those in in third quartile. Due to small effective sample sizes within
quartiles, the estimates are more imprecise than those in Table 1.2. Therefore, one
cannot reject differences in estimates from the second through the fourth quartile.
Counties in the top 25 percent of bite had about 0.5 percentage points, or 10 percent
of the 2014 average, higher dropout rates than those in the bottom 25 percent due
to the introduction of the minimum wage policy. Appendix Table 1.A.3 reports the
all estimates on which Figure 1.4 is based.
This specification also serves to alleviate concerns that pre-trends in the outcome
are not necessarily parallel across groups, as depicted in Figure 1.3. The fact that
the effect of the third and fourth quartile is comparable implies that the average
effect is not exclusively driven by differences between the extreme quartiles.
Appendix Table 1.A.4 further reports estimates based on a simple median split of
counties based on their Kaitz-ratios. Counties above the median saw a roughly five
percent increase in the dropout rates compared to those below the median. These
estimates are precise and statistically significant at one or five percent.
In order to understand the effect of the minimum wage policy in greater detail it
is instructive to estimate year-specific effects akin to an event-study design. Figure
1.5 does precisely that and suggests that the effect is strongest in the immediate
aftermath of the minimum wage’s introduction. All estimates ought to be interpreted
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Dependent variable: dropout rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post 2015 −.0043 −.0022 −.0069 −.0014 .0004 −.0045
(.0071) (.0072) (.0068) (.0069) (.0069) (.0067)
Post 2015 x Kaitz ratio .0248 .0246 .0280 .0242 .0246 .0294
(.0109) (.0104) (.0100) (.0129) (.0123) (.0119)
Unemployment t-1 .0025 .0011 .0025 .0012
(.0013) (.0011) (.0013) (.0011)
Vacancies helper t-1 .0002 .0003 .0002 .0003
(.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001)
Vacancy skilled t-1 −.00003 .00001 −.00004 −0.000000
(.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0002)
Asylum seekers t-1 −.00002 −.00002 −.00002 −.00002
(.00003) (.00003) (.00003) (.00003)
In-migration t-1 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001
(.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001)
Out-migration t-1 −.0001 −.00005 −.0001 −.0001
(.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001)
Sector 1 t-1 .0010 .0013
(.0022) (.0022)
Sector 2 t-1 .00002 .00002
(.0003) (.0003)
Transfers t-1 .00001 .00001
(.000005) (.000005)
Social security t-1 .0028 .0027
(.0011) (.0011)
Gross local product t-1 −.0001 −.0001
(.0001) (.0001)
Wage implied by: Gross earnings Gross earnings Gross earnings Median income Median income Median income
Fixed effects County County County County County County
State X year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,394 2,390 2,382 2,394 2,390 2,382
Table 1.2: Minimum wage bite and dropout rates. Notes. This table reports estimates of the
minimum wage introduction on dropout rates. ”Post 2015” is an indicator for years 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2018. ”Post
2015 x Kaitz-ratio” is an interaction term of this indicator and the Kaitz-ratio at the county level. The Kaitz-ratio is
constructed from gross earnings (columns 1 through 3) or median income (columns 4 through 6). “Unemployment” is the
county unemployment rate (range 0 - 100). “Vacancies helper” is the share of county vacancies which are classified as being
routine and simple. “Asylum seekers” is the number of asylum seekers per 1000 county inhabitants. “Vacancy skilled” is
the share of vacancies which are classified as requiring special skills and abilities as well as profound training. “Sector 1”
and “Sector 2” are the shares of employees in agriculture, forestry and fishing as well as manufacturing. Note that only
employees in whose name social security contributions are made are counted (ger: sozialversicherungspflichtig). “Transfers”
are the total payments made from the state to the county in e 1000. “Social security” is the share of the population below
65 that is eligible for social security payments (ger: bedürftig nach SGB-2, colloquially called Hartz-IV). Finally, “Gross local
product” is the value of all goods and services produced in a county divided by the total number of inhabitants [in e 1000].
Each specification includes county and state-by-year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the county level are reported
in parentheses.
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● Gross earnings, no controls
Gross earnings, with controls
Median income, no controls
Median income, with controls
Figure 1.4: Quartile effects of minimum wage bite. Notes. This figure plots estimates from a
specification similar to Equation (1.1) where counties are placed into quartiles of minimum wage bite. The
figure thus plots the interaction term of the post-2015 period and the quartile indicators. The full estimation
is reproduced in Table 1.A.3. The 25 percent of counties with the highest average implied wages in 2014
make up the first quartile and are also the base category.
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relative to the year 2013.
There is a pronounced increase in 2015 and 2016—relative to 2013 levels—which
is also statistically significant at the five percent level across all specifications. The
point estimates for 2017 suggest that the effect persisted throughout that year, yet
the widening of the confidence intervals foreshadows the effect disappearing. By
2018, the effect is essentially zero albeit with wide confidence intervals.
The minimum wage was raised to e8.84 (a raise of four percent) but this marginal
increase is unlikely to have strong effects on education. The increase was much less
publicized than the initial reform. The effect starts to disappear in 2017 which is
consistent with decreasing salience of the minimum wage. In contrast, the cohorts
that were to graduate in 2015 and 2016 were much more aware of the minimum wage.
Moreover, the minimum wage did destroy around 200,000 marginal jobs (Caliendo,
Fedorets, Preuss, Schröder, and Wittbrodt, 2018); this effect may have become vis-
ible and changed individuals’ decision environment.
Figure 1.5 is also informative about anticipation effects. Recall that students
cannot immediately start working when dropping out of Hauptschule, and that the
minimum wage does not apply to apprentices. If individuals knew that a minimum
wage would apply once they are eligible for regular employment, they could have
adjusted their schooling decision ahead of time. The law was passed by parliament
in July 2014 but was agreed upon in the coalition treaty for the 2013-2017 adminis-
tration in November 2013. Therefore, students could have anticipated its inception
and decreased schooling investment in 2014. Figure 1.5 disputes that notion as there
is no discernible difference between 2014 and 2013. Thus, anticipation effects do not
play a role in understanding the minimum wage’s side effects.
1.5.2 Composition of effects
This section discusses the composition of the effect along two dimensions of
interest. First, I consider how the reform affected graduation rates for the high
school system’s other tiers. Second, I show that the effects appear to be driven
predominantly by male students.
High school tiers
Section 1.2 describes that Germany’s high school system can be grouped into
three tiers. If a student fails to complete at least the lowest tier, she is considered a
dropout. This is a “zero-sum” calculation in the sense that if somebody drops out,
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● Gross earnings, no controls
Gross earnings, with controls
Median income, no controls
Median income, with controls
Figure 1.5: Year-by-year effects of the minimum wage on dropout rates. Notes. This
figure plots estimates from a specification in which the post-2015 indicator in Equation (1.1) is replaced
with with dummies for each year. These year dummies are then interacted with the continuous measure of
minimum wage bite. 2013 is omitted and serves as the base category. Specification “with controls” (triangles
and crosses) include the full set of covariates as in columns 3 and 6 of Table 1.2.
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she cannot complete another tier in the same year. Therefore, a natural hypothesis
would be that the increase in the dropout ratio coincides with a comparable drop in
the graduation rates in Hauptschule, the lowest tier.
Table 1.3 investigates the effect on graduation rates for other school types. The
estimates are broadly consistent with this notion and suggest that the increase in
dropouts approximately corresponds to the decrease in graduation rates in the lowest
high school tier. There appear to be further compositional changes in higher tiers of
the school system but these effects are imprecisely estimated. This is unsurprising
as one would not expect a policy introducing a wage floor to affect graduation rates
for schools that typically channel into jobs paying significantly more than said wage
floor.
Dependent variable: completion rate
Hauptschule Mittlere Reife Abitur
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post 2015 −.0216 −.0154 .0315 .0181 .0268 .0303
(.0119) (.0122) (.0163) (.0167) (.0148) (.0156)
Post 2015 x Kaitz ratio −.0175 −.0337 −.0483 −.0322 .0235 .0216
(.0159) (.0191) (.0237) (.0299) (.0186) (.0243)
Wage implied by: Gross earnings Median income Gross earnings Median income Gross earnings Median income
Time-varying controls Extended Extended Extended Extended Extended Extended
Fixed effects County County County County County County
State X year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,382 2,382 2,382 2,382 2,370 2,370
Table 1.3: Minimum wage bite and completion rates by school types. Notes. This
table reports estimates of the minimum wage introduction on completion rates by school type. Completion
rates are calculated from the bottom-tier school type (Hauptschule, columns 1 and 2), middle-tier school
type (Realschule, columns 3 and 4) and top-tier school degree (Abitur, columns 5 and 6). “Post 2015”
is an indicator for years 2015, 2016 and 2017. “Post 2015 x Kaitz-ratio” is an interaction term of this
indicator and the Kaitz-ratio at the county level. The specifications are analogous to Equation (1.1) and
the “extended” set of controls refers to the full set of covariates as in columns 3 and 6 of Table 1.2. The
Kaitz-ratio is constructed from gross earnings (columns 1,3 and 5) or median income (columns 2,4 and 6).
Each specification includes county and state-by-year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the county
level are reported in parentheses.
Differential effects by gender
Appendix Table 1.A.5 assesses whether there are any empirical differences in
the effect of the minimum wage on dropout rates by gender. Regardless of the
specification, the effect on male dropout rates is about twice as large as the effect
on female dropout rates. Despite imprecisely estimated coefficients preventing a
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definite statement, the results suggest that the effect is predominantly driven by
male students. There is a sizable effect for male students, about 1.2 times the
average effect from Table 1.2. On the other hand, we cannot reject that there is
no effect at all on women. Appendix Table 1.A.6 confirms this notion using the
quartile-based measure of minimum wage bite.
This heterogeneity can be rationalized by evaluating the composition of the pool
of individuals whose productivity is below e8.50, and who therefore have an incentive
to drop out of school. There is reason to believe that there are more men than women
in this pool; that is, relative to overall enrollment, more young men should be located
at the lower end of the productivity distribution. The literature provides at least two
reasons for why this is likely to be the case. First, young females tend to have higher
non-cognitive ability (Becker, Hubbard, and Murphy, 2010; Fortin, Oreopoulos, and
Phipps, 2015). Second, Bertrand and Pan (2013) state that young females tend to
have higher educational aspirations than males of comparable age.
1.5.3 Regional variation
This section addresses two margins of effect heterogeneity. First, are there mea-
surable differences for counties located in the former GDR? Second, do the effects
differ between urban and rural counties?
West vs East Germany
Recall the discussion from the introduction about persistent socio-economic dif-
ferences between West and East Germany; these former states tend to have higher
wages and incomes even today. Those states that used to form the GDR also tend
to have higher levels of unemployment, and Figure 1.1(a) shows higher levels of
minimum wage bite in East Germany.
In order to assess whether there is heterogeneity in the way the minimum wage
reform affected dropout rates between West and East Germany, I estimate Equa-
tion (1.1) and introduce an interaction effect for counties in East Germany. East
Germany is geographically smaller, and is comprised of 76 counties. In this type
of specification, the interaction term of the Kaitz-ratio with the post-2015 indica-
tor measures the effect for counties in West Germany; the additional interaction
with East Germany measures the difference in the effects between West and East
Germany. Results from the linear-in-Kaitz-ratio specification are displayed in Ta-
ble 1.4(a) and show that the point estimates for East Germany do not differ from
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those for West Germany. The triple interaction term for East Germany is estimated
to be close to zero. The effect for West Germany matches the average effect from
Table 1.2. This suggests that there is no systematically countervailing effect in East
Germany.
Rural vs urban areas.
Policymakers have been concerned about a rural exodus and asymmetric devel-
opment of rural and urban areas (Bauer, Rulff, and Tamminga, 2019). A larger
effect on dropout rates in rural counties could contribute to a widening of the gap
in economic performance between urban and rural counties. The INKAR database
classifies counties along the urban-rural spectrum and there are 196 urban and 203
rural counties in Germany.
First, in the previous paragraph’s spirit, I test for heterogeneous effects by in-
teracting minimum wage bite in Equation (1.1) with an indicator for rural counties.
Table 1.4(b) presents the results; there is no discernible additional effect of the min-
imum wage introduction on dropout rates in rural counties. The effect for urban
counties is comparable to the effect from Table 1.2, while the interaction effect is
close to zero and imprecisely estimated. Thus, the results indicate that the effect is
at play in a similar fashion in rural and urban areas. Appendix Table 1.A.7 evaluates
heterogeneous effect on gender-specific dropout rates. The patterns are consistent
with results above; the effect is stronger for male students but, there is no additional
effect on males in rural areas.
1.5.4 Robustness of results
The results presented in previous sections are robust to alternative specifications.
The following paragraphs will discuss alternatives, as well as their relative merits
compared to the benchmark model.
Alternative specification of time trends
The results in Table 1.2 include state by year fixed effects which serve to ab-
sorb state-specific shocks on a year to year basis. Time trends on the other hand
more efficiently account for underlying trends. As Figure 1.3 suggest, dropout rates
have generally started to climb in 2013. Not all states follow a comparable upward
trajectory—see Appendix Figure 1.A.4—and this modeling choice allows trends to
differ across states.
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Dependent variable: dropout rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post 2015 −.0046 −.0018 −.0065 −.0040 −.0015 −.0064
(.0075) (.0076) (.0072) (.0082) (.0082) (.0078)
Post 2015 X East Germany .0139 .0088 .0149 .0198 .0186 .0245
(.0217) (.0222) (.0214) (.0166) (.0166) (.0156)
Post 2015 x Kaitz ratio .0254 .0240 .0274 .0296 .0283 .0331
(.0117) (.0111) (.0105) (.0159) (.0150) (.0143)
Post 2015 x Kaitz ratio x East Germany −.0060 .0060 .0064 −.0199 −.0136 −.0136
(.0327) (.0337) (.0331) (.0267) (.0265) (.0253)
Wage implied by: Gross earnings Gross earnings Gross earnings Median income Median income Median income
Time-varying control: None Basic Extended None Basic Extended
Fixed effects County County County County County County
State X year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,394 2,390 2,382 2,394 2,390 2,382
(a) West vs East
Dependent variable: dropout rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post 2015 −.0043 −.0012 −.0054 −.0029 −.0012 −.0055
(.0071) (.0084) (.0080) (.0087) (.0087) (.0084)
Post 2015 X rural −.0046 −.0055 .0045 .0031 .0022
(.0095) (.0092) (.0081) (.0080) (.0076)
Post 2015 x Kaitz ratio .0248 .0228 .0251 .0272 .0283 .0316
(.0109) (.0139) (.0135) (.0180) (.0174) (.0170)
Post 2015 x Kaitz ratio x rural .0076 .0095 −.0089 −.0067 −.0046
(.0173) (.0168) (.0173) (.0171) (.0162)
Wage implied by: Gross earnings Gross earnings Gross earnings Median income Median income Median income
Time-varying controls None Basic Extended None Basic Extended
Fixed effects County County County County County County
State X year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,394 2,390 2,382 2,394 2,390 2,382
(b) Rural vs urban
Table 1.4: Geographical variation in the minimum wage’s effects. Notes. This table
reports geographical variation in the effect of minimum wage bite on dropout rates. In panel (a), the effect
is broken by West vs East Germany. Panel (b) analyzes the effect in rural vs urban counties. ”Rural” is a
dummy variable equal to 1 if the county is classified as rural, and 0 if it classified as urban. “x” denotes
interactions of variables. The specifications are analogous to Table 1.2. Specifications in columns 1 and
4 do not contain any controls: specifications in columns 2,3,5 and 6 mimic the specifications in the same
columns of Table 1.2. Refer to the table notes of Table 1.2 for definitions of the variables. Each specification
includes county and state-by-year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the county level are reported in
parentheses.
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The results in Appendix Tables 1.B.1 and 1.B.2 present results when state-specific
linear time trends are included. The results are slightly smaller in magnitude but
equally precisely estimated. The estimates for the quartile-based treatment measure
suggests an effect of 0.4 percentage points (preferred specification: 0.5).
Yet another way of absorbing variation over time is to include state-by-post-
reform fixed effects; that is, fixed effects that control for differential conditions in
each states after 2015 as compared to before. This specification would control for
a situation in which states chose to systematically pursue different education policy
after the minimum wage introduction. If they did not adapt this policy on a year-
to-year basis, this specification is more powerful than the more flexible state-by-year
fixed effect. Results are presented in Appendix Tables 1.B.3 and 1.B.4 and are larger
in magnitude than the effects in Table 1.2.
Using different years for covariates
The school year for those who are supposed to graduate finishes between late
April and June. Thus, contemporaneous levels of time-varying controls also consti-
tute a measure of prevailing economic conditions at the time when students make
their schooling decisions. Alternatively, one may argue that the decision environ-
ment students observe is the product of past economic conditions. The second lag of
time-varying covariates may be better able to capture this than the first lag. When
using contemporaneous covariates, I cannot use the year 2018 as most time-varying
control variables are not observed through 2018.
Appendix Tables 1.B.5 and 1.B.6 present results with contemporaneous covari-
ates. Effects are stronger in magnitude which is unsurprising as Figure 1.5 indicates
that the effect starts to disappear in 2018, which is the year not included when using
contemporaneous covariates. Further, Appendix Tables 1.B.7 and 1.B.8 condition
on the second lag of time-varying covariates. The magnitude becomes visibly smaller
and the estimates are less precise. Signs still point in the same direction and the
effects along the quartiles are as expected.
Alternative way of clustering
Recall that this study utilizes data on all counties in Germany. To the ex-
tent that Germany is the population of interest, it is unclear what underlying sam-
pling mechanism may have resulted in a dataset with German counties and realized
dropout rates. Thus, rather than associating the estimates above with sampling
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uncertainty, one could view this analysis as a finite population analysis. Manski and
Pepper (2018) describe this issue in more detail when they discuss their choice to
not conduct inference in a cross-state study in the US. Abadie, Athey, Imbens, and
Wooldridge (2020) provide an alternative framework that takes into account design-
based uncertainty. The parameter of interest— the causal effect of the minimum
wage introduction—is defined in terms of unobserved outcomes; dropout rates un-
der alternative 2014 wage levels. Using the insights in Abadie, Athey, Imbens, and
Wooldridge (2020), the correct way to conduct inference in this application is cluster
standard errors at the county level as treatment is assigned at the county level. All
results presented thus far follow this suggestion.
However, an alternative strand of literature argues that the choice of clustering
unit should be guided by beliefs about intra-cluster correlations of covariates and
errors. Cameron and Miller (2015) recommend being conservative and use more
aggregate clusters, and state that ignoring within-state cross-county correlation of
the regressors and the errors could result in biased standard errors. It is conceivable
that both, dropout rates and economic conditions, correlate within states, and that
this correlations spans years.
Therefore, following the advise in Cameron and Miller (2015) I provide estimates
where inference is based on alternative ways of clustering. I consider four additional
cases: first, one-way clustering using state-by-year cells. Second, two-way clustering
across states and years. The justification for the latter would be an argument that
economic conditions and education outcomes correlate within any given year across
all counties and, at the same time, across time within any given state. Further, I
provide estimates based on two-way clustering at the county and year level. Finally,
the most conservative specification clusters at the state level. Clustering across
states (eleven) and years (six) profoundly reduces the number of clusters which in
turn may lead to inconsistent estimation of standard errors.
Appendix Figure 1.B.1 presents the results from those four alternative cluster
specifications. Unsurprisingly, standard errors are larger when clustering at more
aggregate levels. Results based on gross income remain statistically significant at
five percent across all specifications. In the most conservative specification – one-way
clustering at the state level – the 95 percent confidence interval for the point estimate
based on gross income (median earnings) is [0.0065, 0.050] ([−0.0001, 0.060]). These
results corroborate the findings of an economically meaningful effect of the minimum
wage introduction on dropout rates.
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1.6 Randomization inference
Exposition
Randomization inference, sometimes referred to as permutation inference, is a
tool to simulate the distribution of a test statistic under a designated null hypothesis
(Fisher, 1935). It has recently received increasing attention in Economics, especially
in the evaluation of randomized experiments (Heß, 2017). Young (2019) re-analyzes a
number of experimental studies and provides a perspective on seemingly statistically
significant results through the lens of randomization inference. The procedure is
also applicable to non-experimental settings and allows the researcher to calculate
an exact p-value of a sharp null hypothesis.
For the ease of exposition, suppose treatment is binary and a county is treated if
its Kaitz-ratio is higher than the median Kaitz-ratio in 2014. Appendix Table 1.A.4
shows that the effect of being above the median is about 0.3 percentage points—6
percent of 2014 averages. Randomization inference tests a sharp null hypothesis; for
instance, no individual treatment effect. If, under the null hypothesis no individual
effect is assumed, one can impute the missing outcome for each unit. That is, under
H0, yi(di = 0) = yi(di = 1), where yi is the outcome of county i under treatment
di ∈ 0, 1. By means of this equality, one could take any two counties, and “flip”
their treatment assignment which would have no effect on observed outcomes. The
logic generalizes to a continuous measure of treatment.
Thus, randomization inference starts with generating a large number of possible
permutations of the treatment vector and calculating the respectively implied effects.
The distribution of resulting treatment effects is referred to as the randomization
distribution.14 It approximates the universe of possible effect magnitudes that could
have resulted by chance despite there being a zero individual effect. Finally, by
comparing the randomization distribution to the observed treatment effect, one can
calculate an exact p-value for a two-sided hypothesis using the ratio of the number
of more extreme test statistics to the number of permutations.
14 In this application, I am calculating the treatment effect—that is, the point estimate in a model
such as Equation (1.1)—across all treatment permutations. The procedure also lends itself to a
different choice of test statistics, such as the t-statistic for instance or the inter-quartile range.
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Results
In order to conduct randomization inference in this context, one needs to generate
permutations of counties and their minimum wage bite in 2014. Note that, all
observations of a county take on the same treatment value. Thus, in an experimental
setting this would correspond to a clustered design in which counties are randomly
drawn, and all observations in a cluster are assigned the same treatment value.
The following results are based on the following procedure. I create 999 bootstrap
samples (i.e., drawn with replacement) of counties in 2014 and their treatment value.
Treatment is either given by an above-median indicator, or the continuous value of
the Kaitz-ratio. In each of these 999 samples, I obtain an estimate β̂2 using Equation
(1.1). Finally, I plot a histogram of the implied randomization distribution and mark
the value of the actually observed treatment effect.
Appendix Figure 1.A.6 plots the randomization distributions of four “treatment
effects”. First, I consider the benchmark models in which treatment is a county’s
Kaitz-ratio in 2014 as implied by either, gross income or median earnings. Second,
treatment is based on a median split on those quantities. The vertical, dashed lines
indicate the actually observed effect in each of those four scenarios.
The randomization distributions of the effect of the minimum wage introduction
on dropout rates are such that I can reject the null hypothesis of no individual effect
in all four cases. Read clockwise, the p-values of the specifications in Figure 1.A.6 are
0 (top left), 0 (top right), 0.002 (bottom left) and 0.001 (bottom right). I interpret
this as corroborating evidence that the minimum wage reform did in fact have an
effect on high school dropout rates.
1.7 Conclusion
This paper presents evidence that the German federal minimum wage of 2015
causally increased dropout rates among high school students. The minimum wage
reform resulted in 0.085 percentage points, or roughly 5 percent of 2014 levels, more
dropouts in the county at the 75th percentile compared to the county at 25th per-
centile of minimum wage bite. I decompose the effect along margins of interest to
policymakers and show that the effect is stronger for male than for female students.
A number of robustness checks corroborate this result, and permutation tests lend
further credibility to the causal link.
This result may be the consequence of individuals with low productivity reduc-
ing their investment into education. Specifically, if individuals expect that further
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investment is unlikely to raise their productivity above the level of the minimum
wage, abstaining from further education may make sense. The fact that the mini-
mum wage does not immediately cover minors who drop out of school should “stack
the deck” against finding such an effect. Thus, the estimates can be interpreted
as a conservative lower bound for the relationship between minimum wages and
education.
The present paper extends the literature on minimum wage effects in three di-
rections. First, it adds to the literature on human capital effects of minimum wage
legislation by using a measure of schooling that is free of labor-force participation
concerns. Second, it extends existing evidence beyond the Anglo-Saxon environ-
ment. Third, the identification structure improves on existing work by exploiting
finely grained variation in minimum wage within geographical entities, states, where
individuals are subject to the same education policy.
Nonetheless, my findings are not free of limitations. While existing work on
this subject has noted that the Kaitz-ratio correlates well with other measures of
minimum wage bite, its appropriateness to measure minimum wage bite rests on
specific distributional assumptions.
Two theoretical mechanisms may be at play in generating a link between min-
imum wages and education; the opportunity cost of education is affected, but also
jobs at the lower end of the productivity distribution are likely to be destroyed. My
study identifies the composite of these two effects. A structural treatment of this
link may be helpful in separately quantifying these mechanisms. This constitutes a
fruitful avenue for further research.
This research is potentially important for policymakers. Minimum wages are an
increasingly popular tool of labor policy, and increasingly so in developing countries.
Introducing or profoundly increasing a minimum wage may result in individuals
decreasing their human capital investment. Policymakers ought to be aware of this
possibly unanticipated side effect. Individuals who do alter their human capital
investment in response to minimum wages risk falling behind in a labor market




2. Charitable Donations to Natural Disasters
Evidence from an Online Platform1
Abstract
We investigate how demand for and supply of charitable donations on a large
online platform respond to natural disasters. We find that donations are concen-
trated in a small fraction of the 1,720 disasters in our 5-year period of observation.
These tend to be severe disasters that receive media coverage. Event study estimates
indicate that the pattern of disaster donations is consistent with donor fatigue over
time and across disasters, but is inconsistent with crowding out of other charitable
causes. Instrumental variable estimates suggest that charities could raise additional
donations on the platform for disaster relief, had they fundraised for them.
1 This chapter is based on joint work with Rajshri Jayaraman (University of Toronto, Canada, and
European School of Management and Technology (ESMT) Berlin) and Marrit Teirlinck (Humboldt
University and ESMT Berlin).
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2.1 Introduction
Major natural disasters tend to attract generous charitable donations, while a
large number of smaller-scale disasters go effectively unfunded. For example Ty-
phoon Haiyan, which struck the Philippines in November, 2013 killing over 7,000
people, received extensive media coverage and raised $33 million from U.S. donors
within the space of two weeks, on top of the $37 million pledged by the White House
(Hicken, 2013; The White House, 2013). Incredibly, Haiyan was already the twenty-
third major storm or typhoon to hit the Philippines that year.2 None was as deadly
as Haiyan but put together, storms that battered the Philippines and other South
East Asian countries in 2013 wrought considerable devastation. So too did floods
that hit East African countries that year. Yet, these smaller natural disaster events
barely registered on private donors’ radars.3
This has real consequences for the alleviation of human suffering in the aftermath
of natural disasters. Charities, who are major players in relief activities for disasters
of all shapes and sizes, get 90% of their funding for these activities through charitable
donations from private individuals (Stirk, 2014). Understanding which disasters are
successful at raising donations and why some disasters may be unsuccessful in doing
so is important in this context. When a natural disaster fails to attract donations,
“donor fatigue” is often blamed. This refers to the casual observation that after a
major disaster, which initially elicits generous charitable contributions, donations
tend to dry up. Donors “tire” of giving.
In this paper, we ask three questions. First, which natural disasters tend to
receive charitable donations? Second, is the pattern of donations consistent with
donor fatigue? Third, how much funding could charities have raised for disasters,
had they solicited donations? We begin with a descriptive exercise, which asks which
types of natural disasters are successful in attracting donations, by examining the
correlates of disaster relief fundraising and donations.
Then, using an event study design, we investigate whether the pattern of do-
2 Storms and typhoons in the country are named alphabetically and Haiyan’s official name was
“Yolanda”. The Guardian Newspaper quipped, “In 2013, the Philippines had so many typhoons
that it ran out of letters to name them.” (The Guardian, 2015).
3 In South East Asia, our data for 2013 reports 1,177 casualties from natural disasters, excluding
Typhoon Haiyan. Cumulatively, these events are recorded to have affected nearly 900,000 individuals
in that year. In East Africa, floods alone are reported to have affected nearly 1,400,000 individuals,
and killed 323. In India and China, natural disasters (not including the June 2013 North Indian
floods, which received widespread media coverage) inflicted 2,460 casualties and affected 43,753,779
individuals.
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nations is consistent with donor fatigue. We look at three dimensions commonly
alluded to in the popular press as culprits for why disasters fail to attract dona-
tions. The first is what we call temporal fatigue: after an initial surge in generosity
following disaster onset, donations to the disaster tend to dry up. For example,
following Typhoon Haiyan Time Magazine reported, “While the international com-
munity came together for an unprecedented mobilization of relief, [temporal] donor
fatigue has now set in” (Time Magazine, 2014).
The second manifestation of donor fatigue is crowding out : a surge in donations
for disaster relief is thought to crowd out donations to other charitable projects
because people have limits to how much they want to, or can, give. For example,
The New York Times reported that “After Hurricane Katrina, Congress was so
concerned that donations for hurricane relief efforts would cut into other charitable
giving that it passed one of the biggest temporary tax breaks in history” (New York
Times, 2006). Anticipation of crowding out, which would compromise their ability
to successfully fundraise for other, non-disaster-related, projects, may make charities
reluctant to fundraise for disaster relief.
The third category of donor fatigue is commonly called disaster fatigue: after a
major disaster that received generous donations, subsequent disasters that arrive in
close proximity to the major disaster may fail to attract donations. For example,
in 2017, this variant of donor fatigue was blamed for the fact that The American
Red Cross raised less than one tenth of what it raised after Hurricane Harvey for
Hurricane Maria, which hit Puerto Rico only one month later (Penta, 2017).
In the final step of the analysis we ask how much more charities could have raised
for disaster relief by more actively engaging in fundraising, while conservatively
accounting for donor fatigue. In this step, we use an instrumental variables (IV)
approach to estimate the causal effect of fundraising on disaster relief.
The setting we explore is Betterplace.org, which is by far the largest platform for
online fundraising and giving in Germany.4 It is a rich and active digital ecosystem
wherein charities demand donations by posting fundraising pages for a wide range
of charitable projects, and individuals supply donations to these projects. During
our observation period, from 2013-2017, the platform hosted fundraising pages for
nearly 20,000 projects, posted by 13,000 charities of all sizes, and to which 600,000
individuals made almost 700,000 donations totaling e35 million. We match these
4 In Germany, there are no real competitors to Betterplace. Comparable platforms that collect
funds for charities are for example GlobalGiving.org and charity.gofundme.com, both of which are
U.S.-based.
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real-time administrative data to a census of 1,720 natural disaster events. This
allows us to assign each time-stamped project fundraising page and donation to a
unique natural disaster or a non-disaster-related cause.
There are three main advantages to this setting. First, it allows us to investigate
both the demand and supply of donations to natural disasters. For each of the 1,720
natural disasters that occurred over our observation period, we are able to track
whether a fundraising page for a disaster relief project was posted by a charity on
Betterplace; this captures donation demand for disaster relief, and in what follows we
often refer to donation demand as “fundraising” or “project entry”. We are also able
to track individual donations to each project. This measures donation supply, which
we often refer to as “donations” or “disaster relief”. Supplementing these admin-
istrative and disaster census data with additional disaster characteristics, including
media coverage, enables us to examine the correlates of disaster relief donations.
Second, we know whether charitable projects and the donations they attract are
devoted to disaster relief or non-disaster-related charitable causes. This allows us
to examine crowding out. Finally, time stamps combined with high-frequency data
permit the use of an event study design that exploits the plausibly exogenous onset
of disaster events to investigate causal donation responses. This allows us to explore
whether time series patterns in donations are consistent with donor fatigue.
The questions of whether, and which, disasters attract donations, and whether
disaster relief funding may be subject to donor fatigue are important. Natural disas-
ters, which affect tens of millions each year, are chronically underfunded. In 2019, for
example, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA)
reported a 44% funding shortfall—the gap between estimated need and provision of
funding—in humanitarian disaster relief efforts (United Nations, 2018, p.8). Chari-
table donations from private individuals play an important role in filling this gap. Of
the $27.3 billion in international humanitarian assistance in 2016, about a quarter
($6.5 billion) came from private donors, the majority of whom are private indi-
viduals. Moreover, private donations are growing at a faster rate than those from
government sources. Whereas humanitarian assistance from government sources saw
only a modest increase of 1.5% from 2016 to 2017, contributions from private donors
increased by an impressive 8.3% (Development Initiatives, 2018). Online giving is
especially important in this context, since it is growing at a much faster rate than
overall giving. In the U.S., for example, overall giving grew by 9% between 2016
and 2018 whereas online giving grew at almost twice this rate (Backbaud Institute,
2018).
49
Chapter 2 – Charitable Giving & Natural Disasters
Against this backdrop, online platforms such as Betterplace present a real oppor-
tunity to raise money for disaster relief from private individuals. On the donation
demand side, they provide a relatively inexpensive way for charities to fundraise for
their disaster-relief activities in a timely manner. The monetary cost of posting a
fundraising page for a charitable project on most online donation platforms is neg-
ligible, and the marginal cost of soliciting donations once a page has been posted is
effectively zero. This marks a striking departure from charities’ traditionally high
marginal costs of solicitation, including direct mailing, door-to-door fundraising, and
telemarketing (Andreoni and Payne, 2011; Name-Correa and Yildirim, 2013). On
the donation supply side, online platforms provide a relatively easy way for would-be
philanthropists to give to charities’ disaster relief projects. Giving remotely at the
time of one’s choosing from a computer or mobile device is likely to impose lower
transaction, psychic, and social costs compared to traditional modes of giving, such
as over the telephone, by mail or in person. Thus, at least in principle, online dona-
tion platforms provide an opportunity to channel private donations to disaster relief
by lowering the barriers to both fundraising and giving.
We find that online giving fails to cater to the bulk of natural disasters. Hetero-
geneity analysis, which follows the seminal contributions of Strömberg (2007) and
Eisensee and Strömberg (2007), indicates that disasters which see traction on the
platform tend to be the usual suspects, namely severe disasters which receive media
coverage. Concretely, 80% of disaster relief donations on the platform go to natural
disasters that account for only 20% of casualties. This is eerily reminiscent of the
so-called 80/20 Pareto rule that characterizes traditional product markets, where
the bulk of sales revenue (≈80%) is generated by a small proportion of products
(≈20%).5 It is surprising in view of the role online platforms such as eBay and
Amazon have played in catering to the remaining 80% of niche products—akin to
the smaller scale disasters in our context. The contrast between product market
platforms and this donation platform could not be starker: overall, we observe de-
mand and supply for only 4% of disasters on Betterplace. Interestingly, this outcome
is characterized by a paucity of demand. Although disaster relief projects that are
posted to the platform tend to be successful in raising donations, very few charities
fundraise for disaster relief on the platform.
5 This is sometimes referred to as the “long tail” phenomenon—a term popularized in the business
context by Anderson (2006), with reference to the ability of digital markets to cater to niche product
offerings in the “long tail of the product distribution”. See also Brynjolfsson, Hu, and Smith (2006)
and Brynjolfsson, Hu, and Simester (2011).
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Donation patterns are consistent with temporal and disaster fatigue, but not
with crowding out. More specifically, fundraising and donations kick into gear within
a week of disaster onset. The speed of the uptick underscores the low barriers to
fundraising and donating online. By the same token, both dissipate by the third week
after disaster onset. This pattern is consistent with temporal fatigue. Furthermore,
fundraising and donations are effectively absent for disasters that occur within a two-
month window of large disasters which have attracted massive funding; by contrast,
events that transpire outside this two-month window do receive donations. This is
consistent with disaster fatigue.
At the same time, disaster relief fundraising and donations do not appear to
crowd out other causes. The evidence suggests that any increase in the former
comes from successful additional fundraising rather than a substitution away from
other charitable causes.
In a final step of our analysis we provide a causally interpretable estimate for
how much more money could be raised on the platform if providers were to solicit
funding for more disasters. Endogeneity is an obvious concern when estimating how
the demand for donations affects the supply of donations.
We address this by using an IV strategy, instrumenting for demand using his-
torical charity presence in a country affected by the disaster. The rationale is that
historical charity presence plausibly reduces costs of initiating local disaster relief
operations, thus making it more likely for charities to engage in fundraising for these
activities (i.e. demand donations).
Our estimates suggest that, had they posted disaster-relief projects on the plat-
form, charities could have raised roughly e1,000 in additional funding for marginal
events. Although this sum is unlikely to make or break a disaster relief project, the
amount itself is non-trivial. The marginal cost of posting a new fundraising page
on Betterplace for the thousands of charities who are already active there is close to
zero. Yet, the amount they would raise for a project devoted to a marginal disaster is
almost two times the median amount (of e600) historically raised for disaster relief
projects posted on the platform. This indicates the presence of fundraising potential
on this platform for disaster relief, which remains untapped.
2.2 Related literature
This paper lies at the intersection of two distinct strands of literature: one on
disaster relief funding, and the other on charitable donations. We make two con-
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tributions to these literatures. The first is to understand how an online platform
for charitable donations is, and could be, used to fundraise for disaster relief. The
second is to provide systematic evidence regarding donor fatigue.
The literature on disaster relief funding has primarily focused on either overseas
development assistance (ODA) (Strömberg, 2007; Eisensee and Strömberg, 2007;
Fink and Redaelli, 2011; Becerra, Cavallo, and Noy, 2010; David, 2011), or remit-
tances (Mohapatra, Joseph, and Ratha, 2009; Yang, 2008). We add to this literature
by examining private donation responses to disaster events in the context of online
donation platforms, which have become an increasingly important vehicle for donat-
ing to charitable organizations.
More generally in terms of the charitable donations literature, millions of dol-
lars are spent every year on fundraising; see List (2011) and Andreoni and Payne
(2013) for excellent reviews. Andreoni and Payne (2011), for example, report that in
the U.S. the average fundraising-to-donation ratio is 12%, with the average charity
spending $100,000 per year on fundraising. Online fundraising has driven these costs
down dramatically. There are two main channels through which this opportunity
has been operationalized by charities. The first is through fundraising on their own
websites. Perhaps the most famous example of this is Wikimedia, which successfully
raises millions of dollars within the matter of weeks through fundraising banners
on Wikipedia.6 The second online fundraising channel is the use of advertisements
to solicit donations. For example, in a thoughtfully designed recent field experi-
ment, Adena and Hager (2020) find that video advertisements on Facebook were a
cost-effective way for the NGO Save the Children to fundraise.
Charities may not be able to avail themselves to either of these two online
fundraising channels for at least three reasons. First, successful Wikipedia-style
fundraising requires sufficient website visitor traffic and compelling web design, nei-
ther of which many (especially smaller) charities have. Second, online advertising
requires deeper pockets than most charities possess. Third, many charities have dif-
ficulty overcoming bureaucratic hurdles for collecting donations online, such as pro-
viding electronic payment options or tax receipts. These barriers can be overcome,
but this requires the kind of time and money that are in scarce supply, particularly
in the aftermath of a disaster.
6 See, for example, https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Fundraising/2018-19_Report. Chen,
Li, and MacKie-Mason (2005) provide a presciently early field experiment designed to evaluate the
efficacy of different online fundraising mechanisms on giving on the website of the Internet Public
Library.
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We contribute to the fundraising literature by exploring whether charities are
taking advantage of a third online fundraising channel—online donation platforms—
to overcome these barriers. In particular, online platforms exhibit high web traffic;
sleek design; a large number of online payment options; customizable “plug and
play” fundraising page templates that can be up and running in a matter of hours;
and charities can post projects on them at low marginal cost. In fact, Betterplace
offers this service, complete with charity customer support for setting up fundraising
pages, pro bono to almost all charities. While a number of studies have explored
the efficacy of particular fundraising strategies on online donation platforms more
generally (for example, Bøg, Harmgart, Huck, and Jeffers (2012) and Payne, Scharf,
Smith, et al. (2014) study the U.K.-based platform, justgiving.com; Altmann, Falk,
Heidhues, Jayaraman, and Teirlinck (2019) study Betterplace), we are aware of none
that has explored their broader role in catering to a wide range of disaster events
and charities.
In focussing on not just the supply but also the demand for donations (i.e.
fundraising), this paper also fills a gap in both the charitable donations and dis-
aster relief literatures. With respect to the former, List (2011) notes a paucity of
studies investigating the entry of charitable organizations in the market for charita-
ble giving. We shed some light on this by examining charities’ entry on this online
platform in the context of disaster relief. As for the latter, the literature on ODA
and remittances typically ignores the demand side of the funding equation, under
the entirely reasonable assumption that disaster relief funding will (or should) be
absorbed locally. This assumption is arguably less reasonable in our context where
supply is contingent on demand: donors can only give to a disaster event if a char-
ity posts a fundraising page soliciting funding for that event. Indeed, equilibrium
outcomes in this online platform seem to be characterized by relatively generous
donation responses conditional on charities asking for disaster relief funds, but very
little fundraising activity for disaster relief in the first place. This suggests that
anemic demand is part of the explanation for why so many disasters go unfunded.
This is, as far as we know, a novel insight in both the literature on disaster relief
funding and the literature on charitable giving.
Our analysis examines donor fatigue along three dimensions and in so doing,
brings together three separate strands of the charitable donations literature. The
first strand pertains to temporal fatigue. Brown and Minty (2008) use data from the
websites of six major charities to examine the effect of media coverage on charitable
giving after the 2004 tsunami in the Indian Ocean. Although peripheral to their
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analysis, they show that donations taper off over time. Scharf, Smith, and Wilhelm
(2017) document a similar pattern in the context of fundraising appeals for six major
disasters. We confirm the findings of these studies with respect to donation supply
for a substantially larger set of disasters and charities, and supplement them by
examining how demand-side fundraising efforts respond to disaster onset.
The second dimension of our donor fatigue analysis speaks to a large literature
in charitable donations on crowding out. A central question in this literature has
been whether successful fundraising efforts on the part of charitable organizations
raise new donations, or simply divert funds away from other causes. Although this
issue was conceptualized decades ago by Rose-Ackerman (1982), systematic empirical
evidence is scant (Andreoni and Payne, 2013).7 This is not altogether surprising.
Individuals and charities are likely to decide on portfolios of giving or fundraising
for different causes, and this makes it challenging to identify any potential crowding
out effect.
Natural disasters have proved handy in identifying potential crowding out, since
they are plausibly random events, which generate exogenous variation in both fundrais-
ing and giving. A handful of studies have exploited this feature of natural disasters
to investigate whether they crowd out donations to other causes. Brown, Harris, and
Taylor (2012) and Scharf, Smith, and Wilhelm (2017) use panel data to explore how
individual giving patterns to different causes change in the aftermath of (fundraising
efforts for) disaster events.8 Petrova, Perez-Truglia, Simonov, and Yildirim (2020)
investigate whether charitable donations to American Red Cross disaster relief efforts
crowd out political giving and vice versa.
Methodologically, our donor fatigue analysis is closest to the event-study strat-
egy employed in Petrova, Perez-Truglia, Simonov, and Yildirim (2020). Empirically,
we add to the crowding out literature by examining both the demand and supply of
donations, and broadening the scope of the analysis to the universe of non-disaster-
related fundraising efforts and donations on Betterplace. Conceptually, our paper
is distinct from this literature given our interest in understanding whether, consis-
tent with crowding out, successful disaster-related fundraising is countered by less
successful fundraising for other causes.
7 There is, by contrast, a large literature on whether government grants crowd out private do-
nations. See, for example, the contributions of Andreoni and co-authors in Andreoni and Payne
(2003), Andreoni and Payne (2011), and Andreoni, Payne, and Smith (2014).
8 A number of studies have examined individual correlates of disaster-related giving using survey
data; see the recent contribution of Devlin and Rowlands (2019) and the references cited therein.
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Third, there seems to be widespread consensus in both the popular press and
among humanitarian relief organizations that disaster fatigue is commonplace. This
claim tends to rest on anecdotal evidence that when a major disaster has attracted
generous donations, the next one gets precious little. We provide what the best of
our knowledge is the first systematic evidence exploring this phenomenon.
2.3 Data
We use two main data sources covering the five-year period from 2013-2017.
The first, EM-DAT, is an inventory of natural disasters and their characteristics.
The second, Betterplace, furnishes administrative records on charitable projects as
well as real-time individual records on the donations towards each of these projects.
Using project descriptions, project locations, as well as donation time stamps, each
donation can be broadly classified as going towards a natural disaster or “other”,
non-disaster-related, causes. We combine these data to create an event-level dataset,
which associates each natural disaster with its corresponding Betterplace fundraising
activity and donations.
To this dataset, we match a number of disaster- and country-level characteristics,
including media coverage, socio-economic environment and bilateral distance mea-
sures. These covariates, collected from multiple sources detailed at the end of this
section, allow us to investigate sources of heterogeneity in disaster relief donation
responses.
2.3.1 Natural disasters
Data on natural disasters is obtained from the Emergency Disaster Database
(EM-DAT) maintained by the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters
(CRED) at the Catholic University of Leuven (Guha-Sapir, 2018). Disaster events in
this database fulfill one or more of the following requirements: ten or more people are
reported killed; 100 or more people are reported affected, injured, and/or homeless;
a state of emergency has been declared; or there has been a call for international
assistance. A separate entry is made for each country affected by a disaster (e.g., if
a typhoon affects three countries, three entries are made recording the same event).
The three deadliest disasters during our observation period were the 2015 Nepal
earthquake, Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines (2013), and the Indian Flood of
2013. Each killed over 6,000 people and affected over half a million (see Appendix
Table 2.A.1). But they are just the tip of the iceberg. In total, the sample comprises
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1,720 disaster country-events (referred to as “events” hereafter). These stem from
1,439 unique disasters across 173 countries.
Table 2.1 provides summary statistics for our final cross-section of 1,720 disas-
ters.9 Over the five-year period of observation, these events reportedly killed over
eighty-six thousand and affected nearly one billion people. While the average dis-
aster across all years killed 50 people, it affected over half a million. The severity
of disasters varies considerably. Those at the 25th percentile inflict no casualties
and affect around a hundred people, while the most severe disasters kill thousands
and affect hundreds of millions (see Appendix Figure 2.A.1). We use the natural
logarithms to account for right skewed distributions (Smith, Ottoni-Wilhelm, and
Scharf, 2017).
# Casualties # Affected
(1) (2)
Total 86, 333 967, 185, 633
Mean 50 561, 990
Median 6 3, 600
p25 0 105
p75 21 42, 500
Max 8, 969 330, 000, 000
Table 2.1: Natural disaster severity: Casualties and number affected. Notes. This table
shows the number of casualties from and the number of people affected by natural disasters in the years
2013-2017. The table reports the total; mean; median; the 25th and 75th percentiles; and the maximum.
2.3.2 Donations: demand & supply
Data on the demand for and supply of charitable donations are obtained from
Betterplace, Germany’s largest online platform for charitable giving. Betterplace is a
fundraising platform on which charities post fundraising pages for charitable projects
to which individuals can donate. The only formal requirement for charities to post
project pages is that they are registered in Germany. Project pages themselves
are eclectic in terms of geography, funding request, and cause, including natural
disaster relief. Betterplace accounts for under 1% of overall private donations in
Germany, but in proportion to domestic giving it is more than 12 times as large as
9 Although EM-DAT also records an economic estimate of damage caused, we omit it from the
analysis as it suffers from severe measurement error and is plagued by missing values. This is
exemplified in the zeros in Appendix Table 2.A.1.
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Global Giving, the world’s largest online donations platform, based in the U.S.10 As
online giving has grown in popularity, so too has Betterplace, with total donations
increasing by 43% from 2013 to 2017. Betterplace also plays an outsized role in
disaster relief donations. For example, in the five weeks after Typhoon Haiyan,
Germans donated e13.7 to relief (SIR/dpa, 2013); donations on Betterplace totaled
e520,000 (4%). In sum, Betterplace provides us with a rich and diverse private
donations ecosystem, which allows us to study platform-based charitable giving.
Although not directly material to our analysis, it is worth noting that donors on
Betterplace are not representative of the overall donor population. In the interest of
data privacy, Betterplace does not track users’ personal data. However, a compari-
son of Betterplace’s (aggregated) Google analytics data to German Socio-Economic
Panel (G-SOEP) data indicates that donors on Betterplace tend to be dispropor-
tionately young and female—a pattern that is consistent with survey evidence on the
demographic profile of online donors in the U.K. (Just Giving, 2012). As such, the
donation patterns studied in this paper are more likely to pertain to digital natives
rather than the donor population at large.11
Crucially, administrative data from Betterplace capture both the demand for
donations (fundraising pages for projects posted by charities), and the supply of
donations (from individual donors). Both are illustrated in Figure 2.1. Panel (a)
presents a typical fundraising page posted on Betterplace, in this case, by a charity
engaged in disaster relief operations following the 2015 Nepal earthquake. It ex-
emplifies our data source for donation demand. Administrative data records each
project description (“About this project”) as well as when the project was posted;
by which charity; where it is located; and how much funding was requested. Vis-
itors who wish to donate to this project click on the “Donate now” button to be
redirected to the donation page depicted in Panel (b), which exemplifies our data
source for donation supply. Here again, Betterplace records how much was donated
and to which project in real time.
Roughly 80% of visitors to Betterplace land on a fundraising page like the one
10 In 2017, Global Giving raised $69.5 million, a year in which Americans gave $390 billion to
charity. In the same year, Betterplace.org raised e11.1 million, with Germans giving a total of e5.2
billion to charity.
11 There is, to the best of our knowledge, no representative survey of charitable giving in Germany.
We use Betterplace’s Google analytics web tracking data from June-October 2018 (which covers 51%
of Betterplace’s donors) with a question on donations administered to a representative sample of
Germans in the 2014-15 wave of the German Socio-Economic Panel (G-SOEP) data (see Appendix
Figure 2.A.2).
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(a) Project Page (b) Donation Page
Figure 2.1: Project fundraising & donation pages on Betterplace. Notes. Panel (a) shows
a project fundraising page posted by the charity “Love for Life”, to raise money for a disaster relief project
in Katmandu, Nepal, and neighboring regions, in the wake of the 2015 Nepal earthquake. Clicking on the
“Donate Now” button redirects project page visitors to the donation page on Panel (b), where “Amount” is
a free text field into which the donor can type the Euro amount they wish to donate. The bottom half of
the project page continues with the project description; the bottom half of the donation page requires the
donor to fill in personal information required to complete the donation. Both have been suppressed in these
screen shots.
in Figure 2.1(a). Most are directed there by charities soliciting funds from potential
donors, typically via a link embedded in an email. These charities all have multiple
fundraising methods, of which posting a fundraising page on Betterplace is only one.
As such, for most if not all of these charities, successful fundraising efforts on the
platform raise additional revenue with which to finance projects.
In order to understand how donations respond to natural disasters, we need
to be able to classify each fundraising project and each donation as being either
disaster- or non-disaster related. We accomplish this by matching each project, and
by extension each donation, on Betterplace to a particular disaster event using double
entry with reconciliation. We proceed in four steps detailed in Appendix Section 4.6
and summarized here. First, each project record (comprising a description, location,
and dates) is manually read by two separate individuals. On the basis of this reading,
each project is classified as either disaster relief or “other”. Second, for projects
classified as disaster relief, information from the project description on the disaster
location, the type of disaster, and (if applicable) the disaster name is recorded.
Third, any discrepancies in the double-entries for each project are reconciled by a
third person. Finally, disaster relief projects are matched to entries in the EM-
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DAT database, based on the recorded disaster characteristics, and time and location
stamps. At the end of this exercise, we are able to match each project and donation
record from Betterplace to a unique disaster event from EM-DAT, or a non-disaster-
related cause.
Table 2.2 presents summary statistics for the entire observation period on charita-
ble projects’ demand for donations in Panel (a), and individuals’ supply of donations
in Panel (b), disaggregated by disaster- (column 1) and other, non-disaster-related,
causes (column 2). Appendix Table 2.A.2 provides a breakdown across years. On the
demand side, the platform witnessed the entry of 19,488 fundraising pages, through
which 12,986 different charitable organizations requested on average e6,361. The
large number of charitable organizations reflects the fact that, in addition to hosting
household names such as Doctors without Borders and CARE, Betterplace also hosts
thousands of smaller charitable organizations that might otherwise lack visibility, but
have strong roots in local communities on the ground.12
Disaster relief fundraising accounted for just under 3% (543) of projects on the
platform. Roughly 77% of these projects received some funding, and about 50%
met their funding goals. Despite the fact that they requested only half as much
as disaster relief projects on average (roughly e6,000 vs. e12,000), non-disaster-
related projects had less success in fundraising: 73% of them received any funding
and 43% met their funding targets. There is pronounced skewness in fundraising
requests as the median request for disaster relief projects is e4000, only about a
third of the mean. The median disaster relief project raised about e600, double
what projects for other causes raised. Note that since fundraising requests can be
adjusted dynamically by charities, and a project receives all donations given to it
regardless of whether the fundraising request has been met, we do not use this
variable in our subsequent analysis.
On the supply side, Panel (b), roughly 681,000 unique donations from 590,000
individual donors, totaling e35.2 million were given to projects on Betterplace. Of
this total, just over e2.5 million (7%) went towards disaster relief. This came from
a disproportionately large number of donations and donors, giving smaller amounts.
More specifically, 17% of donations and 19% of donors contributed to disaster relief,
with an average donation of e22, which is less than half the average donation to
12 In fact, catering to the “long tail of charity” is Betterplace’s raison d’être. See https:
//www.betterplace.org/c/about-us/history. The charitable organizations on Betterplace are
overwhelmingly NGOs, although organizations like the ICRC and the U.N. also regularly post
fundraising pages on the platform.
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Disaster relief Other Total
(1) (2) (3)
# Fundraising pages 543 18,935 19,488
# Charities 412 12,720 12,986
Mean requested amount in e 12,242 6,188 6,361
SD of requested amount e 29,997 25,777 25,918
Median requested amount in e 4,000 2,190 2,243
Proportion receiving donations 0.772 0.727 0.728
Proportion request fulfilled 0.502 0.427 0.429
(a) Fundraising pages—demand side
Disaster relief Other Total
(1) (2) (3)
# Donations 115,146 565,755 681,114
# Unique donors 112,686 477,300 588,573
Mean donation in e 22 58 52
SD donation 89 232 215
Median donation in e 9 20 20
Total donations in e 2,543,445 32,646,194 35,196,791
(b) Individual donations—supply side
Table 2.2: Donation demand & supply: Summary statistics. Notes. This table reports
summary statistics of fundraising and donation activity on Betterplace broken down by disaster relief and
non-disaster relief activity. Panel (a) summarizes the demand side and reports the number of fundraising
pages; the number of charities that posted them; mean, standard deviation and median of the amount
requested by these pages; proportion of pages donated to; and the proportion of pages that raised at least
the amount they requested. Panel (b) summarizes the supply side and reports the total number of donations;
the number of unique donors; summary statistics of donations (mean, standard deviation, and median); and
the total volume of donations.
non-disaster-related projects (e58). The same holds true for the median donation
(e9 for disasters vs. e20 for other causes). The donations distribution for both
types of projects are right-skewed, with a large mass of individuals donating single-
or double-digit amounts and a few very large donations. We account for this by
transforming donations using the natural logarithm.
2.3.3 Time series patterns
Figure 2.2 describes the time series pattern of disaster-related casualties from
EM-DAT and disaster relief donation demand and supply on Betterplace. The top
panel depicts monthly time series of overall donations (solid line) and donations
to natural disasters (shaded area). The bottom panel captures the time series of
fundraising activity, measured by the number of disaster relief projects entering the
platform (solid line), and natural disaster casualties (dashed line). Total donations
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on the platform have grown steadily over the years, reflecting the growing popular-
ity of online donations in general and Betterplace in particular. Overall donations
exhibit classic seasonality, with roughly 30% of giving transpiring at year-end, which
coincides with both traditional Christmas giving and the end of the tax year. Our
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Figure 2.2: Disaster relief fundraising activity, donations, and casualties. Notes. Panel
(a) depicts aggregate monthly disaster relief (grey filled area) as well as total donations on Betterplace (in
e1000, black line). Total donations in the figure are censored at e2 million, although the underlying data
are not; this only binds during year-end giving in 2015, 2016 and 2017. Panel (b) shows the time series of
casualties across the 1,720 events in our sample (dashed line, left axis), as well as the number of disaster-
relief fundraising pages posted on Betterplace (solid line, right axis). Major events are illustrated using
their earliest start date. The abbreviations “SLE” and “a.o.” stand for Sierra Leone and among others,
respectively.
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Donations to disaster relief do not display the same time series regularities as
overall donations, but do not appear to be entirely idiosyncratic either. For example,
large spikes in both disaster relief fundraising activity and donations coincide with
some major disasters, such as Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines and the Nepal
earthquake. But disaster severity cannot be the sole explanation because contem-
poraneous donation responses are virtually absent for other major disasters, such as
the 2015 heatwaves in India and Pakistan (see Appendix Table 2.A.1). Beyond this,
there is not much we can say. Given that disaster events overlap, it is impossible
to attribute donations or project entry on the platform to particular disaster events
using time series variation alone.
In order to understand the heterogeneity in donation responses, the relevant unit
of analysis is an individual disaster. In what follows, we use this unit of analysis in
our core sample to explore how the characteristics of individual disasters correlate
with the demand and supply of charitable donations.
2.3.4 Additional data sources
In order to understand what accounts for variation in donation demand and sup-
ply, we supplement the core event-level dataset capturing donation activity as well
as disaster severity with a number of data sources which we match, as appropriate,
on the basis of country or event. First, we measure media attention devoted to the
disasters in our sample by scraping the twitter feeds of five major German news out-
lets and applying regular expression matching using disaster types (storm, typhoon,
etc.) and names (Haiyan, etc.) to identify tweets related to natural disasters.13 Our
measure of media attention an event received is the total number of tweets devoted
to it by these media outlets; 97% of these tweets link directly to the corresponding
coverage in the media outlet.
Next, we construct a measure of whether any charity present on Betterplace was
active in a country prior to the respective country experiencing a disaster event using
the project registry on Betterplace. We also measure the number of charities present
in a disaster-afflicted country in 2011, two years before our observation window
begins. We rely on the latter variable for identification in the IV estimator of Section
2.6.
13 We scrape the entire twitter feed during our period of observation from 2013 to 2017 of Bild
Zeitung (its print version is the daily tabloid newspaper with the highest circulation in Germany),
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), Süddeutsche Zeitung (SZ), Welt and Zeit.
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Mean S.D. Median 25th 75th N
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
# of tweets 0.6 4.6 0 0 0 1,720
# of active charities 49 80 25 11 46 1,720
Trade with GER [1 Mio EUR]) 22,649 35,809 2,914 204 26,099 1,682
Distance from capital to Berlin [1000km] 7.3 3.2 7.4 5.5 9.5 1,665
Freedom of press [/ 100] 0.52 0.23 0.5 0.33 0.71 1,699
Ease of doing business [/ 100] 0.61 0.13 0.6 0.53 0.69 1,690
Corruption perception [/ 100] 0.41 0.18 0.36 0.31 0.44 1,677
# of active charities 2011 23 37 11 4 21 1,720
Table 2.3: Correlates of giving—summary statistics. Notes. In this table we report the
summary statistics (mean, standard deviation, median, 25th and 75th percentile, and the number of obser-
vations) of correlates of donation demand and supply. Each variable is described in Section 2.3.4. Note that
the indices are divided by 100 and are all in the range of zero to one. For all indices, higher values represent
a more benevolent political climate. “ # of active charities 2011” is the stock of charities present in countries
observed in the event data as of 2011. This is the instrument we employ in Section 2.6.1.
Third, we employ dyadic distance measures between Berlin, Germany’s capital,
and recipient countries’ capitals using data from CEPII.14 Economic integration is
measured via total trade—the sum of imports and exports between a given country
and Germany—using the UN’s comtrade database.
Finally, we employ a number of indices to measure the socio-political environment
of countries. We utilize the Freedom of the Press report compiled by Freedom House,
a watchdog organization that compiles annual reports to systematically document
threats to press freedom. Next, we supplement our data with the World Bank’s
Doing Business report which measures business regulations and their enforcement.
Finally, we include records from the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) published by
Transparency International on perceived corruption using surveys, business people’s
opinions and expert assessments. For all indices we use observations from 2012 or
the earliest year after 2012 for which data is available.
Summary statistics of these variables are presented in Table 2.3. About 11% of
events are tweeted about but the distribution of tweets is lopsided, with the median
disaster getting no tweets at all. On average, 49 charities are active in a country
prior to the onset of a disaster, and the distribution is right-skewed with a median
of 21.
14 CEPII is the Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales, a leading French
institute for international economics. We also matched Hofstede’s index to our disasters sample to
measure cultural distance between Germany and recipient countries, but do not present the results
in this paper on account of the sample loss it entails. The results, with sample loss, are statistically
insignificant in all our econometric specifications.
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2.4 Which natural disasters get funding?
In this section, we ask which natural disasters get funding on this online donation
platform. In order for a disaster to attract donations on Betterplace, two things
must happen. First, one or more charities must solicit donations for this disaster
by posting a fundraising page on Betterplace. Second, donors must give to these
projects. What we observe in our data is the equilibrium demand and supply of
donations of this two-stage process.
The analysis in this section essentially describes this equilibrium and its corre-
lates, on both the donation demand and supply side. We begin with a graphical
analysis and then estimate a simple regression model in order to examine correlates
of donation demand and supply. In Appendix Section 4.6, we report additional re-
sults based on lasso regression, which investigate the most predictive covariates of
fundraising activity following an event.
2.4.1 Graphical analysis
The pattern of disaster relief donations is extremely lopsided. The Lorenz curves
in Figure 2.3 depict this graphically, by plotting the cumulative share of casualties
on the x-axes against the cumulative share of disaster relief donations (Panel (a))
and the cumulative share of the number of donations (Panel (b)). Panel (a) shows
that almost 80% of disaster relief funding accrues to a tiny number of events, which
together account for barely 20% of casualties—a disaster relief version of the Pareto
rule. The number of donations, depicted in Panel (b), mirrors this pattern. Disasters
that together account for the lion’s share of casualties, received approximately 20%
of overall and individual donations.
This equilibrium outcome is not characterized by fundraising projects failing to
attract donations. Rather, there is negligible demand for donations: the bulk of dis-
asters do not experience any fundraising efforts on the platform. Figure 2.4 depicts
the 1,720 disasters events (circles and triangles) that occurred between 2013-2017,
plotted by the number of casualties (x-axis) and the number of affected people (y-
axis). Of the 1,720 natural disasters, only 67 (3.9%) witness any fundraising activity
(triangles). At the same time, 84% of events with fundraising pages on Betterplace
(56 of 67) receive at least one donation (solid triangles). It would appear, there-
fore, that donors are potentially inclined to give to disaster relief. Unfortunately,
giving is conditional on having a disaster relief project to give to, and disaster relief
fundraising activity on the platform is anemic. The upshot is that, of the 1,720
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Figure 2.3: Pareto rule in disaster relief donations. Notes. This figure shows the relationship
between cumulative disaster casualties and cumulative disaster relief. Panel (a) plots the cumulative share
of disaster relief donations (y-axis) against the cumulative share of casualties from natural disasters (x-axis).
Panel (b) plots the cumulative share of the number of donations to disaster relief on the y-axis. Thus, an
exemplary point in Panel (a) can be read as: “events that together account for x% of all casualties (x-axis)
received y% of total disaster relief donations on Betterplace (y-axis)”. A 45◦ line would correspond to a
situation in which disasters received donations in perfect proportion to the number of casualties.
natural disasters that struck during this period, only 3.3% received any donations
on Betterplace.
The paltry equilibrium response to disasters begs the question of why a handful
of disasters elicit substantial donation responses, while the vast majority is effectively
absent on this online platform. Figure 2.4 indicates that more severe disasters—in
terms of casualties or number affected (or both)—are more likely to get traction
on Betterplace by stimulating both demand and supply side responses. Figure 2.5
shows that media coverage, as measured by the number of tweets devoted to each
disaster by Germany’s five largest media outlets (see Section 2.3.4) is also correlated
with event-level activity on Betterplace. Many disasters receive no media coverage.
The most severe disasters in terms of casualties tend to receive considerable media
coverage and, as we saw in Figure 2.4, these disasters are also likely to generate a
donation response on Betterplace. In short, the descriptive evidence suggests that
donations on the platform do not really cater to the mass of disasters which is
relatively less severe in terms of casualties or number affected, and receives little
media coverage.
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Figure 2.4: Disaster severity, fundraising, and donations. Notes. This scatter plot describes
the demand- and supply-side responses on Betterplace to disaster events that transpired from 2013-2017.
Disaster event casualties are on the x-axis, and the number of people affected is plotted on the y-axis. Both
axes are scaled using a log10 transformation. Each marker on the scatter plot pertains to an individual
disaster event (n = 1, 720). Triangles denote events for which at least one disaster relief fundraising page
was created on the platform (n = 67). Solid triangles capture fundraising pages which received donations
(n = 56). Empty triangles denote events which did not receive donations (n = 11) despite there being
fundraising activity for them on Betterplace. Circles denote events which generated no traction on the
platform (n = 1, 653).
2.4.2 Regression model
In order to more systematically explore the heterogeneity in demand and supply
of donations to disasters, we follow an approach analogous to that of Strömberg
(2007), who investigates the correlation between ODA for disaster relief and dis-
aster severity, recipient country characteristics, news coverage, and donor-recipient
relations. Concretely, we estimate the following model:




iγ + αt(i) + εi (2.1)
where i ∈ {1; ...; 1, 720} denotes a particular disaster event, and yi denotes demand-
or supply-side outcomes. The demand-side response is captured by a dummy variable
indicating whether or not a fundraising page devoted to disaster relief for event i was
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Figure 2.5: Media coverage of disaster events. Notes. This scatter plot shows the events that
received media coverage and their severity in terms of the total number of casualties and affected. The solid
blue circles depict events that received at least one donation on Betterplace. Media coverage is measured by
tweet counts from Germany’s major news outlets (n=181 disasters receive media coverage). The circles with
neighboring country code labels (country codes per the ISO-α-2 standard) indicate the events with the top
1% mentions in the media. The size of the circles is proportional to the number of tweets that mentioned
the respective event.
posted on Betterplace. The supply-side response is captured by the amount donated
to (charitable projects devoted to) disaster i, measured in natural logarithms, to
account for the right-skewed donations distribution evident in Table 2.1. We estimate
logit models for binary outcomes, and linear models when the dependent variable is
(the log of) the amount donated.
The coefficient vector of interest, β, captures the heterogeneity in donation re-
sponse with respect to disaster characteristics Xi, which includes disaster severity;
media coverage; distance metrics relative to Germany; socio-political indices; and
prior charity presence in an affected country (see Tables 2.1 and 2.3 for summary
statistics).
The vector Ci contains basic controls. These comprise dummy variables captur-
ing whether the event (i) is listed with a precise onset date by EM-DAT, as opposed
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to only the month or even the year, since such events tend to be more likely to grab
media and attention; (ii) span multiple countries, which is a measure of severity; and
(iii) have no recorded deaths or people affected, both of which are likely to reflect
measurement error. The controls also include a variable measuring the number of
days between an event’s onset and the end of the observation period (Dec 31st, 2017),
since events occurring later mechanically have less time to generate a response on
Betterplace.
Finally, seasonality and the overall time trend, evident in Figure 2.2, are captured
in quarter fixed effects, αt(i), denoting the quarter t = {1; ...; 20} in which event i
took place.
2.4.3 Correlates
Table 2.4 presents estimates of the regression parameters in Equation (2.1). Odds
ratio the presence of any demand for donations are reported in columns 1 and 2,
although results are qualitatively identical with a linear probability model. The
last two columns contain OLS estimates for the supply of donations, measured in
logs. Columns 1 and 3 contain the full sample of 1,720 disaster events, with variables
drawn from EM-DAT, Betterplace, and Twitter. Columns 2 and 4 include additional
correlates. This entails some sample loss, and we ascertain in Appendix Table 2.A.3
that this is not what is driving the (negligible) differences in correlation patterns.
The pattern of correlations is, unsurprisingly, identical for both the demand and
supply of donations regardless of specification.
Both the number of casualties and the number of people affected are significantly
positively correlated with donations, as is media coverage. These correlations, pre-
viewed in the descriptive analysis in Figures 2.4 and 2.5, are entirely consistent with
results pertaining to ODA in Strömberg (2007), Eisensee and Strömberg (2007), and
Fink and Redaelli (2011).
In the full sample, the demand estimates in column 1 indicate that an increase in
the number of casualties by 10% is associated with a 5 percentage point increase in
the odds of a fundraising page for disaster relief project being posted on Betterplace;
the analogous change for the number of people affected is a 3 percentage point
increase in the odds. The estimates suggest that, in proportionate terms, a tweet is
“worth” considerably more than a casualty. A 10% increase in the number of tweets
increases the odds of seeing fundraising activity on the platform by 12 percentage
points. Column 3 indicates an elasticity of donation supply with respect to casualties
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of 0.1, indicating that disaster relief donations increase by 0.1% for a 1% increase
in the number of casualties. The elasticity with respect to the number of affected
people is of similar magnitude.
Prior charity presence in a country is positive and highly significantly correlated
with demand and supply. Row 5 indicates that disasters occurring in countries with
stronger trade ties with Germany and those that are more distant from Germany’s
capital are less significantly likely to witness donation demand (since they have an
odds ratio less than one) or supply. The distance correlation is consistent with
Strömberg (2007), while the trade correlation is not. This may be because strategic
economic considerations are more likely to play a role in ODA decisions than they
are in the market for private charitable donations.
Next, we see that although socio-economic indicators such as freedom of press,
ease of doing business, and corruption may reasonably be expected to be related
to charities’ ease of operation in affected countries, or donors’ willingness to give,
none of these indicators is significantly correlated with either demand or supply of
donations.
We report correlates of additional measures of both demand and supply, in Ap-
pendix Table 2.A.4. There, we ascertain that on the supply side, the correlates of
the number of fundraising pages and the amount requested by these projects follow
very similar patterns. The same is true for an indicator of whether an event received
any donations, and the number of donations that went to all projects associated
with an event.
Appendix Section 4.6 reports additional results based on regularized regression.
It points to the most predictive covariates of donation activity for disasters on the
platform. The analysis suggests that event severity and media coverage are indeed
among the key predictors of such activity. The analysis also suggests that contem-
poraneous charity presence in a country is important in understanding the demand
side response.
In general, the evidence presented in this section indicates that severe disasters
with media attention tend to attract donations. As such, the promise of online
platforms to cater to smaller-scale, more obscure disasters seems largely unrealized.
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Donation demand Donation supply
1[Any fundraising]
Logit odds ratios
Log total disaster relief
OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log # casualties 1.7 1.6 .1 .099
(.23) (.22) (.043) (.042)
Log # affected 1.3 1.4 .07 .07
(.082) (.1) (.02) (.018)
Log # of tweets 3.2 4 1.2 1.2
(.58) (.9) (.17) (.18)
Log # of active NGOs 1.6 2.2 .059 .13
(.32) (.4) (.029) (.034)
Log of trade with GER .67 -.077
(.069) (.015)
Distance from capital to Berlin [1000km] .76 -.023
(.053) (.0088)
Freedom of press [/ 100] .46 .21
(.65) (.19)
Ease of doing business [/ 100] 8.3 .17
(24) (.45)
Corruption perception [/ 100] .85 .58
(2.2) (.31)
Basic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter-of-year FE No Yes Yes Yes
# positives dep var 67 62 56 51
Pse/Adj R-sq .41 .49 .27 .29
N. of observations 1720 1604 1720 1604
Table 2.4: Correlates of disaster relief donation demand and supply on Betterplace.
Notes. This table presents parameter estimates for Equation (2.1). The dependent variable in columns 1
and 2 is an indicator equal to one if at least one fundraising page for a given natural disaster was created on
Betterplace, and zero otherwise. In columns 3 and 4, the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of total
disaster relief for a given event on Betterplace. We show odds ratios from logit models in columns 1 and 2,
and OLS estimates in columns 3 and 4. The covariates are described in Section 2.3.4, and “Log” refers to
the natural logarithm. “Basic controls” contains indicators for when the date of the event can be pinpointed
(rather than the month, only); when more than one country was affected; when the database indicates no
casualties; when the database indicates nobody was affected; and the time in days from the time of the event
until the end of the observation period (12/31/2017). We report standard errors clustered at the country
level in parentheses.
2.5 Donor fatigue
In the previous section we saw that very few disasters attract donations. Donor
fatigue is commonly blamed for this. In this section, we ask whether the pattern of
donation demand and supply is consistent with donor fatigue. Concretely, we explore
70
Chapter 2 – Charitable Giving & Natural Disasters
patterns along three dimensions. First, if donations spike following a disaster and
then taper off to zero over time, this would be consistent with temporal fatigue.
Second, if donations to disaster-related causes displace donations to other charitable
causes, this would be consistent with crowding out. Finally, if disasters occurring
in the direct aftermath of a major disaster that received generous donations fail to
receive funding; whereas those that occur after a sufficient lag do receive donations,
this would be consistent with disaster fatigue.
To test whether and to what extent the evidence is consistent with these three
dimensions of donor fatigue we use an event study design, which exploits daily ob-
servations and the exogenous timing of disaster events. Concretely, for disasters that
received donations, we estimate (i) temporal variation in donations to the disaster
itself; (ii) contemporaneous variation in donations to other causes; and (iii) dona-
tions to other disaster events of varying temporal proximity to major disasters that
received generous donations. These dimensions of variation map directly into the
three dimensions of donor fatigue, namely, (i) temporal fatigue; (ii) crowding out;
and (iii) disaster fatigue. The main identifying assumption is the exogenous onset
of natural disasters, which is likely to be satisfied.
The analysis in this section is naturally restricted to the 67 events that witnessed
fundraising activity on the platform, because the question of Betterplace donor fa-
tigue only arises if disaster donations have been made in the first place. We further
restrict our attention to the subset of 44 disasters with a precise onset date recorded
in EM-DAT, which witnessed fundraising activity after this date on Betterplace.
Our identification strategy relies on the sharp timing of natural disasters, such that
the subsequent donation response can be clearly mapped. The final sample of dis-
asters of 44 events captures the bulk of disaster-related activity in the full sample,
accounting for 94% of total disaster relief donations on Betterplace, and 43% of
disaster-related casualties.
We proceed by building a balanced panel containing these 44 disaster events,
extending over all t =∈ {1; ....; 1, 826} days of observations from 2013-2017 (2016 was
a leap year). Around disasters’ onset dates, we construct 42-day windows covering
two weeks before and four weeks after disaster onset. Given that these disasters are
plausibly exogenous natural hazards, we interpret statistically meaningful patterns in
donations following (the timing of) a disaster event as a causal response to the event.
These donations patterns, in turn, furnish evidence that is (or is not) consistent with
donor fatigue.
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2.5.1 Model
Our assessment of the three dimensions of donor fatigue is predicated on variants




1[t=k(i)+λ]βλ + ατ + αd + αi + εit (2.2)
where the subscripts refer to disaster event i and day t; event i occurs on day k(i).
The indicator function 1[t=k(i)] is equal to one when the condition in the index is
satisfied. The dependent variable, yit, varies depending on relevant dimension of
donor fatigue. For temporal fatigue, it is the demand or supply of donations to
event i on day t. When evaluating crowding out, it is donations to other causes in
the wake of event i on day t. Finally, for disaster fatigue, it is the donation response
to other natural disaster events that happen in the aftermath of i.
Naturally occurring time series variation in donations over the observation period
is captured by week fixed effects ατ , where τ ∈ {1; ...; 260}. To account for day-of-
week patterns in giving we include day-of-week fixed effects αd, where d ∈ {1; ...; 7};
αi is an event fixed effect, which accounts for event specific unobserved time invariant
effects; εit is the error term. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and
serial correlation.
The coefficient vector of interest is βλ. For λ ≥ 0, βλ captures the dynamic
response to an event i that occurred on day λ relative to the onset date, k(i), in its
four-week aftermath. As previously explained, the interpretation of these coefficients
as the causal response to an event rests upon the identifying assumption that the
timing of events and corresponding fundraising effort decisions on the platform are
uncorrelated with market conditions. Pre-trends during the two weeks prior to
events’ onset are captured by βλ where λ < 0. We expect these coefficients to not
be statistically different from zero.
2.5.2 Results
In what follows, we present coefficient plots of the event study estimates, which
speak to whether fundraising and donation responses are consistent with temporal
fatigue, crowding out, and disaster fatigue in turn. The plots report point estimates
for βλs in Equation (2.2) along with their 95% confidence intervals. In these fig-
ures, the coefficient estimates for λ < 0 furnish a visual test of our identification
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strategy, which relies on the assumption that outcomes are not driven by pre-event
donation market trends. This implies that coefficients for λ < 0 should not be sta-
tistically different from zero. This is exactly what we observe for for all our outcome
variables.15
Temporal fatigue
Figure 2.6 examines whether fundraising and donation patterns for the 44 disas-
ters in the event study sample are consistent temporal donor fatigue. Because these
disasters vary greatly in severity and time patterns can be more clearly mapped for
larger events, the regressions are weighted by a severity index. This index is equal
to the mean of the normalized number of casualties and affected individuals (sub-
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(b) Disaster relief donations
Figure 2.6: Temporal fatigue. Notes. Panel (a) depicts the daily fundraising activity, measured as
the number of new disaster relief fundraising project pages posted on the platform in response to a disaster
event. Panel (b) depicts the daily disaster relief donations response, measured as total donations going to
disaster relief fundraising projects. The underlying data structure and the model are described just before
and in the beginning of Section 2.5.1. The error bands show the 95% confidence interval.
Panel (a) of Figure 2.6 shows that disaster relief fundraising activity is concen-
trated in the one-week aftermath of an event, with an immediate up-tick in fundrais-
ing activity following disaster onset, reaching a peak with four to five fundraising
pages being posted by charities each day. It highlights the strength of online fundrais-
ing, namely the speed with which it can kick into gear. However, in week two this
15 The fact that βλ is not always a precisely estimated zero for disaster relief fundraising and
donations just prior to event onset stems from the fact that week fixed effects span days on both
sides of event onset for some disasters.
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activity abates, reverting to zero in week four.
Panel (b) describes the supply-side response. This is more gradual than the
demand response, which is to be expected since disaster-relief donations in this
context are conditional on disaster-relief fundraising activity. Donations witness a
profound increase near the end of the first week following an event. Point estimates
indicate a daily donation response of about e60,000 at its peak. Donations fall
equally precipitously, settling back down to zero by the end of week two.
Although the estimates are noisy, the time series pattern of fundraising and
donations towards disaster relief are consistent with temporal fatigue. The speed
with which fundraising efforts and donations are mobilized is impressive. It indicates
that charities are able to leverage this online platform to generate funding in a timely
manner for their disaster relief activities. At the same time, donations dry up within
a couple of weeks of disaster onset, indicating that there is a narrow window of
opportunity for charities to fundraise for disaster relief before temporal fatigue sets
in. This is consistent with anecdotal accounts of donor fatigue being responsible for
the shortfall in disaster relief funding months after disasters like Typhoon Haiyan.
Crowding out
Figure 2.7 describes contemporaneous changes in fundraising and donations to
non-disaster-related—other—causes. It shows a wildly different pattern, wherein
estimates varying insignificantly around zero over the event window. Crucially, there
is no discernible change in the noisy fundraising pattern, Panel (a), before and after
the occurrence of a disaster event. In other words, there is no evidence that disaster
relief fundraising efforts crowd out fundraising efforts for non-disaster-related causes
on the platform. Neither is there any evidence, Panel (b), that there is crowding out
in terms of giving to other causes. Here again, we estimate precise zeros over the
entire event window.
It is worth noting that the sample used in this analysis is selected on the basis
of an endogenous variable, namely whether a fundraising page for a disaster was
posted on Betterplace. This constitutes a threat to identification to the extent that
fundraising activity is correlated with unobserved factors that drive donation out-
comes. For example, if projects are likely to enter the platform due to a surge in
generosity that coincides with a disaster occurrence, then we are likely to underesti-
mate potential crowding out. We believe that strategic entry of this sort is likely to
play a role only for marginal disasters, which are at risk of receiving no donations.
74


















−14−12−10−8 −6 −4 −2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26

































−14−12−10−8 −6 −4 −2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26

















Figure 2.7: Crowding out. Notes. Panel (a) depicts the daily fundraising activity, measured as the
number of new non-disaster relief fundraising project pages posted on the platform after a disaster event.
Panel (b) depicts the corresponding daily volume of donations to causes not related to disaster relief. The
underlying data structure and the model are described just before and in the beginning of Section 2.5.1. The
error bands show the 95% confidence interval.
In addition, unobserved heterogeneity should be captured in the pre-event window.
Such pre-trends in donations and fundraising activity are not evident in Figure 2.7.
Nevertheless, we address this concern in robustness checks by restricting the
attention to the most severe events that are least likely to be marginal (i.e., highly
likely to attract donations). Appendix Figure 2.A.3 presents estimates based on
using only the most severe events for identification. We use the top 10 and top
2 events—see Panel (d) of Appendix Table 2.A.1—and show that there was no
crowding out by these more severe events either. This also addresses, and rejects,
the concern that since the majority of funding goes to a handful of events, evidence
of crowding out is diluted by the large number of events that received little funding.
In the previous section we saw that for those disasters that receive funding,
fundraising and donations spike in the direct aftermath of a disaster event. The
results in this section indicate that this increase in disaster relief funding does not
come at the expense of other charitable causes. Together, these results suggest
that on this platform, donor fatigue is not manifested in crowding out, at least
not contemporaneously. This would seem to confirm anecdotal evidence that fears
regarding crowding out in the wake of generous donation responses to major natural
disasters may be misplaced. For example, the tax break aimed at offsetting potential
crowding out of charitable donations after the outpouring of donations for Hurricane
Katrina is widely thought to have been completely unnecessary (New York Times,
2006).
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Disaster fatigue
In this section, we explore disaster fatigue by asking whether disasters that occur
in close temporal proximity to a major disaster are less likely to spur fundraising and
donations than more temporally distant disasters. In order to conduct this exercise,
we need to make a judgement call regarding two questions: what is a “proximate”
disaster and what is a “major” disaster? We define proximate as a two-month
window following a major disaster. The rationale is that, as we saw in Section 2.5.2,
all the disaster relief action on the platform takes place within a month of disaster
onset. The second month both allows us to explore persistence of disaster fatigue
over a longer time horizon, and gives us more statistical power. Beyond the two
months, we are faced with potential confounding changes that compromise causal
inference.
As for what constitutes a major disaster, we focus on the two events in our full
sample that (i) have a precise onset date; (ii) inflicted the first and second largest
number of casualties; and (iii) together attracted 70% of overall donations. These
are the Nepal earthquake in April of 2015, which killed almost 9,000 people; and
Typhoon Haiyan in November of 2013, which killed over 7,300.
Two patterns in the data would be consistent with disaster fatigue. First, the 118
disasters that occur within two months after the Nepal earthquake or two months
after Typhoon Haiyan should receive meager, if any, funding. Second, disasters that
occur outside of these two 2-month windows should witness relatively more funding.
The challenge we face is that disasters that are proximate or distant are, by definition,
different. This raises the concern that differential outcomes in proximate and distant
windows may be attributable to differences in disasters rather than differences in
proximity to major disasters.
To address this concern, we construct a matched sample of disaster events that
occur within two months of the two large events, and those that occur outside
this window. We then examine how much fundraising and donations transpires
for events within two months—treated events—as opposed to outside these two
months—control events. The matched samples of treated and control events is gen-
erated using a classic propensity score matching procedure (Rosenbaum and Rubin,
1983).16 We estimate the propensity using only the natural logarithms of casual-
16 The propensity score is estimated using a logit-model in which the dependent variable is an
indicator equal to one if a disaster is treated, and zero otherwise. The propensity is given by the
predicted probability from this model. Prior to matching, all events whose propensity score falls
outside the common support are discarded.
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ties and the number of affected people, as well as, indicators for an event having
zero deaths or affected. Since we have complete data for these variables, this allows
us to use the full sample of treated events for the match. We then leverage the
scope of our data and match five control events to each of the 118 treated events
using nearest neighbour matching without replacement in random order. Appendix
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(d) Donations outside 2-month window
Figure 2.8: Disaster fatigue. Notes. This figures compares fundraising activity for and disaster relief
donations to events within two months—Panels (a) and (c)—of Typhoon Haiyan and the Nepal earthquake
to a matched sample of events outside that two month window—Panels (b) and (d). Panels (a) and (b) show
fundraising activity, measured as the number of new disaster relief fundraising project pages posted on the
platform in response to disaster events. Panels (c) and (d) shows the daily disaster relief donations response,
measured as total donations going to disaster relief fundraising projects. The matched sample contains five
control events for each treated event using propensity scores based on events’ severity. The procedure is
detailed in Section 2.5.2. The underlying data structure and the model are described just before and in the
beginning of Section 2.5.1. The error bands show the 95% confidence interval.
Figure 2.8 investigates whether fundraising and donation patterns are consistent
with disaster fatigue. The outcome variable in Panels (a) and (b) are daily fundrais-
ing project entry on Betterplace for disasters other than the 2015 Nepal earthquake
and Typhoon Haiyan. Panels (c) and (d) show the corresponding estimates for the
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amount of daily donations. The panels on the left capture fundraising and donation
activity for treated events—those that occurred in the proximate two-month win-
dow after the major disasters. Those on the right show the analogous outcomes for
control events—those that occurred outside this two-month window.
The results are broadly consistent with disaster fatigue. In particular, the two
left hand panels show that disaster events occurring within two months after the
Nepal earthquake and Typhoon Haiyan do not experience any fundraising activity
(Panel (a)) and, consequently, do not receive any donations (Panel (c)). The latter
would seem to fit the American Red Cross’ experience with Hurricane Maria after
Hurricane Harvey. By contrast, events that occur outside this proximate window,
experience both fundraising (Panel (b)) and donation activity (Panel (d)). The
coefficients are imprecisely estimated, but the contrast between the patterns on the
left and right are patently obvious. Interestingly, the disaster fatigue evidenced here
is not mirrored in media fatigue. As shown in Appendix Figure 2.A.5, there is media
coverage of disaster of both treated and control events.
Robustness checks presented in the appendix show analogous results to Fig-
ure 2.8 using a different specification for the propensity score. There, we estimate
the propensity using all the covariates used in Section 2.4, which reduces the sample
of treated events from 118 to 111, as we lose some observations due to incomplete
records on covariates. Because the model is more saturated, making it difficult to do
one-to-many matching, we conduct one-to-one nearest neighbour matching without
replacement in random order. This procedure is successful in obtaining a match for
each treated observation, and Appendix Figure 2.A.4(b) shows matching balance.
The results from this exercise are presented in Appendix Figure 2.A.6. The donation
patterns are qualitatively identical, consistent with disaster fatigue.
2.6 Fundraising for disaster relief
As alluded to in the introduction, charities are major players in local disaster
relief. They are almost completely reliant on private individuals for charitable do-
nations to these projects; and these are chronically underfunded. Online platforms
such as Betterplace provide an opportunity fundraise for disaster relief at a relatively
low cost. Yet, we saw in Section 2.4 that donation demand for bulk of smaller scale
disasters is anemic. As we just saw in Section 2.5, disaster fatigue is one possible
explanation.
Nevertheless, two factors suggest that by failing to post disaster relief projects on
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Betterplace, charities may be missing an opportunity to raise money for them. First,
disaster fatigue does not characterize large intervals of our observation period. For
example, 2016 and 2017 did not experience any major international disasters whose
donation response aftermath could reasonably have been characterized by donor
fatigue. Second, the descriptive evidence in Section 2.4 indicates that, conditional
on demand, donation supply tends to be forthcoming. Of course, as an equilibrium
response this is merely suggestive.
In this section, we ask how much additional disaster relief funding could be raised
on Betterplace if charities posted fundraising pages on the platform.17 Providing a
causally interpretable answer to this question entails estimation of the donation
supply function: we want to know how much would have been donated to disaster
relief projects if charities had only fundraised for them.
2.6.1 Model and estimation
Concretely, we would like to estimate the donation supply for disaster event i:
si = X
′
iα+ ρdi + εi (2.3)
where Xi are event-specific characteristics and di ∈ {0, 1} denotes there being
any fundraising effort, i.e. demand for donations towards disaster i on the platform.
Estimation of ρ is complicated by the fact that events which witness demand for
donations are likely to be the same events to which people feel inclined to supply
donations to, so E[dε] 6= 0. Measures of disaster severity and country character-
istics captured in X go some way in addressing the issue, but are bound to be
inadequate.18 As Eisensee and Strömberg (2007) note, disasters tend to have an
“unobserved salience”. How a tropical storm affects people, or is perceived to affect
people, is imperfectly captured by a headcount of how many people are affected. The
term “affected” itself is an elastic concept. Similarly, a measure of media coverage
captured in a tweet count is unlikely to adequately convey the same sense of severity
17 Our underlying assumption here is that there exist charities that are in the position to provide
disaster relief. While we have no way of directly verifying this, it seems to be a reasonable assumption
given the fact that charities are the principle providers of disaster relief in practice, and 20,000 of
them, including organizations like the German Red Cross and Doctors without Borders are active
on Betterplace.
18 Intuitively, one would expect the estimate of ρ to be larger when X is not included in the
regression. The reason is that X contains elements, such as event severity, which correlate positively
with both the demand and supply of donations. The data confirms this intuition.
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or extent of distress imparted in a turn of phrase or a picture in the news. This type
of unobserved heterogeneity is likely to be positively correlated with both charities’
disaster relief activities and individuals’ donations, and would thus lead to upward
bias in ρ̂OLS .
To identify the causal effect, we instead rely on an instrumental variable to gen-
erate plausibly exogenous variation in fundraising activity. As the instrument, we
use historical charity presence (in its natural logarithm) in the country where event
i occurred. This variable is measured in terms of the number of charities present
in a disaster-afflicted country in 2011, two years before our observation window be-
gins. Instrument relevance is built on the premise that general charity presence in
a country likely reflects lower costs of providing disaster relief, and generally an
environment more conducive to charity operations, which in turn requires funding.
Higher charity presence thus increases the likelihood that charities initiate and pro-
vide disaster relief in a given country. As we saw in Section 2.5.2, charities only have
a narrow window of opportunity within which to raise funds for disaster relief. The
need for a timely response further motivates the instrument as charities are more
likely to be able to respond quickly when they have had “boots on the ground” in
the disaster-afflicted country.
The main identifying assumption is that charity presence in 2011 only affects de-
mand for donations by triggering fundraising activity on the platform after having
conditioned on disaster severity, media coverage, and country’s socio-political cli-
mate, including corruption and freedom of press. Furthermore, employing the 2011
rather than a more proximately lagged stock of charities contributes to ensuring
instrument exogeneity.19
In order to account for the disaster fatigue documented in the previous section,
we restrict the sample to events that happened either (i) at least 30 days before, or
(ii) at least 90 days after one of the two major events. The former restriction is aimed
at dampening concerns over temporal fatigue, given the finding from Section 2.5.2,
that donations can persist until up to four weeks following disaster onset. The
latter minimizes exposure to disaster fatigue, which we saw in Section 2.5.2 impedes
fundraising in the two months following disaster onset. Together, these relatively
conservative thresholds reduce the initial set of 1,720 events to 1,443. The sample
with full coverage on covariates of 1,604 is reduced to 1,346—with 50 events that
19 When we instead use the stock of charities present in the month prior to an event as instrument,
the results are unchanged. The instrument is valid by conventional thresholds, and estimates are
about 1% smaller than those we report in Table 2.5, and remain highly statistically significant.
80
Chapter 2 – Charitable Giving & Natural Disasters
witness fundraising activity.
In this sample, the mean (median) country has about 13 (4) active charities
in 2011. More importantly, as the map in Appendix Figure 2.A.7 shows, there
is considerable variation in the value of the instrument both across countries, and
within regions. This variation is key to identifying the causal effect of disaster relief
fundraising activity on donation supply,
Estimation proceeds in two steps. In the first step we estimate a logit regression,
which accounts for the binary nature of the endogenous regressor indicating any
fundraising activity for an event (di ∈ {0, 1}), on the instrument and the vector of
covariates (Xi). We use this to obtain the predicted probability, d̂i, of fundraising
activity for event i.20 In the second step, predicted values are used as instrument for
di in Equation (2.3), which is then estimated using the standard 2SLS procedure.
The resulting estimates of ρ are consistent (Angrist and Pischke, 2008; Wooldridge,
2010).
2.6.2 Results
Table 2.5 presents parameter estimates for Equation 2.3 for the (log of) the total
amount donated and the number of donations towards disaster events. Columns 1
and 4 present OLS estimates, columns 2 and 5 present 2SLS estimates, with a first
stage logit model, and columns 3 and 6 present 2SLS estimates with a first stage
linear probability model (LPM). The first thing to notice is that the OLS estimates
for ρ in columns 1 and 4 are smaller than the corresponding 2SLS estimates. This
may seem surprising in view of our prior that unobserved disaster characteristics
are likely to be positively correlated with both fundraising activity (demand) and
giving (supply). However, it likely reflects the fact that the OLS estimate averages
the effect of fundraising activity across all events in the data; by contrast the IV
estimates capture the effect of fundraising activity on the sub-population of disaster
events in countries with prior charity presence large enough to expect disaster relief
operations and fundraising among charities who have (at least historically) been
active on Betterplace. Disaster events in this sub-population are likely to be more
successful at generating donations than the full set of events, which includes disasters
that are not especially “salient” to potential donors and therefore unlikely to attract
20 Our results are robust to choosing a probit specification in the first step. In fact, probit models
produce slightly stronger test statistics for instrument validity, and marginally larger point estimates
in the second stage (about 2% larger). Statistical significance in the second stage is not affected.
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donations.
Tests for instrument relevance in the first stage are reported at the bottom of
Table 2.5. We provide χ2-statistics for our preferred specifications in columns 2
and 5, and F-statistics for the models in columns 3 and 6. These statistics indicate
instrument validity in the former set of models, but only weak relevance for models
in the latter set. This is unsurprising as the linear model is ill-suited to capture the
skewed nature of the project entry variable. We discuss this at length in Appendix
4.6.
Appendix Table 2.A.5 shows the first stage estimates for both specifications.
Appendix Figure 2.A.8 reports the predicted probabilities obtained by estimating
the logit model for the demand function. Unsurprisingly there is significant bunch-
ing around zero which corresponds to minor events that were very unlikely to see
any fundraising activity. However, there are some events with an extremely low
probability that did see fundraising pages being created.
The results suggest that demand shortfalls constitute a barrier to disaster relief
donations on Betterplace. We estimate a causal effect of fundraising activity on dis-
aster relief donations of about e1,000 (≈ exp(6.9)).21 This implies that a marginal
disaster—an event for which a large enough prior charity presence could warrant
fundraising activity—would have been able to raise slightly less than twice the me-
dian donation to a disaster relief project of e 590 in this sample, or 3.5% of average
disaster relief project donation, conditional on entry.22 In columns 3 and 4 we esti-
mate that fundraising activity would have attracted around 37 individual donations
to those marginal events, with an average donation of e 27. Columns 1 and 4 of
Table 2.5 suggest that ignoring omitted variable bias would led us to underestimate
the disaster relief fundraising on donations—the OLS estimate indicates that only
about e 220 would have been raised.
21 Recall that these results are based on dropping events within 30 days before and 90 days after
one of the two major events. An even more conservative approach would be to only use events in
the years 2016 and 2017—years without a major disaster (Typhoon Haiyan happened in November
2013, and disaster fatigue likely extends into 2014). Even in this more restricted sample—2016 and
2017—we estimate a causal effect of a comparable magnitude of about e500.
22 The qualitative implications of these results are not driven by the largest disasters (left in the
sample) attracting a disproportionate share of donations. In Appendix Tables 2.A.6 and 2.A.7 we
re-estimate these specification after dropping the ten most severe events; and separately, the events
receiving the ten largest donations (in the subset of 1,336 considered). While point estimates become
smaller, the estimates still suggest that charities could raise economically meaningful amounts by
soliciting donations for marginal disasters.
82
Chapter 2 – Charitable Giving & Natural Disasters
Log total donations to disaster relief Log # of donations to disaster relief
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1[Any fundraising] 5.4 6.9 6.4 2.5 3.6 3.2
(0.43) (0.56) (1) (0.27) (0.47) (0.67)
Log # casualties -0.014 -0.053 -0.041 -0.0072 -0.036 -0.025
(0.026) (0.026) (0.038) (0.021) (0.018) (0.026)
Log # affected -0.0044 -0.015 -0.011 -0.0026 -0.01 -0.0072
(0.0033) (0.0049) (0.0088) (0.0025) (0.0033) (0.0055)
Log # of tweets 0.46 0.29 0.34 0.32 0.2 0.24
(0.11) (0.089) (0.17) (0.086) (0.074) (0.12)
Log of trade with GER -0.018 -0.012 -0.014 -0.015 -0.011 -0.012
(0.0081) (0.0081) (0.0088) (0.0058) (0.0058) (0.0062)
Distance from capital to Berlin [1000km] 0.00046 0.0062 0.0044 -0.0017 0.0025 0.00087
(0.0063) (0.0068) (0.0087) (0.0037) (0.004) (0.0049)
Freedom of press [/ 100] 0.24 0.37 0.33 0.21 0.3 0.27
(0.12) (0.14) (0.13) (0.09) (0.1) (0.098)
Ease of doing business [/ 100] -0.028 0.0018 -0.0076 -0.11 -0.083 -0.092
(0.29) (0.3) (0.3) (0.2) (0.21) (0.2)
Corruption perception [/ 100] 0.23 0.3 0.28 0.26 0.31 0.29
(0.17) (0.19) (0.17) (0.14) (0.15) (0.14)
Basic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter-of-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
First stage Logit LPM Logit LPM
χ2 / F first stage 11 7.5 11 7.5
Adj R-sq 0.75 0.71 0.73 0.62 0.55 0.59
N. of observations 1346 1346 1346 1346 1346 1346
Table 2.5: Effect of fundraising activity on disaster relief. Notes. This table presents
estimates of the effect of a project creation on the natural logarithm of total disaster relief (columns 1-3),
and the natural logarithm of the number of donations to all fundraising pages devoted to an event (column
4-6). Columns 1 and 4 report OLS estimates, while columns 2,3,5 and 6 report 2SLS instrumental variable
estimates. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of total disaster relief for a given event in
columns 1-3, and the natural logarithm of the number of disaster relief donations to all fundraising pages
for a given event in columns 4-6. In columns 2,3,5 and 6 we instrument for “1[Any fundraising]” using the
natural logarithm of the number of charities present in a country in 2011. Columns 2 and 4 show estimates
from the two-step procedure described in Section 2.6.1; columns 3 and 6 show estimates from a standard
2SLS procedure. “χ2/F first stage” reports the test statistic of instrument relevance in the first stage.
See Section 2.3.4 for definitions of variables. We report standard errors clustered at the country level in
parentheses.
2.7 Conclusion
This paper has investigated the demand and supply of donations to natural
disasters on an online charitable donations platform, by asking three questions. First,
which natural disasters tend to get funding? Second, is the pattern of donations
consistent with donor fatigue? Third, how much funding could charities have raised
for marginal disasters, had they solicited donations?
We find that this online platform does not cater the vast majority of natural
disasters, which cumulatively wreak the lion’s share of devastation. Instead, donation
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patterns conform to a version of the Pareto rule, whereby 80% of donations go to
a tiny fraction of disasters responsible for merely 20% of casualties. Those events
that do attract funding activity tend to be severe disasters, which enjoy media
coverage. Pertinently, the equilibrium demand and supply of donations on this
platform is characterized by a paucity of disaster-relief fundraising activity on the
part of charities. Although disaster relief projects in general tend to be successful at
fundraising on the platform, very few disaster events witness any fundraising activity.
The contrast between the failure of this online donations platform to cater to
smaller-scale disasters, and the success of conventional e-commerce platforms in
selling niche products is striking. One possible explanation is that online fundraising
in this form is simply not part of charities’ business models. This seems unlikely
given the large number and variety of charities represented on Betterplace. Another
is that charities do not need the extra funding, either because they already have it or
because they are not involved in disaster relief operations. This too seems dubious
given the large funding gap in disaster relief and the fact that charities are known
do the heavy lifting in relief activities on the ground.
This leaves two arguably more plausible explanations for this discrepancy. First,
one of the reasons for the success of online product platforms is that they cater to
heterogeneous preferences. It is hard to imagine what the analog of heterogeneous
preferences over product characteristics would mean in the context of natural disas-
ters or indeed, if such heterogeneity exists at all. Second, the importance of search
engines in enabling customers to find products they prefer is another feature that
has been credited for the success of online markets to cater to niche products. In
other words, reducing barriers to fundraising and donating may not be enough to
remedy the neglect of disasters. Additional tools may be needed in order to reduce
information frictions and raise awareness. It is probably in acknowledgement of this
fact that Betterplace, and its U.S. analog GlobalGiving, have started using social
media (e.g., Facebook crisis response pages) or e-mail newsletters to draw attention
to more natural disasters. An open question for future research is whether such
efforts will be successful in spurring both demand and supply donation responses to
neglected disasters.
Using an event-study design, which exploits high-frequency data and the exogene-
ity of natural disaster occurrences for identification, we find that donation patterns
are consistent with temporal fatigue and disaster fatigue, but not with crowding out.
The results indicate that this online setting allows charities to fundraise for disaster
relief in a timely manner without the worry that successful efforts on that count will
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crowd out donations for other charitable causes on the platform. But there are two
caveats. First, temporal fatigue means charities have a narrow two-week window
within which to raise money on the platform after disaster onset. Second, disaster
fatigue may compromise their ability to raise money for disasters which follow on
the heels of a major disaster.
Finally, our IV estimates suggest that there may be unexploited potential for
disaster relief fundraising on the platform. The estimates indicate that charities
could have raised about e1,300 in additional funding for marginal disasters, equiva-
lent to twice the median event donation volume, had they solicited donations on the
platform. This amount is unlikely to make or break a project. As such, fundraising
for disaster relief on the platform seems unlikely to be the kind of “silver bullet”
online platforms have proved to be for catering to the long tail of niche products.
Nevertheless, the failure to solicit donations on the platform does seem to present
something of a missed opportunity.
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3. Identifying and Teaching High-Growth Entrepreneurship
Experimental Evidence from Academies for University
Students in Uganda1
Abstract
We present an ongoing randomized control trial in Uganda which disentangles
the extent to which entrepreneurial success of university students can be attributed
to skill formation and to selection. To study skill formation we randomly accept
applications to a training program fostering an entrepreneurial mindset. We study
individuals’ motivation for entrepreneurship by experimentally varying marketing
messages prior to students’ application decision, emphasizing either entrepreneurial
profit or freedom. Lastly, we non-experimentally describe endogenous self-selection
by comparing key outcomes of applicants and eligible students who did not express
interest. We track labor market outcomes of all groups for up to three years.
1 This chapter is based on joint work with Vojtěch Bartoš (LMU Munich), Kristina Czura (Uni-
versity of Groningen, the Netherlands), Timm Opitz (Max Planck Institute for Innovation and
Competition (Munich) and LMU Munich and Brendan Shanks (LMU Munich). Please note that
the project presented in this chapter is ongoing as of February 2021.
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3.1 Introduction
Entrepreneurship is key for economic development (Schumpeter, 1934). While
most individuals in low-income countries are self-employed (e.g., 78.1 percent of the
working population in Uganda was self-employed in 2019), these are mainly small-
scale businesses that are only remotely related to the Schumpeterian entrepreneur-
ship that drives economic growth (Hsieh and Olken, 2014; Porta and Shleifer, 2008).
They typically lack capital and entrepreneurial ability, preventing them from reaping
the full benefits of high-return investment opportunities (Beaman, Magruder, and
Robinson, 2014; Bruhn, Karlan, and Schoar, 2018; De Mel, McKenzie, and Woodruff,
2012). While relieving credit constraints shows some improvement in terms of busi-
ness profits, it does not result in sustained business growth (Banerjee, Duflo, Glen-
nerster, and Kinnan, 2015). Interventions aimed at improving business practices and
managerial capital have not been shown to result in sustained increases in profits or
employment (McKenzie and Woodruff, 2014). More promising approaches focus on
the role of the psychology of entrepreneurship. Campos, Frese, Goldstein, Iacovone,
Johnson, McKenzie, and Mensmann (2017) show that training programs focusing
on soft skill concepts, such as personal initiative and the entrepreneurial mindset,
outperform programs teaching accounting, finance and marketing skills.2
Most business training studies target existing businesses—with the notable ex-
ception of Klinger and Schündeln (2011), Blattman, Fiala, and Martinez (2014), and
Premand, Brodmann, Almeida, Grun, and Barouni (2016)—but neglect the impor-
tance of selection into entrepreneurship. Levine and Rubinstein (2017) and Levine
and Rubinstein (2018) provide evidence that successful entrepreneurs in the USA are
positively selected on human capital. Moreover, evidence from high-income countries
shows that cognitive and non-cognitive traits predict entrepreneurial success (Ander-
sen, Di Girolamo, Harrison, and Lau, 2014; Koudstaal, Sloof, and Van Praag, 2016;
Levine and Rubinstein, 2017). Yet little is known on whether non-cognitive traits
are shaped by entrepreneurial activity, or whether people select into entrepreneur-
ship based on these traits. This distinction is important for policy. If relevant
non-cognitive traits are malleable, this would favour programs aimed at develop-
ing an entrepreneurial mindset. If they are not, interventions designed to identify
high-potential entrepreneurs would be more promising.
2 Entrepreneurial mindset is one’s ability to spot and benefit from opportunities that are encoun-
tered in daily life. Personal initiative captures one’s desire to proactively tackle problems (Frese,
Krauss, Keith, Escher, Grabarkiewicz, Luneng, Heers, Unger, and Friedrich, 2007).
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We seek to disentangle the extent entrepreneurial success can be attributed to
skill formation and to selection. First, we causally identify the effects of a business
training program, which develops an entrepreneurial mindset, on business creation
and business performance. In our field experiment, training is randomly offered to
university students in Uganda who had expressed interest in entrepreneurship, a
suitable sample positively selected on human capital. Second, we study how selec-
tion into the entrepreneurship training program varies by motives and personality
traits. Using panel-data drawn from the same population, we document how stu-
dents interested in entrepreneurship differ from those that are not with respect to
socio-economic, cognitive and non-cognitive factors, as well as labor market out-
comes, including self-employment. Third, we causally identify what motives draw
students to entrepreneurship training.
We partner with a Ugandan organization, StartHub Africa, that provides ex-
tracurricular entrepreneurship training academies at leading local universities. We
track three semesters of training academies (henceforth “waves”) conducted at eight
to ten universities with a combined enrollment of around 2,000 students in our study
sample.3 Each wave consists of a marketing campaign, an application phase, and an
entrepreneurship training academy. A wave begins with an untargeted marketing
campaign to raise general awareness of the program. Then, to be eligible for the
program, students must attend an information session that consists of short presen-
tations that summarize the training program. This is also where the application
forms are distributed.
Our experimental design relies on two sources of exogenous variation. First, we
randomly vary the motivational message for becoming an entrepreneur that is mar-
keted in the information sessions’ video presentations: financial gains or creative
freedom. This allows us to causally identify the motivations of applicants. Second,
among those who apply, we randomly offer admission to the program to identify the
effect of being offered admission on business creation, survival and performance. We
complement these analyses by documenting patterns of entrepreneurial self-selection
by comparing applicants to those who were aware of the training program but did not
express interest along several repeated measures of socio-economic indicators, person-
3 Two waves have been conducted to date. We plan to include one more wave. We will discuss
the feasibility of this extension and base our power calculations both on the status quo and the
planned implementation.
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ality traits and preferences.4 The data collection effort includes surveys at different
points in the self-selection and application process, as well as surveys administered
both before and after the entrepreneurship training academies (Figure 3.1).
This study relates to four strands of literature. First, we contribute to the litera-
ture on entrepreneurship and business training in low-income countries by studying
a unique sample of highly-educated, high-potential individuals (see Levine and Ru-
binstein (2017) and Levine and Rubinstein (2018)) who aspire to be entrepreneurs.
Despite extensive research on business training interventions, there is a paucity of ev-
idence on the effects of training on high-skilled youths. Interventions in low-income
countries typically provide middle-aged, incumbent micro-entrepreneurs with educa-
tion on business skills and managerial capital, which have not been found to result
in sustained increases in revenue, profits or employment (Hsieh and Olken, 2014;
Bruhn, Karlan, and Schoar, 2018; Bruhn and Zia, 2013; McKenzie and Woodruff,
2014; McKenzie, 2017; Rigol, Hussam, and Roth, 2018). This population, how-
ever, may lack the necessary skills for becoming successful entrepreneurs (Levine
and Rubinstein, 2018; Bjorvatn and Tungodden, 2010; Hurst and Pugsley, 2011;
Carlson and Rink, 2019) or may be unwilling or unable to change the way they run
their businesses (Burmeister and Schade, 2007). With respect to our target popu-
lation, the most closely related study is Premand, Brodmann, Almeida, Grun, and
Barouni (2016) who analyze the inception of an official entrepreneurship track at
universities in Tunisia. They document modest increases of one to four percent in
self-employment rates but no effect on overall employment.5 Our setting differs from
theirs in that we study an extracurricular program that is more likely to only attract
the genuine subpopulation of those interested in pursuing entrepreneurship.
Second, we contribute to the literature on the entrepreneurial mindset. The en-
trepreneurship training program we study is based on a curriculum that aims to
foster an entrepreneurial mindset and personal initiative. Campos, Frese, Goldstein,
Iacovone, Johnson, McKenzie, and Mensmann (2017) show that this type of train-
ing results in larger increases of profits than a traditional business training program.
Ubfal, Arraiz, Beuermann, Frese, Maffioli, and Verch (2019) find transient, short-
4 We elicit data on the Big-5 personality traits, grit, personal initiative and aspirations. Further,
we gather measurements of time and risk preference as well as individuals’ degree of loss aversion.
5 This speaks to substitution from wage employment to self-employment, and does not imply
overall employment effects. Alaref, Brodmann, and Premand (2020) present results from a medium
term follow-up and show that any effects were short lived: four years after the program, there are
no differences in self-employment and wage employment rates between the treatment and control
groups.
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term effects of this type of training on micro-entrepreneurs in Jamaica. We comple-
ment this burgeoning literature by offering further evidence on the merits of non-
traditional training programs and enhance it by focusing on nascent entrepreneurs
who have been found to benefit from traditional training programs (see Klinger and
Schündeln, 2011).
Third, we contribute to the literature on selection into entrepreneurship and pre-
dictors of entrepreneurial success. Levine and Rubinstein (2017) show that successful
entrepreneurs select along both cognitive and non-cognitive dimensions. Evidence
from high-income countries suggests that cognitive and non-cognitive traits are im-
portant predictors of entrepreneurial success (Andersen, Di Girolamo, Harrison, and
Lau, 2014; Koudstaal, Sloof, and Van Praag, 2016; Levine and Rubinstein, 2017). For
example, entrepreneurs are generally more risk-tolerant (Bouchouicha and Vieider,
2019) and display more overconfidence (Åstebro, Jeffrey, and Adomdza, 2007; Herz,
Schunk, and Zehnder, 2014). Evidence is scarce on whether non-cognitive traits are
shaped by entrepreneurial activity or whether people select into entrepreneurship
based on these traits. An established view suggests that preferences are relatively
stable (Schildberg-Hörisch, 2018). There is however recent evidence that personal-
ity traits, such as grit, may be malleable—at least among young adolescents (Alan,
Boneva, and Ertac, 2019). We extend this literature by documenting personality
traits, preferences, and beliefs before individuals select into entrepreneurship, how
these differ by interest in entrepreneurship, and by identifying how entrepreneurship
training affects these characteristics.
Fourth, we speak to the motivations of becoming an entrepreneur, and whether
selection patterns differ by motivation. A sparse literature using observational data
from the USA stresses that non-pecuniary benefits, such as being one’s own boss or
having flexible working hours, play a first-order role for business creation decisions
and that these independence-oriented workers are willing to forgo higher earnings
from wage-employment (Hamilton, 2000; Hurst and Pugsley, 2011, 2015). Guzman,
Oh, and Sen (2020) and Ganguli, Huysentruyt, and Le Coq (2018) confirm the impor-
tance of motives and differential responses to monetary and non-pecuniary motives
resulting in selection patterns into entrepreneurship competitions in randomized field
experiments in the USA and the UK, respectively.6 We complement this recent lit-
erature by identifying the differential selection decisions made by high-skilled youth
6 Ashraf, Bandiera, Davenport, and Lee (2020) vary the salience of career incentives in a recruit-
ment drive for public health workers in Zambia, and also show that the salience of motives affects
selection patterns, and later, performance on the job.
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StartHub Africa (SHA) conducts the academy at local universities during the
academic semester. There is one academy per university which has a target class
size of 40 students that spans nine weeks with one three-hour session each week.
The academy covers all stages of training for nascent entrepreneurs: developing a
business idea, creating a prototype, and implementing the idea. In the curriculum
developed by SHA, management skills, such as cost accounting, and basic principles
of finance and marketing are included, but emphasis is placed on developing par-
ticipants’ personal initiative to foster their entrepreneurial mindset. In this respect
the training program is similar to the program studied by Campos, Frese, Goldstein,
Iacovone, Johnson, McKenzie, and Mensmann (2017). Lecturers are encouraged to
create an interactive atmosphere, and the standardized materials SHA provides to
the instructors require active input from the participants. Finally, the curriculum
contains a number of practical exercises outside of the classroom. For instance, stu-
dents are taught basic principles of market research, then brainstorm product ideas
and spend the rest of the session venturing out on campus to assess people’s reaction
to their product ideas. The training is taught by university lecturers or respected
entrepreneurs from the local community that have been extensively trained and are
continuously supported by SHA.
The academy is preceded by a marketing and application phase which spans the
first three weeks of the semester. During the marketing phase, SHA creates aware-
ness of the program using posters and flyers across campus, and in short pitches in
classrooms and at campus events. Students are informed that attending an informa-
tion session is a prerequisite for applying. Six to twelve of these 30-minute sessions
are held per day over two or three days in a central location at each university.
The information sessions provide detailed information on the academy’s content,
the expectations of the participants, in particular the time commitment necessary
to complete the academy, success stories from previous participants, and the possi-
bility to ask questions to SHA staff. To harmonize the information sessions as much
as possible, the same SHA staff hold the information sessions throughout each day.
Moreover, the presentations are video-based and contain the same structure: moti-
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vation for the academy, details, deliverables and requirements of the academy, and
success stories from alumni. After the information session, students could pick up an
application form in person, fill it out (in 10 to 15 minutes) and return it either to the
team conducting information session, or to a well-know place on campus indicated
on the application form. Application forms were only available to participants of the
information sessions.
3.2.2 Experimental design
We exploit two sources of exogenous, experimental variation. First, in the en-
trepreneurship training experiment, admission to the academy is randomly offered
to a subset of applicants. We use this variation to estimate the causal effect of
being offered admission to the academy on entrepreneurial activity and economic
outcomes. We also investigate effects on cognitive and non-cognitive skills. Sec-
ond, to understand in more detail the characteristics and motivations of these young
entrepreneurs, we add a second layer of exogenous variation: In the selection exper-
iment, we randomly vary whether marketing for the academy emphasizes financial
independence or creative freedom as motivation for becoming an entrepreneur. This
variation allows us to identify how motivation impacts the application decision and to
study heterogeneous effects based on individual characteristics. Figure 3.1 presents
the experimental design. Finally, using a sample drawn from the same population,
we document endogenous self-selection by comparing eligible students who did not
express interest in the academy to applicants. We also investigate how key out-
comes from the entrepreneurship training experiment evolve differentially over time
between students who did not express interest to those who applied but did not
receive training.
We first discuss the selection experiment and the complementary observational
examination of self-selection, and then the entrepreneurship training experiment be-
cause this follows the chronological journey of a student from hearing about the train-
ing to submitting an application and possibly being offered admission. Nonetheless,
the main research question draws on hypotheses about the entrepreneurship training
experiment.
Understanding selection and motives.
The first layer of experimental variation is induced by randomly exposing clus-
ters of students to different marketing messages during the information sessions. In
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Figure 3.1: Experimental design and data collection. Notes. Different phases of the experi-
mental design and self-selection decisions is marked in grey, exogenous experimental variation is marked in
orange, and data collection is marked in blue.
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the selection experiment, the content of two motivational video presentations is ran-
domly varied between emphasizing i) that entrepreneurship offers the possibility of
achieving financial independence, and ii) that entrepreneurship offers the freedom to
be creative. For this, the respective motives are varied in four of the twelve overall
slides reiterating the benefits of becoming an entrepreneur and in the corresponding
voice-over of these slides.7 Everything else is kept constant. Support staff ascer-
tained that no student listened to two information sessions by either staying in the
room for the next session or entering early during an ongoing session. This exoge-
nous variation allows us to cleanly identify how the pool of applicants differs across
these two messages.
To analyze selection into the academy, we compare students who are interested
in entrepreneurship, indicated by applying to the academy, with those who are not
interested in entrepreneurship indicated by being aware of the entrepreneurship
academy and not attending an information session. We refer to this latter group
as the non-interested subpopulation. In other words, conditional on having been
exposed to the marketing phase, we investigate what drives certain individuals to
opt-in to the academy.
Entrepreneurship training experiment
The entrepreneurship training experiment allows for causally estimating the ef-
fect of the academy on individuals’ self-employment probability, as well as on labor
market outcomes and personality traits. Having participated in an information ses-
sion, students decide whether to apply to the academy. A random sample, stratified
by year and field of study, is then drawn from the set of all applications and offered
admission to the training program — the treatment group. The remainder is placed
into the control group.
3.2.3 Hypotheses
Grounded in the results of previous work, there are several hypotheses we seek
to test. The first set of hypotheses concerns the effects of entrepreneurship training
on economic and business outcomes and inputs. First, as shown by Klinger and
Schündeln (2011) for a traditional entrepreneurship training program, we hypoth-
esize that participating in the entrepreneurship academy fosters business creation.
7 In Appendix Section 4.6 we present in detail how information sessions differed across the two
marketing themes.
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Yet, as our entire sample consists of highly-educated students that are all interested
in entrepreneurship, we may not find significant differences between treatment and
control groups at the extensive margin. Therefore, we further hypothesize that par-
ticipation in the academy will improve business performance, captured by indicators
such as monthly sales and profits, measures of capital and labor input, and measures
of general economic self-sufficiency. One particular dimension we are interested in
is labor input, and whether treated subjects create jobs through the businesses they
create. The hypotheses are summarized in Table 3.1, Family 1.1. Positive find-
ings for these hypotheses would provide evidence for entrepreneurial activity being
teachable.
Second, we seek to identify channels through which the entrepreneurship training
effects the primary outcomes of business creation and performance. Campos, Frese,
Goldstein, Iacovone, Johnson, McKenzie, and Mensmann (2017) find that a personal
initiative training program can deliver lasting improvements for small business own-
ers and they identified several channels: application of successful business practices,
increased personal initiative, increased capital and labor inputs, substantial inno-
vative activity (e.g., in the form of new products originating from own ideas) and
product differentiation. We therefore hypothesize that participation in the academy
leads to implementing more successful business practices, greater financial profession-
alization, marketing activities, product and process innovation, and better access to
business networks. The hypotheses are summarized in Table 3.1, Family 1.2, Hy-
potheses 1 to 6. Finding effects along these dimensions would lend evidence to the
most effective channels through which entrepreneurship training impacts individuals’
economic outcomes.
Moreover, as laid out before, there is evidence that entrepreneurs are posi-
tively selected on cognitive and non-cognitive traits. Little is known, however,
about whether non-cognitive traits may be shaped beyond adolescence. We there-
fore test hypotheses that investigate whether participating in the academy shapes
non-cognitive traits. These hypotheses are summarized in Table 3.1, Family 1.2,
Hypotheses 7 and 8. These hypotheses allow us to test whether — and to what ex-
tend — non-cognitive traits are malleable through participation in entrepreneurship
training.
The second set of hypotheses concerns selection into entrepreneurship. First,
individuals may have different motives for desiring to be an entrepreneur. Guz-
man, Oh, and Sen (2020) study entrepreneurs and find that women and individuals
located in more altruistic cultures are motivated more by social-impact messages
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than money, whereas men and those in less altruistic cultures are motivated more
by money than potential social-impact. Ganguli, Huysentruyt, and Le Coq (2018)
document crowding-out between extrinsic, cash-based and intrinsic, social motives
for social entrepreneurs. While extrinsic motivational messages affect effort in ap-
plications for a start-up grant, they reduce the pool of applicants at the same time.
Further, business success was less likely: social entrepreneurs motivated by extrin-
sic messages worked fewer hours per week, created fewer employment opportunities,
and profited less from their venture. We therefore test which marketing message
attracts more applicants: whether monetary motives or the promise of indepen-
dent work better draws young, highly-educated individuals to entrepreneurship. We
also investigate the types of individuals that are drawn to the different market-
ing messages. We consider measures of average cognitive ability, over-confidence
and entrepreneurial self-assessment. These hypotheses are summarized in Table 3.1,
Family 2.1, Hypotheses 1 to 4. These hypotheses test whether stressing different
motivations for becoming an entrepreneur lead to differential application patterns,
both in terms of the quantity of applications and the attributes of the applicants
themselves. Finding differences between the two messages would also speak to how
different motivations to undertake entrepreneurship training are correlated with cer-
tain individual characteristics, and how such motivations shape the composition of
applicants.
Further, we document selection into entrepreneurship (as proxied by selection
into the academy) by comparing those that applied to the academy to those that
were exposed to the marketing campaign but did not apply for the program (non-
interested subpopulation). The outcomes of interest are listed under Hypothesis
Families 2.2.1 and 2.2.2, and mirror those in Hypothesis Families 1.1 and 1.2 from
the primary outcomes of the entrepreneurship training experiment. Comparing base-
line characteristics and outcomes between the two groups allows us to identify the
dimensions on which individuals select into entrepreneurship. Those and additional
measures are investigated at endline to document how the non-interested subpopu-
lation evolves over time compared to those that applied to the training and were not
admitted (control group).
The outcome variables and their measurement are detailed in Section 3.3.2, while
the empirical analysis is detailed in Section 3.4. Our results will inform to what
extent teaching entrepreneurial skills and selection are important aspects for en-
trepreneurship. This is interesting from an academic perspective as it addresses
fundamental questions on skill formation and its potential repercussions for en-
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trepreneurship. It is also of utmost importance for policy: If entrepreneurial skills
can indeed be formed, we offer an evaluation of a cost-effective, relatively easy to
implement, and scalable intervention for high-potential, well-educated individuals.
We can also document whether the nascent entrepreneurs originate from high-skilled
individuals that would otherwise be unemployed or whether they are substituting
away from formal-employment. If selection is found as relatively more important for
entrepreneurial success, our study would inform policy makers that identifying high-
potential entrepreneurs is of first-order importance (see McKenzie (2017) and Rigol,
Hussam, and Roth (2018) who seek to identify high-potential entrepreneurs, and
Shane (2009) who warns about dragging people into risky, non-growth entrepreneur-
ship). Our results would also offer some guidance on the motives that attract these
entrepreneurs-to-be.
3.2.4 Time frame
The proposed project consists of three waves of entrepreneurship training academies.
Each wave consists of the implementation of the entrepreneurship academies, the
experimental variation introduced in both the entrepreneurship training experiment
and the selection experiment, and the data collection before and after the interven-
tion. As detailed below, there will be a baseline survey, an implementation check
survey (one to two months after the intervention), a midline survey (six months
later) and two endline surveys. The Endline Survey I takes place 12 months after
the intervention, the Endline Survey II then 24 months after the intervention of the
last wave.
The first wave started in September 2019, and the second wave started in January
2020. The third wave is scheduled for September 2020. The Endline Survey I will
take place in February 2021 (Wave I), July 2021 (Wave II), and February 2022 (Wave
III). The Endline Survey II is scheduled for February 2023 for all three waves. We
expect to finish the analysis in the summer of 2023. Table 3.2 sets out the detailed
time line for all steps in all waves. The implementation of Wave I and Wave II is
already in progress, while the data collection for the midline survey (Wave I) and the
implementation check survey (Wave II) in 2020 is scheduled. Later data collection
and the implementation of Wave III is planned.
Due to the current Covid-19 crisis, we may not be able to implement Wave III as
planned in September 2020, but have to postpone it to the spring semester 2021. In
this case, all of the following dates will be postponed by around six months. In the
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Stage/Instrument Sample Status Date
Piloting 3 academies, 380 applicants Completed March-May 2018
Wave I 10 academies
Marketing / information sessions / short surveys n = 1019 Completed Aug.- Sept. 2019
Application data / Baseline survey napp = 713, nbaseline = 672 Completed Aug.- Sept. 2019
Enterpreneurship academy n = 414 Completed Aug. 2019 - Jan. 2020
Implementation check survey n = 625 Completed Jan. - Feb. 2020
Midline survey Scheduled Sep. - Oct. 2020
Endline survey I&II Planned Jan. - Feb. 2021 & Jan. - Feb. 2023
Wave II 8 academies
Marketing / information sessions / short surveys n = 760 Completed Feb. - March 2020
Application data / Baseline survey napp = 584, nbaseline = 562 Completed Feb. - March 2020
Enterpreneurship academy n = 313 In process Feb. - July 2020
Student screening survey n = 926 Completed Feb. - March 2020
Student population survey I In process May- June 2020
Implementation check Scheduled July - Aug. 2020
Midline survey Planned Jan. - Feb. 2021
Endline survey I&II Planned July- Aug. 2021 & Jan. - Feb. 2023
Student population survey II Planned Jan. - Feb. 2023
Wave III 9 academies
Marketing / information sessions/ short surveys Planned Aug.- Sept. 2020
Application data Planned Aug.- Sept. 2020
Enterpreneurship academy Planned Aug. 2020 - Jan. 2021
Student screening survey Planned Sep. - Oct. 2020
Student population survey I Planned Oct. - Dec. 2020
Implementation check Planned Jan. - Feb. 2021
Midline survey Planned July - Aug. 2021
Endline survey I&II Planned Jan. - Feb. 2022 & Jan. - Feb. 2023
Student population survey II Planned Jan. - Feb. 2023
Table 3.2: Research project timeline. Notes. The midline survey of Wave I is scheduled for
September and October 2020 research funds that have been secured in June 2020 are being disbursed. Wave
III is planned for the fall semester 2020/2021. Due to Covid-19, Wave III may have to be postponed to the
spring semester of 2021. All following dates will be postponed by around six months in this case. In we are
unable to implement Wave III, endline survey II will be conducted in the summer of 2022 for Wave I and II.
worst possible case, we may not be able to implement Wave III at all. Although we
deem this highly unlikely, we are conservative in the statistical power calculations
below and account for a worst-case scenario with only the two already implemented
waves and a base-case scenario with all three planned waves. The Covid-19 crisis will
not have any effect on the scheduled data collection as only the endline survey will
be conducted as an in-person survey, all other surveys are conducted via telephone.
3.2.5 Treatment assignment and statistical power
Selection experiment
Each information session presenter was provided with a randomly drawn mar-
keting theme — financial independence or creative freedom — for the first session
of the day. This was randomly chosen by the research team using a fair coin. The
themes for the remaining sessions were then alternated by the presenter.
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Entrepreneurship training experiment
The randomization procedure offered admission to the training program to in-
dividuals with complete applications. Within each training cohort (i.e., university-
semester), the target was to offer admission to 40 students, an optimal classroom
size determined by SHA.8 We targeted a control group of equal size; however, the
group sizes were constrained by the number of applications received.
Thus the treatment and control group sizes were a function of the number of
applicants. Specifically, if there were over 120 applications, we picked 45 students
at random and offered admission, assigned 75 to the control group and omitted the
remaining students from the study.9 We anticipated low demand in some train-
ing cohorts and chose to over-sample the control group when possible; in case of
low demand, having a sufficiently sized treatment group took priority. When we
received between 85 and 120 applications, 45 students were randomized into the
treatment group, and the rest was assigned to the control group. In case of 80 to
85 applications, we assigned 40 students to control and offered treatment to the re-
maining ones. Finally, if there were less than 80 applications we offered treatment
to nT = min[napplications, 40], and assigned napplications − nT to control.10
Having chosen the experimental group sizes, we implemented the following ran-
domization algorithm which stratifies along two dimensions. First, we grouped stu-
dents according to how many years they had studied their current degree. This is
top coded at three years as this is the modal number of years students require to
complete a Bachelor degree.11 The rationale for this is that students who are close
to graduation are more likely to move into (self-) employment in the near future.
Second, the algorithm ascertains that the share of business students (students who
study business, management, finance, marketing or related fields) is balanced be-
tween treatment and control within each year of study. Students’ prior knowledge
about business and entrepreneurship concepts may interact with the training content
8 SHA allowed for deviations from the optimal size within a range of between 30 to 45 students.
In case of excess (insufficient) interest, the classes were larger (smaller).
9 This is done due to capacity and resource constraints. In practice, it is rare to receive over 120
applications for an academy.
10 Note that the second term can be zero if less than 40 applications are received.
11 Most applicants are Bachelor students (≈ 87 percent) and those that are not are almost ex-
clusively enrolled in “certificate” and “diploma” programs, which can either be a preparatory or
supplementary degree. These usually take two years and can precede or follow a Bachelor degree.
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and business students’ responses to the training program would systematically differ
vis-à-vis non-business students.
We form six cells based on the program of study: business-related (two dimen-
sions: yes or no), and years into the program (three dimensions: one, two or three
years). We first use both cells for third-year students, and within each assign an
equal number to either treatment or control. This ensures that all applications from
third-year students are used.12 We then applied the same procedure to second-year
students. If not all applications from second-year students were necessary to com-
plete target group sizes, we chose a subset at random. Finally, if group sizes were
still not exhausted, we included (a random subset of) first-year students.13 The
exact same procedure will be used in Wave III.
Our calculations show both the worst-case scenario, in which we cannot imple-
ment the planned third wave at all, and the base-case scenario, in which we proceed
with our project as planned or with some delays. To benchmark the statistical power
of detecting effects of the training program on business success, we are conservative
and present minimum detectable effect sizes based on the actual training cohort sizes
from the first two waves of training conducted in the fall of 2019 and the spring of
2020 as the worst-case scenario. We further provide power calculations for various
scenarios of attrition and non-compliance given the realized sample size.
During the first two waves we worked with 18 cohorts, meaning 18 university-by-
semester blocks. There are 727 and 497 students in the treatment and control groups
respectively. This corresponds to an average treatment group size and control group
size of 40.4 and 27.6, respectively, and 68 students per cohort in total.
To incorporate myriad factors such as attrition, non-compliance, varying treat-
ment and control group sizes into the power calculations, we perform simulations.
We specify a data generating process and set the magnitude of our treatment effect
to be equal to a pre-specified percentage of the standard deviation of a generic out-
come; this can be interpreted as an effect size in percentage terms. This maps well
into our strategy to deal with concerns from testing multiple hypotheses which rests
12 In theory, it would be possible to receive applications from third-year students in excess of the
experimental group sizes. In such cases, we would have randomly picked the respective number. In
practice this was never the cases.
13 As an example, suppose there are 80 third year applicants; 56 in business-related degrees, 24
in non-business related degrees. The procedure allocates 28 of the business students to each of
treatment and control; similarly, 12 of the non-business students would be in each of treatment
and control. Overall, there would be 40 students in treatment and 40 in control, but the shares of
business and non-business students would be equal across the groups.
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on constructing normalized indices of our outcome variables with a mean of zero and
a standard deviation of one.14
For the simulations, we estimate the primary specification (see Equation (3.1))
in a simulated sample and conduct a two-sided t-test of the null hypothesis of a zero
effect of the treatment using standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity
for inference. For the simulated sample, we set the number of cohorts, rates for
attrition, non-compliance, and percent of sample treated as specified in the next
paragraph. Then we vary the sample size per cohort starting from four, going until
122 in steps of four.15 We draw 1,000 simulation samples per sample size considered.
Across all simulated samples, we calculate the share of rejected null hypotheses at
α = 0.05 which is the measure of simulated power.
The simulation results are shown in Figure 3.2. Panel (a) presents the base-case
scenario based on three waves of academies (left panel) and the worst-case scenario
based on the two waves of academies that have been implemented already. We set
the following parameters for our benchmark simulations: attrition rate of 5 percent,
corresponding to twice the actually observed attrition in the implementation check of
the first wave in fall 2019; a non-compliance rate of 25 percent as calculated based on
the attendance data for the first wave in fall 2019; and a correlation within training
cohorts of 10 percent, corresponding to a generously upward rounded measure from
pilot data. The right half of panel (a) indicates that the design is sufficiently powerful
(76 percent) to detect an effect of 20 percent (or 0.2 of a standard deviation) even in
the worst-case scenario which seems to be a typically observed change (McKenzie and
Woodruff, 2014).16 In the base-case scenario in the left half of panel (a), our design
would be well-powered to detect an effect size of 20 percent (89 percent power). If
the effect size is actually only 15 percent of our standardized variable, the statistical
power of our design reduces to 66 percent.
In panel (b) and (c) of Figure 3.2, we take the worst-case scenario and calculate
the power to detect a 20 percent effect considering even more severe scenarios of
14 In Section 3.2.3, we detail the procedure. In short, combining several measures into one index
measure reduces the number of hypotheses to be tested. Rather than testing one hypothesis per
variable, general conclusions are drawn by testing a hypothesis regarding the index.
15 The lower sample sizes are not realistic, though they help to visualize the trend in power with
respect to cohort size.
16 Our study is not only well-powered to detect typical effect sizes, it also improves on existing
studies. McKenzie and Woodruff (2014) notes that in most studies the power to detect an increase
of 25 or even 50 percent in profits or revenues is well below generally accepted levels of power of
above 80 percent.
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Ideal power (80%)
Ave. # of students (68)
Ideal power (80%)
Ave. # of students (68)
Base-case scenario (3 waves) Worst-case scenario (2 waves)















Effect size    15 % 20 % 25 %
(a) Effect size in base- and worst-case scenario.
Ideal power (80%)














Attrition    5 % 10 % 15 %
(b) Worst-case scenario + attrition.
Ideal power (80%)














Non-compliance    25 % 30 % 35 %
(c) Worst-case scenario + non-compliance.
Figure 3.2: Simulated statistical power. Notes. The simulations in Panel (a) have the following
specifications: attrition rate is five percent, non-compliance is 25 percent, within-cohort correlation is 10
percent and the treatment probability is 59 percent. Statistical power to detect an effect of 15 percent, 20
percent or 25 percent for different average cohort sizes is presented. Cohort size is the sum of treatment and
control group individuals. The right hand panel reports the worst-case scenario (two waves) while the left
hand panel illustrates calculations for the base-case scenario (three waves). The worst-case simulations vary
the attrition rate in Panel (b) and the non-compliance rate in Panel (c) for an effect size of 20 percent.
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attrition and non-compliance, holding the other parameters constant.17 Panel (b)
reports that attrition rates of 10 percent and 15 percent would only have a marginal
effect on the power of the design. Panel (c) shows that non-compliance rates of 30
percent and 35 percent decrease statistical power to detect an effect of 20 percent
to 71 percent and 60 percent, respectively. Overall, our design is well-powered for
the base-case scenario with three waves. The conservative, worst-case scenario still
yields better power than previous studies despite being below the generally accepted
appropriate target of 80 percent power (McKenzie and Woodruff, 2014).
3.3 Data
3.3.1 Data collection and processing
Measuring treatment effects at two levels and describing selection into entrepreneur-
ship requires a multitude of surveys. Figure 3.1 details our data collection efforts,
and to which subpopulation surveys are administered. We make all survey instru-
ments available through attachments to the pre-registration in the AEA registry
#4502.18
Selection into entrepreneurship
The highest level of self-section occurs when individuals select into being in-
terested in entrepreneurship training and attend an information session (see top of
the pyramid in Figure 3.1). From this subpopulation, we collect the following data
during the information session: pen and paper based short surveys eliciting contact
details, field of study, measures of cognitive ability using four Raven matrices, stu-
dent’s assessment of how many of these they believed they completed correctly and
their assessment of their own entrepreneurial potential on a scale from one through
17 In results not reported, we can also demonstrate that a correlation of 0.15 within training
cohorts has only a negligible effect on the minimum detectable effect.
18 To ascertain data integrity and safety, and to ensure survey respondents’ privacy, we collect,
manage and store data in the following way: First, the interview data is collected by experienced
local enumerators. Prior to each data collection effort, PIs personally conduct extensive multi-day
workshops with the enumerators. Data is collected using Kobo toolbox, and its Android-based
mobile device app. Data is stored on secure drives provided by the University of Munich digital
infrastructure. When data is collected using pen and paper, data is digitized also using Kobo
toolbox in a timely manner and physical records are safely kept at the University of Munich to
ensure privacy thereafter.
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ten.19 To reach the non-interested subpopulation we track those classes where the
training academy was advertised using short pitches. We classify all students of such
a class as having been exposed to marketing. We return to the same classrooms a
few weeks later and distribute student population screening surveys. These surveys
mimic short surveys conducted during information sessions and also elicit students’
awareness of entrepreneurship training programs. This allows us to identify students
who were aware of the academy based on whether they have heard about our training
program or about any entrepreneurship training program at their university.20 The
pool of students who are aware of a training program but did not apply constitutes
the sampling frame for the student population survey. We then randomly sample 80
students per university, and survey them at two points in time. First, we conduct
a phone survey mimicking the baseline survey conducted with academy applicants,
which allows us to describe predictors of selection into entrepreneurship (Student
Population Survey I ). Second, we repeat this in Student Population Survey II to
analyze how the subpopulation of non-interested students evolved over time relative
to those who expressed in training but were not admitted—the control group. There
is no experimental variation at either stage of this comparison.
Selection experiment
Attending information sessions is a necessary requirement for students to be able
to apply to the training program since the exogenous variation of the marketing mes-
sages in the selection experiment is implemented in the information sessions. At the
end of an information session, interested students can pick up a paper-based applica-
tion form. Thus, application form data is only available for the subset of those inter-
ested in the training who actually submit a (complete) application form. Application
forms contain contact details, demographic information, questions about motivations
for and experience with entrepreneurship. We also include questions on students’
expected future wage income, as well as expected earnings from entrepreneurship.
With the experimental variation of the marketing messages we identify how selection
into applying for entrepreneurship training varies with the stressed motives.
19 A short and standardized illustration on how Raven matrices work in general and how students
ought to indicate their answers on the short surveys was provided.
20 Most universities do not offer alternative entrepreneurship training programs. Thus, it is rea-
sonable to assume that students who were aware of a general academy were aware of our academy
despite being unable to exactly recall the name of the program.
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Entrepreneurship training experiment
To causally identify the effect of being offered entrepreneurship training, admis-
sion to the training program is offered on a random basis among those who apply.
We gather pre-treatment data by conducting a baseline survey prior to individuals
being informed about their admissions decisions. After the entrepreneurship training
academy, we conduct an implementation check survey (around one to two months
after the academy ends) and a midline survey (around six month later) with the
treatment and control groups. Finally, we carry out two endline surveys: Endline
Survey I will be conducted 12 months after each cohort is finished with their training;
Endline Survey II surveys the entire sample around two years after the last round of
academies. This survey will be conducted simultaneously for all cohorts and allows
us to look at how medium to long-term effects evolve.
While the baseline, implementation check and midline survey are conducted over
the phone, the endline surveys will be conducted in person. As detailed below,
the surveys elicit information on socio-economic characteristics and main outcome
variables, such as prior and ongoing wage and self-employment, preferences measures
(risk and time preferences, degree of loss aversion), and non-cognitive traits (Big-5,
grit, aspirations and personal initiative). Financial compensation for participation
in the endline surveys helps to minimize attrition.
3.3.2 Key outcomes
We use the collected data to construct outcome measures for our five families of
hypotheses, as laid out in Section 3.2.3. To test hypotheses we follow the approach by
Kling, Liebman, and Katz (2007) and aggregate variables into indices to test each
main hypothesis (see Table 3.1) when possible. This reduces the number of tests
conducted within each family. For instance, rather than testing for effects across
ten business practices, we define an index using adherence to those ten practices
and only conduct one hypothesis test. This hypothesis test in turn is part of a
family of hypothesis tests. While we focus on indices of outcome measures here to
address multiple hypothesis testing, we will also look at individual outcome variables
during the analysis. We will clearly mark which results are accounting for multiple
hypothesis testing and which are not.
Testing primary Hypothesis Families 1.1 and 2.1 will allow us to draw general
conclusions about the entrepreneurship training experiment. Testing hypotheses
within Hypothesis Family 1.2 is informative about the mechanisms through which
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the training program works. Hypotheses 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 set out to analyze dimensions
which correlate with entrepreneurial aspirations and success by comparing applicants
to the non-interested subpopulation.21
To create a summary index from several continuous variables we calculate the
unweighted average of those variables’ z-scores. Z-scores are constructed using the
control group mean and dividing by the control group standard deviation. Thus,
each component of the index has a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one
for the control group. To create an index of a set of binary variables we calculate
their mean; that is, the fraction of “successes” across all component variables. If
required, variables that are used to construct an index are reversed so that meaning
is consistent.22 In Appendix 4.6 we describe which variables are used to construct
the indices in Table 3.1. The pre-analysis plan details the construction of the specific
indices.
Hypothesis Family 1.1 consists of four indices: i) business creation (extensive
margin), ii) business success (revenue, profits), iii) labor (employees) and capital
(assets, inventory) input, and iv), an index of economic self-sufficiency which aggre-
gates earnings from self-employment, wage employment and other sources.
Hypotheses Family 1.2 consists of six primary indices: i) business practices (we
draw on an abbreviated version of the 22-item questionnaire used in McKenzie and
Woodruff (2016), and retain ten elements of the original questionnaire (see Appendix
4.6), ii) financial professionalization (contains among others, knowledge and usage
of financing instruments, indicators of business registration and licensing), iii) mar-
keting practices, iv) capacity to innovate, v) business networks, and vi) development
of an “entrepreneurial mindeset” (a composite index constructed from measures of
personal initiative, aspirations and entrepreneurial future and self-efficacy (Frese,
Krauss, Keith, Escher, Grabarkiewicz, Luneng, Heers, Unger, and Friedrich, 2007;
Campos, Frese, Goldstein, Iacovone, Johnson, McKenzie, and Mensmann, 2017;
Bernard and Taffesse, 2014; Streicher, Rosendahl Huber, Moberg, Jørgensen, and
Redford, 2019)). The last two Hypothesis Families contain non-cogntive traits, such
as the Big-5 personality traits or grit, time and risk preferences, as well as one’s
degree of loss aversion (Rammstedt and John, 2007; Duckworth and Quinn, 2009;
21 We can compare the non-interested subpopulation to the full set of applicants using baseline
data (pre-intervention). Using endline data, we compare the non-interested subpopulation to the
control group (post-intervention).
22 For example, all variables used to create the “Innovation” index are arranged so that a larger
number indicates more innovative.
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Falk, Becker, Dohmen, Enke, Huffman, and Sunde, 2018; Fehr and Goette, 2007).
In these Families, we create indices where there is a natural grouping (e.g., risk and
subjective risk preferences), and investigate sub-indices in other cases (e.g., Big-5
indices).
Hypotheses Family 2.1 is the essence of the selection study and consists of four
hypotheses: i) the relative effectiveness of the two randomly chosen marketing mes-
sages in terms of attracting applications, ii) whether applicants differ in their cog-
nitive ability (proxied by performance on Raven matrices), iii) whether applicants
exhibit differences in over-confidence, and iv) whether applicants self-assess their
entrepreneurial potential differently. We construct a measure of over-confidence by
comparing individuals’ observed and subjective (self-reported) performance on the
Raven matrices (Åstebro, Herz, Nanda, and Weber, 2014; Moore and Healy, 2008).
There are two families of hypotheses which we use to study correlates of en-
trepreneurial aspirations and success in the wider population, Families 2.1.1 and
2.1.2. They mirror the hypotheses from Families 1.1 and 1.2 and therefore mimic
the baseline and endline. These two families of hypotheses describe patterns through
which students select into being interested in entrepreneurship training. We non-
experimentally study baseline and endline differences between students who were
interested in entrepreneurship training, and students who were not. First, the base-
line comparison sheds light on how the subpopulation that applied to the training
program differs from the general student population at large. Second, by comparing
those that did not express interest (non-interested subpopulation) to interested stu-
dents who were not offered admission to the training (control group) at endline, we
can observe how those groups evolved over time.
3.3.3 Variation from intended sample size
The final sample size depends on the number of applicants and their response
rate. To ensure that potentially interested students know about the academy and
come to information sessions, we closely monitor the marketing campaign. To reduce
attrition (i.e., non response) of the applicants over time, we conduct multiple rounds
of follow-up surveys to establish frequent contact and trust.
Changing phone numbers represent the highest threat to maintaining contact
with the surveyees. Therefore, in addition to students’ own phone number(s), we in-
quire into contact details from a next-of-kin, their classroom coordinator and ask for
an email address. In subsequent surveys, respondents are asked to verify or update
108
Chapter 3 – Entrepreneurship in Uganda
this information. We achieved a response rate of 97.1 percent in the implementation
check of the first wave.
We may use social media groups of the academies as an additional source of
information in the future.23 If those groups retain additional information, attrition
could be treatment-specific. We try to account for this by documenting whether
the data used to contact surveyees would have been available for both treatment
and control. Further, when testing whether attrition is treatment-specific we will
be conservative and test for attrition using 10 percent as threshold for statistical
significance.
Should treatment status predict attrition, we will additionally provide treatment
effect bounds using two approaches recently proposed in the literature. First, the
procedure proposed by Lee (2009) quantifies the distribution of those who were
induced to “staying in the sample” by treatment and estimates the best and worst-
case scenarios. Second, we construct treatment effect bounds using the method
suggested by Behaghel, Crépon, Gurgand, and Le Barbanchon (2015). This approach
uses the number of attempts (e.g., phone calls) made to reach a person as instrument
in a Heckman-type selection model.
3.3.4 Randomization balance
At this point, implementation of the intervention of the first two waves is com-
pleted. We have data available for all participants of the information session where
we implemented the selection experiment using randomly chosen marketing messages
across both waves. Additionally, we have collected baseline data from applicants and
randomized admission offers across both waves (see Figure 3.1).
In Table 3.3, we conduct balance checks using the baseline data and compare
those individuals who were offered admission (treatment) to those who were not
(control) in the entrepreneurship training experiment. Columns 1 and 3 report the
unconditional means for the treatment and control group. In column 5, we regress
the respective variable on a treatment indicator, controlling for training cohort fixed-
effects, and report the estimated treatment effect (regression-adjusted difference).
Using heteroskedasticity robust standard errors, we then conduct a two-sided t-
test of whether the treatment effect is equal to zero, and report the p-value in
column 6. Overall, Table 3.3 suggests that randomization was successful; from 49
23 Trainers typically create WhatsApp groups to stay in touch with their class members, share
materials, and give updates about scheduling and locations.
109
Chapter 3 – Entrepreneurship in Uganda
tests we conduct, only one difference is statistically significant at the five percent
level. Specifically, treatment subjects report higher time preference scores which we
attribute to random sampling variation.
For the selection experiment, we only have the short-surveys of participants at
the information sessions as baseline data. The elicited characteristics (gender, field
and year of study) were balanced across both randomly assigned marketing themes.
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Treatment Control Reg. Adj.
Mean St. dev. Mean St. dev. Diff. p-value N
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
General
Profit marketing theme (d) 0.44 0.50 0.41 0.41 0.01 0.83 1215
Male student (d) 0.52 0.50 0.58 0.58 −0.02 0.48 1215
Employment
Working for a wage during the semester (d) 0.10 0.30 0.07 0.07 0.02 0.21 1214
Employer is company (d) 0.04 0.20 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.33 1214
Compensation per month in UGX (ths) 39.37 184.51 35.40 35.40 6.35 0.65 1214
Hours per week working 3.71 13.88 2.42 2.42 1.01 0.19 1214
Business
Ever owned a business (d) 0.28 0.45 0.25 0.25 0.01 0.73 1214
Currently owning a business (d) 0.22 0.41 0.19 0.19 0.01 0.62 1214
Founder/Co-founder of business (d) 0.26 0.44 0.24 0.24 0.00 0.98 1214
Number of partners in business [*] 0.38 1.82 0.29 0.29 0.10 0.39 547
Business officially registered (d) [*] 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.71 546
Business has local trading license (d) [*] 0.03 0.16 0.05 0.05 −0.02 0.13 536
Length of existence of business 0.57 1.74 0.53 0.53 0.04 0.74 1214
Length of work at business in months 0.56 1.72 0.48 0.48 0.07 0.53 1214
Number of full-time employees 0.71 11.25 0.40 0.40 0.48 0.43 1214
Number of part-time employees 0.20 1.20 0.20 0.20 −0.01 0.93 1214
Hours per week working at business 7.71 18.58 6.12 6.12 0.19 0.85 1209
Profit per month at business in UGX (ths) 174.32 689.43 147.19 147.19 31.29 0.43 1214
Number of additional businesses owned [*] 0.06 0.27 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.52 547
Networks
Personal contacts for business advice 0.70 0.46 0.73 0.73 −0.01 0.71 1210
Number of contacts in family and friends 2.74 3.30 2.86 2.86 −0.02 0.91 1206
Number of contacts outside family and friends 0.80 1.83 1.03 1.03 −0.23 0.12 1210
Contacts can help discussing business ideas (d) 0.67 0.47 0.72 0.72 −0.02 0.51 1202
Contacts helped discussing business ideas in the past (d) 0.40 0.49 0.43 0.43 −0.02 0.42 1202
Contacts can help collecting payments (d) 0.38 0.49 0.41 0.41 −0.02 0.48 1142
Contacts helped collecting payments in the past (d) 0.12 0.32 0.13 0.13 −0.01 0.55 1142
Contacts can help with sharing tools, inputs, employees (d) 0.37 0.48 0.39 0.39 −0.03 0.37 1126
Contacts helped with sharing tools, inputs, employees in the past (d) 0.12 0.33 0.13 0.13 0.00 0.82 1126
Contacts can help with purchasing inputs, stocks (d) 0.36 0.48 0.38 0.38 −0.02 0.51 1129
Contacts helped with purchasing inputs, stocks in the past (d) 0.13 0.33 0.12 0.12 0.00 0.84 1129
Funding
Ever took loan to fund business idea (d) 0.08 0.28 0.08 0.08 0.00 0.97 1213
Number of known funding initiatives (out of 7) 1.38 1.16 1.41 1.41 0.01 0.88 1172
Non-Cognitive
Big-5: extraversion 0.88 1.44 0.84 0.84 0.13 0.13 1210
Big-5: agreeableness 1.56 1.27 1.44 1.44 0.03 0.75 1212
Big-5: conscientiousness 1.99 1.22 1.90 1.90 0.00 0.95 1211
Big-5: neuroticism −1.15 1.35 −1.13 −1.13 −0.07 0.40 1212
Big-5: openness 7.55 1.27 7.50 7.50 0.04 0.56 1213
Grit score (1-5) 3.57 0.44 3.58 3.58 −0.03 0.32 1203
Personal initiative score (1-5) 4.02 0.41 4.01 4.01 0.00 0.99 1208
Stress score (0-16) 6.20 2.25 6.02 6.02 0.11 0.42 1200
Preferences
Risk preference: scale (1-5) 4.07 0.79 4.06 4.06 −0.03 0.54 1212
Risk preference: final number (1-32) 15.53 11.79 16.09 16.09 0.46 0.52 1213
Loss aversion: Final number (0-6) 4.68 2.02 4.57 4.57 0.16 0.20 1213
Time preference: scale (1-5) 4.03 0.90 3.96 3.96 0.06 0.28 1212
Time preference: final number (1-32) 11.58 12.36 9.79 9.79 1.42 0.05 1213
Entrepreneurial Self-Assessment
Confidence in ability to start own company (1-5) 4.24 0.66 4.24 4.24 −0.03 0.46 1213
Confidence in ability to pursue self-employed career (1-5) 4.30 0.59 4.22 4.22 0.05 0.16 1213
Confidence in ability to manage challenges of an entrepreneur (1-5) 4.17 0.61 4.17 4.17 −0.03 0.39 1213
Confidence in ability to work in own business one year from now (1-5) 3.90 0.90 3.86 3.86 0.00 0.96 1200
Table 3.3: Balance in entrepreneurship training sample. Notes. Columns 1 and 3 report the
unconditional mean, columns 2 and 4 the standard deviation for the treatment, who was randomly offered
admission to the training program, and control group, respectively. Column 5 reports the regression adjusted
mean β̂1 estimated using yi,u = β0 +β1treati,u+αu+ εi,u where αu is training-cohort fixed effect. Column
6 displays the p-value from a two-sided t-test of H0 : β1 = 0 using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.
The last column shows the number of non-missing observations. (d) denotes an indicator variable. Variables
marked with a [*] are those that were only measured in the second wave.
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3.4 Analysis
OLS will be used if the outcome measure is continuous. We will report results
from both logit and OLS regressions for binary outcomes, with the logit specification
being our preferred. Inference about treatment effects will be based on two-sided
t-tests obtained from using (cluster-)robust standard errors. We precisely state how
standard errors are calculated when discussing the empirical specifications for esti-
mating treatment effects. We separately discuss the empirical specifications for the
entrepreneurship training study and the selection study. The p-values that govern
our conclusions will take into account multiple hypotheses testing by being adjusted
to control for the family-wise error rate (FWER). We detail the procedure in Sec-
tion 3.4.4.
3.4.1 Entrepreneurship training experiment
In the entrepreneurship training experiment, we identify the Intention-to-Treat
(ITT) effect of being offered admission to the entrepreneurship training. We sepa-
rately estimate the coefficient of interest β1,r for short-term (r = 2, Endline I) and
long-term effects (r = 3, Endline II) according to Equation (3.1):
yi,u,r = β0,r + β1,rtreati,u + αu + stratai,u + εi,u,r (3.1)
where yi,u,r is outcome (measured by an index) for individual i, training cohort
u ∈ {1, ...,K}, and survey round r. The indicator variable treati,u is equal to
one if individual (applicant) i in training cohort u was randomly offered admission,
and zero otherwise. Since randomization of admission offers was stratified by field
of study and year of study, we include an indicator variable for every combination
of the two variables.24 Since the probability of being assigned to treatment differs
across training cohorts, and is a function of the number of applicants, we include a
training cohort fixed effect αu.
Equation (3.1) is our preferred specification, and results from it will be reported
first in the analysis. Put differently, estimates of β1 from Equation (3.1) will be used
to address the questions and hypotheses posed earlier. The following specifications
are intended to provide more precise estimates in order to help us better gauge the
24 This results in five indicators included in the regressions, with one reference category omitted.
These randomization cells refer to every combination of field of study (business and non-business)
and year of study (first, second, and third).
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magnitude of the estimated effects.
To improve the precision of β̂1 we run a second set of specifications which in-
cludes a set of pre-treatment predictors. We follow the recommendation in Duflo,
Banerjee, Finkelstein, Katz, Olken, and Sautmann (2020) and use a variable selection
approach. The double post-lasso estimation proposed by Belloni, Chernozhukov, and
Hansen (2014) selects a low-dimensional set of predictors which are then included in
the estimation. The method uses two separate Lasso regressions; one model to pre-
dict treatment assignment, another model to predict the outcome, and each model
returns a set of variables to be included. Denote the union of this (as of now un-
known) set of covariates by Xi,u,r=0. We further include the baseline value of the
dependent variable yi,u,r=0 whenever available:
yi,u,r = β0 + β1,rtreati,u + β2yi,u,r=0 +X
′
i,u,r=0γ + stratai,u + αu + εi,u,r (3.2)
McKenzie (2012) discusses the benefits of a design that uses several post-treatment
surveys to obtain more precise treatment effect estimates. Variables central to the
analysis, such as profits and revenues, are likely to exhibit little auto-correlation. In
this setting, statistical power in ANCOVA specifications is increased by pooling post-
treatment observations. Section 3.3 describes that we conduct one midline follow up
in addition to two endline surveys, resulting in three (r ∈ {1, 2, 3}) post-treatment
surveys. Pooling those rounds, we estimate:
yi,u,r = δr + β1treati,u + β2yi,u,r=0 + αu + εi,u,r (3.3)
where δr is a survey round fixed effect, and r = 0 indexes the baseline.
Effect heterogeneity
We are interested in analyzing heterogeneity in the ITT-effects along four in-
dependent, preregistered dimensions. First, we explore whether effects differ by an
individual’s field of study. Students in a business-related degree may have a higher
ex ante likelihood of starting (successful) businesses due to higher entrepreneurial
intentions or a different skill set (e.g., Solesvik, 2013; Bae, Qian, Miao, and Fiet,
2014). Second, we test whether effects differ by an individual’s year in their degree.
Students closer to graduation are more likely to move into (self-)employment in the
near future. Thus, we test whether effects differ between students in their final
(third year) and the remaining students. Third, we assess whether effects are dif-
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ferent for students who report having sufficient financial means at baseline. Capital
constraints have frequently been cited as the major obstacle to business growth in
developing countries, and individuals who already possess the required funds may
stand to benefit in a more immediate way (McKenzie and Woodruff, 2014). Fourth,
we analyze differential effects by gender (Shinnar, Hsu, and Powell, 2014). Additional
exploratory heterogeneity analyses (e.g., along self-reported motives and randomly
assigned marketing themes, economic preferences or personality traits) will be clearly
indicated as such.
Inference
Inference about the estimates in Equations (3.1) and (3.2) will be based on
conventional heteroskedastic-robust Eicker-Huber-White standard errors. In case of
Equation (3.3) standard errors will be clustered at the individual level since we use
up to three observations per individual. Randomization of admission offers occurs
at the individual level, and thus these standard errors are appropriate.
3.4.2 Selection into entrepreneurship
We describe and analyze selection at two steps before being (randomly) offered
admission to the training program. In the selection experiment, random assignment
to marketing messages during information sessions provides us with orthogonal vari-
ation which we exploit to study selection into applying for the training program
along two salient motivations. Specifically, we use the following specification to ana-
lyze the differential effect of exposure to a specific marketing messages on a student’s
propensity to apply (Hypothesis 1 of Hypothesis Family 2.1):
appliedi,u = β0 + β1treat profiti,u + αu +W
′
i,uδ + εi,u. (3.4)
Indices are defined as above; applied is an indicator equal to one if an individual
submits an application for the training program, and zero otherwise; treat profit
is an indicator equal to one if an individual participated in an information session
randomly emphasizing financial independence, and equal to zero if theme was cre-
ative freedom. The vector Wi,u is included to increase the precision of estimates and
it contains an individual’s gender as well as indicators for years in the current degree
(defined as above).
Hypotheses 2 through 4 of Family 2.1.1 capture the idea that selection patterns
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may differ relative to the underlying motivation for entrepreneurship. Denote a di-
mension of hypothesized heterogeneity in selection (cognitive ability, over-confidence,
entrepreneurial self-assessment, see Hypotheses 2 through 4 of Family 2.1.1 in Ta-
ble 3.1) with Zi; we then estimate the following specification to test for different
selection patterns:
appliedi,t = β0+β1treat profiti,u+β2Zi,t+γZi,t∗treat profiti,u+αu+Wi,uδ+εi,t.
(3.5)
Conclusions about differential selection will be based on assessing whether the esti-
mated coefficients of our heterogeneity analyses are statistically significantly different
from zero (H0 : γ = 0).
Effect heterogeneity
We do not anticipate to have sufficient power to study whether effects are het-
erogenous by individuals’ field of study. However, we do intend to conduct ex-
ploratory analyses to assess whether the marketing messages induce differences in
the composition of business and non-business students. In this case, we will follow
Casey, Glennerster, and Miguel (2012) and label the regressions as unregistered and
exploratory.
Inference
The selection experiment is a clustered design in which all students participating
in a given information session are exposed either to the financial independence or the
creative freedom marketing message. Thus, standard errors should be clustered at
the session level (Abadie, Athey, Imbens, and Wooldridge, 2020); the level at which
treatment varies. However, due to administrative issues, for some individuals we are
unable to observe the exact session an individual attended and cannot cluster at this
appropriate level. We attempt to overcome this by conservatively clustering at the
training cohort level which is the next highest level. In the worst-case scenario of two
waves, there are only 18 training cohorts and standard cluster-robust inference may
over-reject. We thus pursue the wild bootstrap adjustment proposed by Cameron,
Gelbach, and Miller (2008) to calculate standard errors and conduct inference.
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Non-experimentally describing selection
Finally, we document selection into entrepreneurship by comparing those who
were informed about the training program but did not attend an information ses-
sion (non-interested subpopulation), to those who applied to the training program
using baseline data. In addition, we document trends in how the non-interested sub-
population evolves over time relative to the subpopulation that expressed interest
in the training. We do so by comparing them to those who applied but were not
admitted—the control group—using Endline I (r = 2) data. Both comparisons are
based on estimating the following specification:
yi,u,r = β0 + β1appliedi,u + αu + εi,u,r (3.6)
Indices are defined as above and we examine them at the baseline (r = 0), and again
at the Endline I (r = 2). appliedi,u is an indicator equal to one if an individual
applied to the training, and zero otherwise. There is no experimental variation at this
stage and therefore β̂1 does not measure a causal effect, but is merely informative of
a correlation. We calculate heteroskedasticty-robust Eicker-Huber-White standard
errors. For completeness, we also show results for individual index components.
3.4.3 Data processing
First, to establish that our results, especially those involving monetary outcomes,
are not driven by extreme observations, we will report results with and without win-
sorizing outcomes at the 99th percentile. Should a variable lack a natural lower bound
(i.e., revenues are bound at zero, while profits are unbounded), we also winsorize at
1st percentile.
Second, distributions of variables such as revenue and profits are likely be skewed
to the right. We apply the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation to this data which
is defined as f(x) = log(x +
√
x2 + 1) (Burbidge, Magee, and Robb, 1988). Note
that this transformation is also defined for x = 0 and retains the interpretation of
the classic linear-logarithmic regression model for all values of x — except for very
small values.
Third, in order to limit noise caused by variables with minimal variation, ques-
tions for which 95 percent of observations have the same value within the relevant
sample will be omitted from the analysis and will not be included in any indicators
or hypothesis tests. In the event that omission decisions result in the exclusion of
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all constituent variables for an indicator, the indicator will be not be calculated. We
explicitly exclude variables in Hypothesis 2 of Family 1.2 for “financial profession-
alization”: Indicators, such as equity investment or business registrations are likely
to be rare events and are insightful despite having little variation.
Fourth, whenever a survey’s skip logic was triggered by a “yes” or “no” answer,
we code the subsequent questions in the logical fashion.25 Note that we account
for the fact that people answer “don’t know” or “don’t want to answer”; We only
impute the logical value if an explicit “yes” or “no” answer triggered the skip logic.
Section 3.3.2 describes how we construct indices to reduce the number of hy-
potheses tests. Note that the index value is missing if there is one or more missing
values in the component variables (e.g., if a person answers ”don’t know” to one of
the questions). We address this problem by providing two estimates in addition to
the estimate based on the actually observed number of non-missing cases. First, we
impute missing values using the mean value for the entire population, and then gen-
erate the index. For robustness, we also provide benchmarks for imputing minimum
and maximum values for the entire population. Second, we implement an Inverse
Probability Weighting (IPW) estimator in which each non-missing index value is
weighted by the inverse probability of having data observed (Seaman and White,
2013). We model the incidence of observing an index value using a logit model with
complete baseline characteristics (sex, employment status, self-employment; see Ta-
ble 3.3), and use the predicted probability.
Fifth, in order to compare monetary values across time, we adjust values using
Consumer Price Index data published by the Uganda Bureau of Statistics.
3.4.4 Multiple hypotheses testing
We construct several indices within each family of outcomes as detailed in Sec-
tion 3.3.2 and Appendix 4.6. We employ two approaches to control the FWER,
that is, controlling the probability of a false positive within each family. First, we
implement the approach used by Aker, Boumnijel, McClelland, and Tierney (2016)
who use a traditional Bonferroni-type adjustment but account for correlations across
variables used to test hypotheses.26 Their method nests the classic Bonferroni ad-
25 For instance, if somebody does not know any entrepreneurs, then the number of friends and
family members who are entrepreneurs is zero — although the skip logic would have result in this
being a missing value.
26 In our cases, we employ the correlation between index measures within each family.
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justment when outcomes are uncorrelated. Second, we also employ the method
outlined by Barsbai, Licuanan, Steinmayr, Tiongson, and Yang (2020) who develop
a regression-adjusted version of List, Shaikh, and Xu (2019). This is a bootstrap-
based stepwise procedure designed to control the FWER in settings with multiple
hypotheses.
Thus, for each hypothesis across our five families we obtain two p-values which
control the FWER, on top of standard p-values. The p-values that correct for mul-
tiple hypothesis testing are of interest for researchers with no priors on the specific
hypotheses we test. Our preferred procedure is the one by Barsbai, Licuanan, Stein-
mayr, Tiongson, and Yang (2020) and our main conclusions will be based on being
able to reject null hypotheses using those p-values. We report p-values using the
procedure by Aker, Boumnijel, McClelland, and Tierney (2016) for comprehensive-
ness.
3.4.5 Test for reporting errors being treatment independent
In business training interventions whose overall effectiveness is — among others
— judged through financial outcomes and adherence to “good” management prac-
tices, reporting errors may not be independent of treatment assignment. Individuals
who have gone through the training program may be better at accurately judging
profits and sales. Alternatively, they may intentionally overstate profits (to suggest
the training was helpful) or positively report on business practices because they are
more likely to know what the “correct” answer is (McKenzie and Woodruff, 2016).
To address this concern, we construct a measure of sales minus profits which
should equal costs and thus be weakly larger than zero. Should it be lower than
zero, it likely signals a reporting error as costs cannot be negative. We then test
whether treatment assignment predicts the incidence and magnitude of observed
reporting errors. In a second step, we calculate implied revenue per customer, and
compare the implied prices of the goods and services across treatment and control
and cross check with market prices.27
Conditional on detecting statistically significant treatment differences in report-
ing errors, we will conduct detailed in-person audits with a randomly selected subset
of 100 treatment and 100 control group subjects. The audits will take place shortly
27 We are aware of the possibility that new businesses may create goods and services of higher qual-
ity which command above-market prices. Nonetheless, implied prices should be largely comparable
to market prices, assuming they are free of reporting errors.
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after the endline data collection in the spirit of McKenzie (2017). We focus on busi-
ness experience and business performance. This allows us to establish bounds of
reporting errors for each of the variables studied (difference between endline self-
reports and the audit data, separately by treatment and control groups). We will
present the bounded results as robustness checks.
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4. Management Practices and Firm Performance
Evidence from Spanish Survey Data1
Abstract
This paper employs unsupervised learning to estimate management styles as la-
tent objects using survey data collected in 2006 ,and examines how they affected
firm performance during the Great Recession. First, we estimate styles using Latent
Dirichlet Allocations and describe each firms’ choice of styles using a scalar index.
Second, we employ independently collected balance sheet data and establish a posi-
tive correlation between a style reflecting structured management with performance
prior to the crisis. Third, we then show that those same firms were more severely
affected by the crisis. Results point to relatively higher holdings of non-liquid assets
and lower employee turnover as mechanisms.
1 This chapter is based on joint work with Florian Englmaier (LMU Munich), Jose E. Galdon-
Sanchez (Universidad Pública de Navarra, Spain) and Ricard Gil (Queen’s University, Canada).
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4.1 Introduction
The study of management has been part of economics almost since day one.
Adam Smith prominently discusses in his books The Wealth of Nations and The
Theory of Moral Sentiments various management topics, such as the division and
organization of labor, wage setting, incentivizing employees, or interpersonal au-
thority. Yet, rigorous empirical economic research, which documents differences in
management and its effect on performance, has only recently become the focus of
a growing literature (Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi, 1997; Ann, Ichniowski, and
Shaw, 2004; Helper and Henderson, 2014; Bloom, Lemos, Sadun, Scur, and van
Reenen, 2014). This literature has shown that management structure and quality
as an input of production varies profoundly across countries, across firms within a
country and even across plants within the same firm (Bloom, Brynjolfsson, Foster,
Jarmin, Patnaik, Saporta-Eksten, and van Reenen, 2019). Differences in manage-
ment can help explain some of the variation in firm productivity within and across
countries as well as over time (Bloom and van Reenen, 2007). Therefore, understand-
ing the consequences of good and bad management practices for firm performance,
productivity and income inequality has clear policy implications.
In this paper, we aim to speak to three aspects of studying management in the
realm of economics. First, we empirically document what bundles of management
practices firms adopt. In the second step, we assess whether and how these bundles
affect productivity and firm performance. By evaluating the interplay between man-
agement bundles and firm performance before and during the Great Recession, we
also speak to whether the effect of management is invariate to changing economic
environments. In order to address these questions, we combine two independently
collected data sources from Spain. First, we employ a firm survey conducted in 2006
which provides extensive information on firms’ human resource policies. Second, we
match the firms from the survey to a panel (2001-2010) of balance sheet data from
Bureau van Dijk, a commercial data provider, to obtain measures of productivity
and firm performance. The firm survey happened to take place in 2006—just before
the Great Financial Crisis—allowing us to study the relationship of management
with performance during the expansionary period before 2006 as well as during the
ensuing Great Recession.
A challenge for empirical studies of management practices have been the supposed
complementarities between individual practices. This leads to to sets of practices
being adopted together by firms which complicates assessing specific management
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practices’ impact in isolation (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990, 1995). Our approach to
the topic embraces this complementarity and leverages unsupervised machine learn-
ing, in particular Latent Dirichlet Allocations (LDA), to retrieve low-dimensional
latent objects which we term management styles from highly dimensional survey
data of Spanish manufacturing firms collected in 2006 (Blei, Ng, and Jordan, 2003).
Intuitively, the algorithm identifies groups of practices that tend to appear together
across firms but whose presence also distinguishes firms from one another. This ap-
proach of applying unsupervised machine learning to management data is inspired
by the work of Bandiera, Prat, Hansen, and Sadun (2020) who use LDA to classify
CEOs according to their usage of time.
In the first step of the analysis, we estimate these latent styles from the survey
data on single-plant firms. We focus on single-plant firms for there is an imme-
diate match between the entity that decides on the adoption of practices and its
performance. We estimate and define two “pure” styles and describe every firm
as a linear combination of these two pure styles. Note that the estimated styles
do neither carry natural labels, nor are they ordinal. In order to work towards
an interpretation of these abstract styles estimated by LDA, we then compare the
single-plant and multi-plant firms. The latter generally exhibit a more structured
style of management, which provides us with a benchmark (Bloom, Sadun, and van
Reenen, 2012b,a). We document that single-plant firms whose management loads
more heavily on abstract Style 2 are similar to multi-plant firms in terms of manage-
ment practices they employ, and consequently label this Style 2 “structured”. This
classification is also consistent with the practices most indicative of the respective
style.
In the second step, we combine the survey data with administrative balance
sheet data that allows us to relate our measure of management style to firms’ per-
formance. We report two key results. First, we find a systematic and significant
positive correlation of the structured management style with firm productivity prior
to the Great Recession. Second, this correlation turns statistically significantly neg-
ative for firms’ performance during the Great Recession. These findings would be
consistent with an interpretation that structured management helps firms strive in
economically benevolent environments, In times of crisis though, more flexible and
informal management styles may have an edge as they are more conducive to short-
term adjustments. While, in terms of exploring this interpretation, we are somewhat
restricted by our data, we document patterns along two margins. First, we document
that more structured firms are adjusting their workforce to a lesser degree during
122
Chapter 4 – Management & Firm Performance
the crisis. Second, that prior to the crisis more structured firms hold relatively more
fixed assets than more informally run firms, ceteris paribus.
Employing LDA, i.e., unsupervised machine learning, enables us to utilize all
available dimensions of the survey data without prior conceptions of what constitutes
good management. It also allows us to retrieve a simple measure of management style
that can be related to performance during times of economic expansion or crisis using
conventional methods (OLS).
Even though data science methods are increasingly used in economics—see for
instance Currie, Kleven, and Zwiers (2020)—many economists are still uncomfort-
able with the application of (unsupervised) machine learning tools. This is possibly
due to the fact that it can at times be considered atheoretical, and many applications
favor short-term predictions over economic content. Moreover, there is an obvious
risk of ex-post rationalization of findings through data and story mining. We are
acutely aware of this but still believe that settings, such as ours, lend themselves well
to the application of these techniques. Applying the algorithm allows us to lever-
age all available data without us pre-imposing structure on the components of the
data. Our results pass key sanity checks in that the retrieved management styles are
meaningful; interpretable; not trivially explained by observable firm characterstics
(size, sector, region, etc.); and, in line with existing literature, correlate significantly
with firm productivity.
From a methodological point of view, it is part of our contribution to show that
automated methods applied to firm surveys can be useful in capturing management
styles. Leveraging plentifully existing survey datasets and combining them with
powerful algorithms allow us to cost-effectively address open questions before starting
new and costly—in terms of money, and especially, research time—data collection
initiatives.
Our paper contributes to various streams of literature. These are extensive lit-
eratures and, therefore, in this section we focus on those that appear, to the best of
our knowledge, most directly connected to our contribution. First and foremost, our
paper contributes to the literature investigating what management practices work
best. Bloom and van Reenen (2007) and all other papers derived from their original
work related to the World Management Survey (WMS hereafter) systematically col-
lect information on management practices across firms, document differences across
firms, industries and countries, and finally examine their relationship with outcomes.
Their work with many other co-authors has studied management practices in manu-
facturing, the service industry, and even health care to name but a few. Their work
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has been highly influential because it has shaped a modern view of management prac-
tices as being ordered along a uni-dimensional score (“good management”). Bloom,
Lemos, Sadun, Scur, and van Reenen (2014) show some associations detailing the
role and impact of WMS measures that validate our findings. Not surprisingly, they
find higher scores of management practices with multinational companies and their
subsidiaries. This is similar to our findings because our management Style 2 (more
structure and larger plants) resembles the style typically present in multinationals.
Methodologically speaking, we contribute to an emerging literature using unsu-
pervised machine learning to retrieve meaningful information from highly dimen-
sional data in the spirit of Bandiera, Prat, Hansen, and Sadun (2020). Extant data
on firm policies come in the form of highly dimensional surveys with no obvious way
of aggregation to a single score. We show that machine learning can be effective
in identifying patterns and clusters of management policies across a large number
of establishments. Most importantly, the use of machine learning to study man-
agement styles allows economists to tackle and advance their knowledge of an old
question in economics, that is, the role of complementarities within organizations
(Ann, Ichniowski, and Shaw, 2004; Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi, 1997). Yet,
Brynjolfsson and Milgrom (2013) describe challenges in the empirical assessment of
interdependencies between organizational practices, stating that the opportunities to
run designed experiments in firms are “underexploited” in this respect. Unsupervised
machine learning allows for complementarities of a large number of management poli-
cies, summarizing all information in low-dimensional space with complementarities
embedded in each style.
Finally, our paper also contributes to work on the impact of the 2008 financial cri-
sis on firms’ management and performance. Almunia, Antras, Lopez-Rodriguez, and
Morales (2018) use firm-level Spanish data to investigate changes in export policies
of Spanish firms before and after the crisis. They find that those firms hit hardest
in their domestic sales are also the firms that increase their exports the most after
the crisis. The paper by Aghion, Bloom, Lucking, Sadun, and VanReenen (2020) is
the closest paper to ours in that they investigate the optimal organizational form
during “bad times”. They find that firms that delegated more power from central
headquarters to local plant managers prior to the Great Recession outperformed
their centralized counterparts in sectors that were most severely affected by the sub-
sequent crisis. Also close to our findings, Yang, Christensen, Bloom, Sadun, and
Rivkin (2020) find that CEOs use a wide range of markedly different processes to
make strategic decisions; some follow highly formalized, rigorous, and deliberate
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processes while others heavily rely on instinct and habit. In their analysis, more
structured strategy processes are associated with larger firm size and faster employ-
ment growth. Our findings align with the results in these two papers in that we find
that those firms with a more structured management style outperformed those firms
with less structure prior to the crisis but not during the crisis.
4.2 Data
In this paper, we use two distinct sources of data. On the one hand, we mea-
sure management policies through a survey administered in 2006 to a sample of
1003 manufacturing plants in Spain. On the other hand, we use independently col-
lected accounting data from SABI to measure plant and firm performance.2 In what
follows, we describe the survey and its matching with the SABI data.
4.2.1 Survey data
We estimate the latent structure of management styles using firm survey data
collected in Spain in 2006. This survey on human resource (HR) practices was ad-
ministered to a sample of Spanish manufacturing firms, and is representative of the
population of manufacturing plants in Spain with 50 or more employees. The survey
was conducted at the establishment level, and collected through computer-assisted
personal interviews with the general managers of those plants.3 The responses from
this survey have been used in earlier work although with a different focus and employ-
ing different methods (Bayo-Moriones, Galdon-Sanchez, and Martinez-de Morentin,
2013, 2017). Bayo-Moriones, Galdon-Sanchez, and Martinez-de Morentin (2017) dis-
cuss sample selection and sampling in more detail and Appendix 1 of said reference
details the full questionnaire.
The entire survey contains 1003 observations; 534 single-plant firms (SPFs) and
469 plants that belong to a superior organization. We refer to the latter group as
multi-plant firms (MPFs). We restrict our analysis in this paper to the sample of
single-plant firms. In single-plant firms, the link between management practices and
firm performance is direct in the sense that no superior entity can interfere with
2 SABI stands for “Sistema de Análisis de Balances Ibéricos” and a quick translation into English
would be “System of Iberian Balance Sheet Analysis”
3 Throughout the paper we use the terms plant and establishment interchangeably. Single-plant
firms are equivalent to firms that only have one establishment. A multi-plant firms consists of
multiple plants or establishments.
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Sector % in sample % in population
(1) (2) (3)
Food, beverages and tobacco 15.5 15.9
Textile industry, wearing apparel, leather and footwear 6.9 8.6
Wood and cork 3.4 2.6
Paper, editing and graphic design 7.0 8.1
Chemical industry 8.0 7.2
Rubber and plastic products 6.7 6.0
Non-metallic mineral products 10.8 9.7
Metallurgy and fabricated mechanical products 15.4 15,4
Machinery and mechanical equipment 7.5 8.0
Electrical, electronic and optical products and equipment 7.1 6.3
Transport equipment 6.0 6.5
Other manufacturing industries 5.7 5.5
TOTAL 100 100
(a) Percentage of firms by sector of activity.
50 ≤ workers < 100 100 ≤ workers < 500 ≥ 500 workers TOTAL
(1) (2) (3) (4)
% in sample 48.4 46.4 5.3 100
% in population 54.2 40.7 5.1 100
(b) Percentage of firms by size.
Table 4.1: Percentage of firms by size. Notes. These tables report the sample composition in
terms of sector of activity—Panel (a)—and number of employees—Panel (b).
decisions in a potentially unobserved manner. Thus, the unit of analysis is the firm
or the establishment which is equivalent under the sample restrictions.
The survey asks plant managers to provide information on a host of administra-
tive information and HR practices. It can be broadly divided into eight dimensions:
(i) plant and firm characteristics such as number of employees, and multinational and
multi-plant status; (ii) HR’s policies for blue-collar workers (demographic informa-
tion, hiring and promotion processes, on-the-job training, etc.); (iii) compensation
policies for blue-collar workers (incentive provision, evaluation criteria, etc.); (iv)
workplace organization (hierarchical levels and supervisors’ roles); (v) labor conflict
and cooperation among blue-collar workers; (vi) governance and authority in the
implementation of human resource strategies; (vii) profile of other (white) workers
and occupations in the plant; and (viii) plant manager characteristics (education,
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demographics, skill set, etc.).
We discuss summary statistics of firms in the sample in more detail in Sec-
tion 4.3.3 when we analyze correlates of firms’ management style.
4.2.2 Measuring management practices
The unsupervised algorithm we employ to construct a low-dimensional measure
of management style requires categorical data. While the majority of the survey’s
questions are indeed categorical, answers are not provided on consistent scales. For
instance, some question elicit agreement on five-point Likert scales, while other use
ten-point scales; some questions are simply binary questions; and again others offer
(non)-exclusive categorical answers. To construct the input matrix for the algorithm
we thus transform all questions into binary measurements which can be thought as
the “smallest common denominator” of answer scales.
In total, we obtain 272 binary variables reflecting all answers to management-
related questions in the survey. We convert all types of agreement scales (three-point,
five-point, seven-point) into three binary variables: i) an indicator for being to the
“left” of the neutral mid-point; ii) an indicator for being at the neutral mid-point;
and iii) an indicator for being to the right of the mid-point.4 Categorical questions
are transformed into binaries by generating an indicator for each answer possibility.
For instance, a question asks for the number one management priority and offers
cost, flexibility, innovation, and quality as answers. Our procedure generates four
indicator variables which are equal to one if the plant reports the respective number
one priority. Finally, there is a set of questions that require the surveyee to report
a percentage between zero and 100. We convert the answer into three indicator
variables: i) an indicator for the answer being 0 percent; ii) an indicator for the
answer being greater than zero but no more 50 percent; iii) an indicator for the
answer being larger than 50 percent.
We refer to these 272 binary measurements as the management practices in our
survey. Appendix Table 4.B.1 details all the indicators along with the questions they
are constructed from, as well as their sample means.
The algorithm requires the input matrix of management practices to only contain
complete cases. That is, no management practice ought to be missing in the data.
Owing to that restriction, we have to drop 71 plants from the sample. Therefore,
4 Consider a standard five-point Likert-scale going from strongly disagree, disagree, neither dis-
agree nor agree, agree to strongly agree. “Neiter disagree nor agree” forms the neutral mid-point.
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our final sample of plants that we use to estimate management style contains 463
single-plant firms.
4.2.3 Firm performance data
SABI is a database collected by Informa D&B in collaboration with Bureau Van
Dijk, both commercial data providers. Informa D&B is a Spanish company that
provides online access to a large database of Business, Financial and Marketing
information for more than 350 million companies in more than 200 countries. The
database contains annual balance sheet information for more than 2 million Spanish
firms across all sectors in the Spanish economy.
We searched this extensive set of firms and matched entries to the 1003 manufac-
turing plants in the survey. We matched our manufacturing plants by firm name, tax
ID (CIF in Spain), industry and location. This exercise resulted in an unbalanced
panel across establishments and years as balance sheet records are not complete. It is
important to note that the SABI database does not contain administrative tax data,
and therefore not all firms in our sample report their accounting data every year.
Furthermore, SABI collects balance sheet data at the firm-level, and it would be
impossible to assign inputs and outputs to different establishments of a multi-plant
firm. This constitutes another reason for why we restrict the sample to single-plant
firms.
From the SABI data we primarily employ information on revenue, labor force,
and assets to construct productivity.5 We detail the procedure used to construct a
measure of firm productivity in Section 4.4.1. In particular, we measure output using
sales; capital input using total assets; and labor input using the number of employees.
Appendix Table 4.A.4 provides summary statistics for the input variables used in
the TFP estimation.
4.3 Estimating latent management styles
This section describes our use of machine learning to estimate latent management
styles using the survey data described in Section 4.2.1. We proceed by first outlining
the unsupervised algorithm we use to that effect. Next, we describe the results and
analyze correlates of those results.
5 The number of employees is also elicited in the firm survey. The correlation between both
measures is = 0.7.
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4.3.1 Latent Dirichlet Allocation
We first briefly describe the algorithm, and the estimation specifications we em-
ploy to generate the low-dimensional measure of management style. We then turn
to describing the results.
Estimation setup
The goal of the empirical analysis is to retrieve a low-dimensional representa-
tion of management practices from the high-dimensional survey data. We argue
that there are underlying management styles which generate differences in observed
management practices across firms. In order to construct (econometrically: esti-
mate) these unobserved latent styles from firms’ observed behavior, we employ Latent
Dirichlet Allocation (LDA), an unsupervised learning algorithm which was originally
conceived to find topics in text data (Blei, Ng, and Jordan, 2003; Erosheva, Fien-
berg, and Joutard, 2007). Yet, it lends itself to the analysis of categorical data more
generally. The seminal analysis of CEO’s time allocation by Bandiera, Prat, Hansen,
and Sadun (2020) introduced this type of analysis into organizational economics.
LDA is a Bayesian hierarchical factor model. The intuition behind it is most
easily explained by using the analogy to text data. Each observation is a snippet of
text (in our case, a firm with observed practices). Each snippet of text is a mixture
of different topics (analogously, each firm’s management is a mixture of styles). In
turn, each topic is a mixture of all words, practices in our case that appear in the
entirety of observed text. Put differently, each topic is a probability distribution
across all words, where words that are more strongly associated with a topic carry
a higher loading. The analogue in the present situation is that a management style
is a probability distribution across all observed practices. Thus, we apply LDA to
model latent management styles as distributions over all observed practices, and to
model firms’ observed configurations of management practices as a mixture of these
styles.6
The crucial input in the analysis is the number of latent styles to be estimated,
which is set by the researcher. We specify two latent styles of management based
on the following three reasons. First, unlike traditional cluster analysis, e.g., k-
means, LDA does not deterministically assign observations to clusters. Thus, a
6 From a technical perspective, we estimate the models using Gibbs sampling, a Markov chain
Monte Carlo algorithm (Griffiths and Steyvers, 2004). For the Gibbs sampler we specify a burn in
period of 5,000 iterations; we then implement 10,000 iterations with a thinning parameter of 2,000.
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specification with two “pure” styles is able to capture heterogeneity beyond assigning
membership to exactly one cluster. Rather, each firm is represented by one weight for
each pure style. Second, two latent factors simplify interpretability. As Blei (2012)
points out, the ease of interpretation should be taken into account when choosing
the parameters of unsupervised learning. Finally, the cross-validation exercise in
Appendix Figure 4.A.2 suggests that model fit does not improve markedly when we
estimate more latent styles. The at best marginal increase in model fit we obtain
through more clusters is unlikely to balance the loss of interpretability.
LDA is a Bayesian technique and, as such, requires priors on both of the Dirichlet
distributions. We follow Bandiera, Prat, Hansen, and Sadun (2020) in setting both
priors. We place a neutral, uniform prior on the firm-over-style distribution (prior
= 1) which would place firms’ initial mixture of styles at 50:50. The prior on the
style-over-practice distribution promotes sparsity (prior = 0.1). This reflects our
conception that styles load heavily on a few rather than a lot of practices since there
are likely to be few practices emblematic of a style.
Setting a non-zero prior ensures a non-zero posterior. Thus, the probability
distributions we estimate have strictly positive loadings for each element. By virtue
of being probability distributions, the loadings sum to one and, individually, are
strictly smaller than one.
Finally, note that LDA is an unsupervised learning algorithm and the estima-
tion procedure does not force the resulting clusters to explain firm performance in
any way. In contrast, supervised methods, such as classification trees, regularized
regression or neural networks, are usually employed with the goal of using a set of
variables to predict the values of a response variable. However, we would like to
first understand what groups of management practices firms choose by finding a
low-dimensional representation of these practices.
Estimation results
First, we obtain distributions over all practices for both styles. In Appendix
Figure 4.A.3 we summarize these distributions but explicitly abstain from attaching
any labels to the output. Styles are non-ordinal and hence, for now, we refer to
the styles neutrally as Style 1 and Style 2. Panel (a) plots all practices’ ordered
according to their Style 1 loading. The figure demonstrates that the procedure is
indeed able to identify two distinct latent constructs. Practices with lower loadings
in Style 1—indicative of a lesser role in style 1—tend to load highly on style 2.
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There are also practices that carry high loadings in both styles. This suggests the
presence of practices that are employed in conjunction with practices that in turn
are emblematic of a specific style. In Panel (b) of Appendix Figure 4.A.3 we plot the
practices whose loadings quotient across styles is largest. On the far right—practices
with a relatively higher loading in Style 1—the algorithm identifies the absence of
evaluation systems as well as a narrow focus on ability and personal interviews in
the recruitment process. In Style 2, human resource department decision making
and the importance of evaluations for promotions is emphasized. Note that this
analysis does not take into account the importance of those feature in the styles, i.e.,
a kind of baseline probability. Thus, two practices with relatively low loadings in
both styles may feature in this description. We return to the practices with highest
single style loadings in more detail below.
Second, we can illustrate firms’ style distributions. Recall that the two styles’
weights are positive and sum to one. Therefore, a firm’s style distribution is fully
characterized by either style share. We focus on the share of Style 2, which we also
refer to as Style 2 intensity. Panel (a) of Appendix Figure 4.A.4 plots the count of
firms across the Style 2 continuum. The distribution is bi-modal, and there is a mass
of firms that load highly on Style 1. A second mass point is between 0.5 and 0.6,
pointing to firms that tend to be rather balanced mixtures of both pure styles. In
the analysis, we provide results based on a continuous measure of Style 2 intensity
as well as based on indicator variables for tertiles.
4.3.2 Characterizing firms’ management styles
Since latent management styles are not ordinal, any labels we may want to attach
to these styles are necessarily subjective. We pursue two approaches in order to
understand what these latent constructs actually capture.
First, we begin to understand what those styles mean by comparing firms of a
certain configuration to a separate set of firms whose management we can character-
ize a priori—that is, without relying on LDA. To this effect, we consider multi-plant
firms. These firms can benefit from economies of scale, and may be forced to delegate
decision rights across space, leading them to employ more structured management
practices (Bloom, Sadun, and van Reenen, 2012b,a). Thus, we seek to describe
the management styles of single-plant firms by comparing them to multi-plant firms
based on style 2 intensity. An additional advantage of this approach is that it does
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not require a subjective evaluation of the style-over-practice distribution.7
We operationalize this comparison by first pooling the surveys of single-plant and
multi-plant firms, and then estimate management styles in this joint sample using
the LDA procedure exactly as described above.8 This estimation returns style shares
for each firm in the pooled sample, and we plot and compare the Style 2 intensity of
three types of firms defined as follow:9 i) multi-plant firms (which do not appear in
the single-plant sample); ii) single-plant firms whose observed intensity of Style 2 in
the single-plant sample estimation is (weakly) smaller than 0.5, i.e., those that we
would describe as rather Style 1 firms; and iii) single-plant firms with an observed
intensity of above 0.5, i.e, those that we would describe as rather Style 2 firms.
Figure 4.1 plots the result of this exercise. First, we note that the distribution
of MPFs puts most mass above 0.5. Secondly, SPFs with a higher Style 2 intensity
from the single-plant sample also put most mass above 0.5 in the joint estimation.
Finally, SPFs with low Style 2 intensity in the single-plant sample below 0.5 behave
the opposite way. In line with prior findings in the literature, this would suggest
that single-plant Style 2 firms employ a more structured management style as their
management style looks more like the one of multi-plant firms.
Second, we analyze those practices that carry the highest loadings in each style.
Table 4.2 reports the five practices with the highest loading in each style. Style
2 exhibits practices that suggest structured management, emphasizing the role of
dedicated human resource departments. In Appendix Figure 4.A.3(b) we plot those
practices whose loadings’ quotient in both styles is largest; that is, those with the
highest relative loadings in both styles, respectively. This corroborates the notion
that Style 2 is exemplified by structured practices, while Style 2 mirrors informal
7 The second approach to understanding the pure style is by evaluating the style-over-practice
distributions which we do below. This is more prone to researchers’ imposing their conceptions of
what styles ought to mean. By comparing styles without attaching labels, we attempt to generate
an unbiased understanding of what pure styles represent.
8 In order to carry out this exercise, we drop 20 practice indicators from the multi-plant survey
as they are about autonomy from the superior organization and hence only relevant for MPFs.
There is no guarantee that the two resulting pure management styles are comparable to the results
obtained from using only the single-plant firms. The estimation in the joint sample proceeds exactly
as the one in the single-plant sample. Equivalent Dirichlet priors are employed, and the MCMC
parameters are kept constant.
9 Equivalently, we could have plotted the Style 1 share as well. This would have not affected the
conclusions we draw in the following paragraph. These styles are unrelated to the styles estimated in
the single-plant sample only. Estimating styles in the joint sample only serves to help understanding
the meaning of styles in the single-plant sample.
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Figure 4.1: Understanding styles by comparing single- and multi-plant firms. Notes.
In this figure, we apply the LDA procedure described above to estimate management styles in a pooled
sample of single- and multi-plant firms (n=871). We then plot the probability density of the corresponding
Style 2 share separately for i) those single-plant firms that exhibited a Style 2 intensity of (weakly) below 0.5
when styles are estimated in the single-plant sample only, ii) those single-plant firms with a corresponding
intensity of above 0.5, and iii) all multi-plant firms.
practices. While we would like to emphasize that any label is subjective, we still
conclude that Style 2 captures a more structured approach to management, and Style
1 represents a more informal approach.
4.3.3 Correlates of management styles
In this section we explore survey data correlates of firms that exhibit high Style
2 intensities and show that management styles are not trivially explained by observ-
ables. Recall from the previous discussion that firms with higher Style 2 intensities
implement management practices that look more like those of multi-plant firms,
stressing more structured forms of management. We denote firm i’s Style 2 intensity
by γ2i and estimate:
γ2i = β0 +Xiβ + εi (4.1)
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Rank Style 1 Style 2
1 Recruitment with personal interviews Dedicated HR department
2 Firm uses no evaluation system HR part of management team
3 White-collar recruitment through interviews HR executed administrative tasks
4 % white-collar in management < 50% % white-collar in intermediate management < 50%
5 % of jobs characterized as manual > 50% HR reports to plant-director
Table 4.2: Five practices with highest loading in each style. Notes. This table lists the five
practices with the highest loadings in each style. These are obtained by sorting the respective style-over-
practice distribution by practices in descending order of their loading.
Xi captures firm characteristics, such as size, export dependency, or a firm’s position
along the value chain.10 We provide both, results from univariate and multivariate
specifications. The latter takes into account the correlation structure across firm
characteristics. Inference is based on standard errors clustered at the three-digit
industry level (at most 78 clusters).
In Appendix Table 4.A.1 we provide summary statistics for those variables which
we study in this analysis. The average firm has 116 employees although the distri-
bution is highly skewed to the right (skewness ≈ 5). Further, the average firm has
sales of about e28,639,000 worth of goods and services (also skewed to the right;
skewness ≈ 7). Firms report sales selectively and only 289 firms report sales in the
survey.11 The modal firm produces a consumer good, while the remaining firms are
equally split between intermediate and capital goods. Two thirds of firms are in
shared ownership, while a quarter is a limited liability company.
The results suggest that both, the number of employees and sales, are positively
correlated with Style 2 intensity. In Appendix Figure 4.A.5 we zoom in on the
(univariate) relationship between Style 2 intensity and firms’ number of employees.
A positive correlation is clearly visible; however, across the support of firms’ number
of employees, there is variation in Style 2 intensity that cannot be explained be
firm size. The positive association of Style 2 intensity and export dependency is
to be viewed similarly. Firms that produce consumer goods tend to have lower
Style 2 intensity, even after controlling for firm size. On average, a firm producing
10 Almunia, Antras, Lopez-Rodriguez, and Morales (2018) document that firms at different po-
sitions in the value chain had different experiences (and margins of adjustment) during the Great
Recession. Hence we control for this position in our analysis
11 Reporting sales in the survey is not systematically correlated with Style 2 intensity. A linear
regression of an indicator for having reported sales on Style 2 intensity results in a coefficient of
0.004 (SE = .09). Controlling for firm size does not alter this conclusion; in fact, firm size measured
by the number of employees is not correlated with the incidence of reporting sales either.
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Dependent variable: Style 2 intensity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log # employees .17 .2 .17
(.017) (.024) (.017)
Log sales [’000 EUR] .037 -.01
(.01) (.0088)
Year plant opened -.00055 .00075 .00038
(.00047) (.00051) (.00046)
% for export .0013 .00077 .00057
(.00045) (.00044) (.00038)
Produces consumer good -.08 -.049 -.088
(.025) (.026) (.024)
Produces intermediate good -.03 .013 -.023
(.031) (.034) (.031)
Shared ownership -.0096 -.0061 -.028
(.052) (.057) (.039)
Limited liability -.077 -.043 -.052
(.055) (.056) (.045)
Adj R-sq .17 .04 .00064 .02 .013 .01 .22 .2
N. of cases 463 289 456 438 458 463 284 430
Table 4.3: Correlates of Style 2 intensity. Notes. This table reports results from OLS regressions
where the dependent variable is a firm’s Style 2 intensity, a variable between zero and one. “Log” refers
to the natural logarithm. “% for export” is a firm’s self-reported share of output that is exported abroad.
“Produces consumer/intermediate good” are indicator variables equal to one when the firm produces the
respective output category, and zero otherwise. The omitted category for this class of indicators is producing
a “capital” good. “Shared ownership” and “limited liability” are indicators equal to one when a firm is
organized according to the respective ownership structure. The omitted category for this class of indicators
is “other” ownership structures. Standard errors clustered at the three-digit industry level are reported in
parentheses.
consumer goods has about eight to nine percentage points lower Style 2 intensity.
Appendix Figure 4.A.6 zooms in on this aspect, and graphically displays lower Style
2 intensity in the consumption good sector. While medians differ, there is ample
common support across different locations in the value chain. Finally, there is no
discernible effect of ownership status on Style 2 intensity.
The results in Table 4.3 are obtained from regressions without region nor sector
fixed effects. Explanatory power only marginally increases if those fixed effects are
included. When region or sector fixed effects are added to the regression, the adjusted
R2 in the analogous specification to column 7 increases to 0.24 or 0.23, respectively.
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When they are jointly included, the adjusted R2 remains at 0.24.12 An interesting
implication is that there is significant variation in styles within economic sectors.
Thus, overall firm characteristics as elicited in the survey can explain about one
quarter of variation in management Style 2 intensity. We note a significant positive
association between firm size (employees, sales) and Style 2 but these characteristics
do not exhaustively explain variation in Style 2 intensity.
4.4 Management style and firm performance before the Great Recession
This section establishes that the management styles we estimated in the previous
section correlate with firms’ performance in the period before the Great Recession.
We measure firm performance using the SABI data we describe in Section 4.2.3,
which was collected independently of the firm survey data. This mimics the approach
by Bloom and van Reenen (2007) who refer to this as the two-step procedure because
it first estimates firm-level Total Factor Productivity (TFP), and then projects it
onto the space of management styles.
4.4.1 Estimating firms’ TFP
We measure firms’ performance using TFP which can be interpreted as a firm’s
technology to combine labor and capital into output. First, we postulate that firms
produce output Y using labor (L), capital (K), and a production technology α
according to a standard Cobb-Douglas production function Y = αLβ1Kβ2 . β denote
the production elasticity with respect to labor and capital, respectively. By taking
the natural logarithm we obtain the following equation where i indexes a firm and t
indexes years:
yit = αi + β1Lit + β2Kit + εit. (4.2)
We use sales in Euro to proxy output, total assets to measure capital input, and
the number of employees to measure labor input, and estimate Equation (4.2) using
12 In Appendix Figure 4.A.7 we show a Style 2 breakdown by sectors and region. The boxplot in
panel (a) shows that there is common support across all sectors; that is, the median and interquartile
range of Style 2 intensity is comparable across sectors. The map in panel (b) shows regional
heterogeneity but comparable means across most regions.
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OLS. The underlying, unbalanced, panel covers the years 2001-2006.13
We obtain a firm’s TFP using the predicted value of αi from Equation (4.2).
Appendix Figure 4.A.8 shows the distribution of the estimated α̂i which is slightly
skewed to the right. More importantly, we observe several extreme values indicating
relatively (un)productive firms. We account for these in the regression by 95%
winsorizing TFP—indicated by the vertical lines in Appendix Figure 4.A.8.
4.4.2 Results
In this section, we provide evidence that the management style we estimated
using firm survey data correlates with firms’ TFP. To this effect, we estimate
α̂i,s,r = β0 + β1γ
2
i,r,s + ωr + ωs +Xr,s,tβ + εi,r,s (4.3)
where i indexes a firm located in region r which is active in sector s. γ2i,r,s denotes
a firm’s management Style 2 intensity, which is a value between 0 and 1. Higher
values indicate a stronger Style 2 intensity. The ωs absorb time-invariant variation
induced by regions and sectors. In Xi,r,s, we control for firms’ location along the
value chain by including indicators for producing consumer goods or equipment—
producing capital goods is the omitted category. We cluster standard errors at the
three-digit industry level.
We provide the results of estimating Equation (4.3) in Table 4.4. Columns 1
and 4 provide simple univariate correlation of Style 2 intensity with firms’ TFP. In
columns 2 and 5, we add region and sector fixed effects. In columns 3 and 6, we
additionally control for value chain location. Columns 1-3 show results based on
95% winsorizing the dependent variable; the remaining columns use non-winsorized
outcomes.
Across all columns, there is a significant correlation between Style 2 intensity and
firms’ TFP. The estimates’ magnitude does not change when correlates and fixed
effects are included. Unsurprisingly, standard errors are smaller when winsorized
data is used on the left-hand side. Style 2 intensity is able to explain about two
percent of variation in the dependent variable. The full specification explains 12%
of variation. We note that firms producing intermediate goods are more productive
13 A total of 446 firms enter the productivity estimation, and the average firm appears 5.5 out of 6
times. 331 firms appear in each year. 11 firms only appear once. We estimate the output elasticities
of labor and capital to be 0.3 and 0.49, respectively. Below we discuss a robustness check only
focusing on full-panel firms. For these firms we estimate elasticities of 0.46 and 0.44, respectively.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mgt style 2 .28 .26 .26 .27 .25 .25
(.079) (.082) (.082) (.091) (.098) (.098)
1[consumer good] .073 .1
(.066) (.081)
1[intermediate good] .13 .16
(.063) (.072)
Sector FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Region FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Adj R-squared .023 .13 .14 .017 .11 .12
N. of cases 385 385 379 385 385 379
Table 4.4: Management style and firms’ TFP before the crisis. Notes. This table reports
the results of estimating Equation (4.4) using OLS. The dependent variable is a firm’s estimated TFP; 95%
winsorized in columns 1-3 and non-winsorized in columns 4-6. “Mgt Style 2” is a firm’s Style 2 intensity.
“1[consumer good]” and “1[intermediate good]” are indicators for firms that are located in the respective
location along the value chain. The omitted category is firms producing capital goods. Columns 2,3,5 and 6
contain sector and region fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the three-digit industry level are reported
in parentheses.
than firms producing consumer goods; which in turn are more productive than firms
producing capital goods. As pointed out above, the full panel structure of production
inputs and output is not available for all years. In Appendix Table 4.A.2 we provide
results for the same specifications only using those firms where the full panel is
available. The estimates are highly comparable to those in Table 4.4.
The magnitude of the correlation of about 0.25 corresponds to a one unit change
in Style 2 intensity. To put the magnitude in perspective consider a one standard
deviation change in Style 2 intensity (σ(γ2) = 0.25); this corresponds to a 0.0625
change in TFP. This in turn is equivalent to an effect of 13% of a standard deviation
in TFP (σ( ˆalpha) = 0.47). Alternatively, the inter-quartile-range in Style 2 of 0.37
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results in a 0.0925 change in TFP; or 20% of a standard deviation in TFP.14
To sum up, we find a positive association between Style 2 intensity and produc-
tivity prior to the Great Recession. That is, more structured management correlates
positively with firms’ TFP. The Spanish economy was booming prior to 2006 and
firms may have been able to benefit from leveraging economies of scale. A structured
management style appears to allow firms to more effectively exploit this beneficial
economic environment.
4.5 Management Style and firm performance during the Great Recession
In this section we shine a light on how management style intensity correlates
with firms’ performance during the Great Recession (2007-2010) that followed the
Great Financial Crisis that struck in 2007. Spain’s experience in the aftermath
of the crisis was markedly different from the, say US or Germany, where after a
severe contraction in the short-run, growth rates quickly recovered. As illustrated in
Appendix Figure 4.A.9, Spain’s economy contracted initially at a comparable rate
but its resurgence was slower with GDP starting to grow only in 2011.
4.5.1 Setup
Firms’ TFP is derived from estimating a specification akin to Equation (4.2) but
now using data for the years 2007-2010. We summarize TFP for the period 2007-2010
in Figure 4.A.10. Panel (a) shows a histogram; the distribution looks comparable
to the pre-crisis distribution but points to a number of outliers on the right of the
distribution. In the analysis, we account for these again by showing estimates based
on 95 percent winsorization. In panel (b), we plot the change in TFP between the
two periods (2007-2010 vs 2001-2006) relative to the pre-period (2001-2006). The
figure suggests a negative relationship which could indicate regression to the mean—
highly productive firms in the pre-period see a mechanical decline in the post-period.
We account for this by controlling for the pre-period level of TFP in the regressions.
14 In Appendix Table 4.A.3 we provide additional results in which we bin management Style 2
intensity into tertiles. In the estimation sample of columns 1,2,4 and 5 of Appendix Table 4.A.3, 130
firms’ management Style 2 intensity is smaller or equal to 1
3
; 182 firms’ Style 2 intensity is larger
than 1
3
but no larger than 2
3
; finally, 73 firms’ Style 2 intensity is larger than 2
3
. We show that
the firms in the middle tercile of Style 2 intensity are marginally more productive than firms in the
bottom tercile. Firms in the top tercile are significantly more productive than firms in the bottom
tercile. Finally, we provide p-values for the comparison of firms in the middle and top tercile; we
are unable to statistically reject that the effects are in fact equal.
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In the second step we relate firms’ productivity in the years 2007-2010 to their
management Style 2 intensity, a set of time-invariant controls, and their pre-crisis
level of TFP. In a set of robustness checks, we also provide estimates for the effect
of Style 2 intensity on the difference in TFP across both periods (before vs during
the crisis). As in Section 4.4.2, standard errors are clustered at the industry level.
In additional results, we show how a censoring approach to missing information due
to potentially endogenous firm exit affects the estimates of firm performance during
the crisis.
Finally, we turn our focus to channels through which Style 2 intensity affects
firm performance during the crisis. While we are unable to authoritatively point to
a specific mechanism, we provide a set of results that suggest that a higher Style 2
intensity leads firms to hold fewer non-fixed assets, and to turn over employees at a
lower rate—holding constant a wide set of firm characteristics.
4.5.2 Results
In Table 4.5 we provide estimates for the conditional correlation of Style 2 in-
tensity and firm performance during the Great Recession 2007-2010. In panel (a)
columns 1-3, we see a statistically significant (at 5 percent) negative coefficient,
suggesting that firms with higher style intensity fared worse during the crisis. In
columns 4-6, we provide estimates without winsorizing the dependent variable, and
see that estimates are comparable in magnitude but less precisely estimated. We
consider columns 1-3 to be our preferred specification as Figure 4.A.10(a) points to
the presence of extreme values in TFP.
In panel (b) of Table 4.5, we provide results for the case of splitting Style 2
intensity into tertiles. The point estimates suggest—and the p-values in the table’s
legend confirm—that the effect is predominantly driven by firms in the top tertile,
that is those with the highest Style 2 intensity. The effect of -0.12 in column 3
implies that, on average, the TFP of firms in the top tercile of Style 2 intensity is
about a third of standard deviation lower (σTFP′07−′09′ = 0.42) than those of firms
in the bottom tertile.
One may be worried that this reflects regression to the mean, in the sense that
firms that did better before the crisis do relatively worse now, and vice versa. Indeed,
Figure 4.A.10(b) suggests a comparable relationship in the bivariate reduced form.
We account for this phenomenon by controlling for firms’ TFP in the year 2001-
2006—“pre-crisis TFP” in the tables. Thus we are able to interpret the effect of Style
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2 intensity on TFP during crisis holding constant pre-crisis TFP. Put differently, in
a scenario of two firms with equivalent pre-crisis TFP, the firm with higher Style 2
intensity does worse during the crisis on average.15
Another concern one may have is that the most unproductive, high Style 1 in-
tensity, firms had to exit the market during the Great Recession. Thus, what we
observe in this period is the set of all firms with high Style 2 intensity, and the subset
of relatively more productive firms with high Style 1 intensity.16 We address this
concern in two ways and show that it cannot explain our results. The approach we
take is similar in spirit to Blundell, Gosling, Ichimura, and Meghir (2007) in that we
try and account for sample selection by simulating a worst-case scenario.
First, we include all firms which we observe before the crisis—Table 4.4—and
impute the productivity level for those we do not see during the crisis. For the
imputation we use the productivity level of the worst-performing firm in the period
2007-2010. That is, for those 44 firms we observe before but not during the crisis, we
pretend that they are as productive as the least productive firm we do observe. To
account for the fact that we are “adding” extreme observations to the data, we now
run quantile regressions and estimate the conditional median. We obtain standard
errors by drawing 1,000 three-digit-industry-clustered bootstrap samples.
We present the finding from this exercise in columns 1-3 of Table 4.A.6. In the
most saturated specification, we estimate the conditional median to be -0.19 units
lower for a point increase in Style 2 intensity. The effect is statistically significant
at five percent.
Second, we pretend that the data is in fact censored and that we cannot observe
the least productive firms because they had to exit. Thus, for all firms we do not ob-
serve in the period 2007-2010 (but do observe before), we impute the fifth percentile
of the TFP distribution 2007-2010. In the second step, we estimate a Tobit-model
with that fifth percentile being the left-censoring limit. Since the Tobit-model is not
rank-based model, and as such sensitive to outliers, we use the fifth percentile rather
15 In Table 4.A.5 we show additional results in which we use a firms’ difference in productivity
across the two periods. The results are qualitatively similar, and show that the difference in pro-
ductivity levels is more negative if Style 2 intensity is higher. That is, holding productivity before
the crisis constant, a higher Style 2 intensity results in a more negative difference across the two
periods.
16 The data weakly suggests that Style 2 intensity is indeed negatively, but statistically insignifi-
cantly, related to firm exit during the crisis. That is, conditional on sector, region, and value chain
location fixed effects, we estimate a negative coefficient of -0.047 (SE = 0.056) of Style 2 intensity on
firm survival in a linear probability model. The marginal effect at the mean from a logit regression
is comparable.
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Chapter 4 – Management & Firm Performance
than the minimum for imputation. In this setting we report (analytic) standard
errors again clustered at the three-digit industry level.
The results in columns 4-6 of Table 4.A.6 display the result of this exercise.
Estimates retain a negative sign but are smaller in magnitude than those of Table 4.5
and do achieve statistical significance at conventional levels. In sum, we interpret the
preponderance of negative estimates for Style 2 intensity as rather strong evidence
that firms characterized by higher Style 2 intensity suffer more during the Great
Recession ceteris paribus.
4.5.3 Mechanisms
At this point it is useful to recap the results presented thus far. First, we il-
lustrated a novel approach to measuring management from high-dimensional survey
data. Based on comparing single-plant and multi-plant firms, and the style-over-
practices distributions, we argued that Style 2 reflects a more structured organiza-
tional design. Second, we reported how this measure of management style signifi-
cantly correlates with firm performance in the period 2001 to 2006. We show that a
higher Style 2 intensity positively affects firm productivity, and speculate that this
may have allowed firms to exploit economies of scale during a period of economic ex-
pansion in Spain. Finally, in Section 4.5.2 we show that this correlation reverses its
sign during the Great Recession 2007-2010. Firms with management more intensely
geared towards Style 2 perform worse during the crisis, ceteris paribus.
In this section, we attempt to disentangle the ways and means that could help
us understand this sign reversal. We investigate whether a higher Style 2 intensity
hampers firms’ ability to tackle the challenges of the Great Recession. We analyze
two indicators. First, SABI data allows us to distinguish between fixed and non-fixed
assets, and we analyze firms’ holdings of non-fixed (i.e., rather liquid) assets before
the crisis. Second, we analyze changes in the workforce as less rigidly organized firms
may better able to adjust the workforce in the short term.
Table 4.6 shows the results of this exercise. Columns 1 and 2 show indeed that
higher Style 2 intensity correlates with relatively lower holdings of non-fixed assets
in 2006. Put differently, more Style 2 correlates with relatively more fixed assets,
even after controlling for sector and region fixed effects. In columns 3 and 4, we
show that Style 2 intensity weakly correlates with lower absolute employee turnover
during the crisis. The dependent variable is the difference between the average
number of employees of 2007-2010 to 2006. The estimates suggest that—holding
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Fraction non-fixed assets ∆ # employees
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mgt style 2 -.063 -.074 -6.3 -9.9
(.033) (.032) (6.4) (6.2)
Total # employees 2006 -.085 -.063
(.031) (.032)
Total assets 2006 .11 .16
(.39) (.35)
1[consumer good] -.017 -5.6
(.028) (6.6)
1[intermediate good] -.029 -.093
(.027) (5.5)
Sector FE No Yes No Yes
Region FE No Yes No Yes
Mean DV .64 .64 -7.3 -7.3
Adj R-squared .0027 .12 .069 .079
N. of cases 372 366 354 349
Table 4.6: Management style and ease of adjustment. Notes. This table shows conditional
correlations of management Style 2 with pre-crisis holdings of non-fixed assets and employee turnover during
the crisis. The dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 is the difference of total and fixed assets divided by
total assets. All quantities are measured in 2006 and were 95 percent winsorized prior to entering the ratio.
The dependent variable is the average number of employees from 2007-2010 minus the number of employees
in 2006. “Mgt Style 2” measures firms’ management Style 2 intensity from zero to 1. “1[consumer good]”
and “1[intermediate good]” are indicators for firms that are located in the respective location along the value
chain. The omitted category is firms producing capital goods. Columns 2 and 4 contain sector and region
fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the three-digit industry level are reported in parentheses.
constant employment in 2006—a higher Style 2 intensity correlates negatively with
employee turnover. The table legend indicates that the average firm had to lay off
about seven workers during the Great Recession. A one standard deviation change
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in Style 2 intensity (0.25) means that about 2.5 fewer employees were laid off.17
4.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we employ an unsupervised learning algorithm to measure clusters
of management practices in Spanish firm survey data collected in 2006, i.e., just
prior to the onset of the Great Financial Crisis. This allows us to classify every
firm in our sample as a mixture of two “pure” styles: one rather informal and one
rather structured style. The fact that our algorithm retrieves internally consistent
clusters of practices is in line with there being complementarities that lead to sets
of practices being adopted jointly.
The styles are meaningful in that they are not substantively determined by ob-
servable firm characteristics. Firm characteristics can explain only about ≈ 30 per-
cent of variation in management styles. More importantly, they are correlated with
firm performance despite the fact that the unsupervised learning algorithm does not
force clusters to explain performance (as a supervised one would do). Specifically, we
find positive correlations of a more structured management style with performance
prior to the financial crisis. This correlation turns negative during the financial crisis
after 2007.
Taking these results at face value, and in line with recent studies by Aghion,
Bloom, Lucking, Sadun, and VanReenen (2020) and McElheran, Ohlmacher, and
Yang (2020), we conclude that while structured management may fit stable eco-
nomic conditions, in times of crisis more flexible and informal styles may strive.
In terms of exploring mechanisms supporting this interpretation, we are somewhat
restricted by our data. However, we document patterns that are consistent with
structured management being an impediment to firms’ short-term adjustment along
two margins. First, we document that more structured firms adjust their workforce
to a lesser degree during the crisis and that, prior to the crisis, more structured firms
hold relatively more fixed assets than firms with a more informal management style.
17 This estimates are robust to a number of different specification which we do not report here.
Overall, specification that only control sector and region fixed effects lie in between the reported
results in terms of magnitude and significance. The results in columns 1-2 become stronger and
more statistically significant when we use the raw data for fixed and total assets rather than 95
percent winsorized values. The results in column 3-4 do not change when we control for the natural
logarithm instead of the raw value of number of employees in 2006. The same is true for columns 1-2
and the logarithm of total assets in 2006. Finally, taking the difference of the number of employees
in 2010 (rather than the average during the crisis) and 2006 produces slightly larger point estimates
in columns 3-4.
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Finally, we also see the present study as a proof of concept. We, as a profession,
have access to a large amount of qualitative and diverse survey data on firm organi-
zation and employment practices. Unsupervised learning algorithms, such as LDA,
offer a principled way to exploit the entirety of these data and hence a cost effec-
tive way to further our understanding of management practices and their intricate




The following pages present the appendices to all four chapters in this disserta-
tion. The appendices contain additional tables and figures which I reference in the
main text, more detail on certain procedures, or a combination thereof.
First, there are two appendices to Chapter 1. The first provides additional results
and tables—especially summary statistics—and offers the reader greater insight into
the underlying data structure. The second appendix contains tables and figures
which speak to the results’ robustness to alternative specifications.
Second, Chapter 2 is accompanied by three appendices. Again, the first reports
further summary statistics and additional results. The second appendix describes
in detail how the data on natural disasters was matched to the donations data from
Betterplace, the online donations platform. Finally, there is an appendix which
describes regularized regression—the lasso estimator—and how the procedure was
applied to better understand correlates of giving and compare the predictive power
of different approaches.
Third, there are two short appendices to Chapter 3. The first details all the
variables which enter the construction of the indices used in the main analysis. The
second shows the slides that were used during the marketing intervention and how
they emphasize the randomly chosen marketing theme.
Fourth, there are two appendices to Chapter 4. The first again provides further
results and summary statistics. The second appendix reports all 272 dummy vari-
ables which entered the estimation of the management styles via Latent Dirichlet
Allocation.
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Appendix A to Chapter 1: Additional tables and figures
Statistic Mean St. Dev. Median Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Min Max
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
2013 0.056 0.025 0.049 0.038 0.068 0.017 0.159
2014 0.056 0.023 0.050 0.040 0.070 0.011 0.144
2015 0.058 0.022 0.053 0.042 0.070 0.017 0.173
2016 0.060 0.021 0.056 0.045 0.071 0.012 0.142
2017 0.066 0.022 0.063 0.049 0.080 0.021 0.167
2018 0.068 0.024 0.064 0.052 0.082 0.023 0.160
Table 1.A.1: Dropout rates across time. Notes. This table reports summary statistics of school
dropout rates from 2013 to 2018. It is based on data from 323 counties in Germany. “Pctl(25)” and
“Pctl(75)” are the 25th and 75th percentile, respectively.
Statistic Mean St. Dev. Median Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Min Max
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Unemployment rate 6.0 2.7 5.6 3.8 7.5 1.4 14.5
Vacancies helper 17.0 4.2 16.7 14.3 19.0 6.9 44.1
Vacancies skilled 66.8 3.8 66.8 64.7 69.3 45.2 77.4
Asylum seekers 7.1 4.6 6.2 5.1 7.7 1.8 69.4
In-migration 55.5 20.0 51.5 43.9 62.3 24.5 193.0
Out-migration 48.4 18.6 43.8 37.4 53.2 22.0 185.3
Sector 1 employment 1.2 1.3 .7 .3 1.7 .01 10.3
Sector 2 employment 32.9 10.6 32.3 25.5 41.1 7.6 62.8
State transfers 426.9 186.8 422.7 305.9 532.8 0.0 1158.7
Social security recipients 8.2 4.6 7.6 4.4 10.8 1.2 23.5
Local GDP 34.6 14.9 30.8 25.9 37.6 15.6 149.2
Table 1.A.2: Summary statistics of time-varying covariates. Notes. This table outlines the
regional economic indicators that are used as covariates in the main specifications of this paper. It shows
averages across the years 2013 to 2017. The unemployment rate gives the number of unemployed divided
by the total labor force. “Vacancies helper” is the share of county vacancies which are defined as being
routine and simple, whereas “Vacancy skilled” comprises vacancies that require special skills and training.
Inward and outward migration is measured as the number of immigrants (emigrants) in a given year per
1,000 inhabitants in the same year. Employment in the first (agriculture, forestry and fishing) and second
sector (manufacturing, mining, construction etc.) is measured as percentage of total employment in the
county in the same year. “Transfers” are the total payments made from the state to the county in Euro
1000. “Social security recipients” is the share of the population below 65 that is eligible for social security
payments. “Local GDP” is the value of all goods and services produced in a county divided by the total
number of inhabitants. “Pctl(25)” and “Pctl(75)” are the 25th and 75th percentile, respectively.
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Dependent variable: dropout rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post 2015 .0076 .0096 .0068 .0068 .0089 .0059
(.0031) (.0036) (.0036) (.0031) (.0036) (.0037)
Post 2015 x Kaitz ratio Qua 2 .0008 .0007 .0009 .0010 .0008 .0011
(.0012) (.0012) (.0012) (.0012) (.0012) (.0012)
Post 2015 x Kaitz ratio Qua 3 .0033 .0029 .0033 .0032 .0029 .0035
(.0017) (.0016) (.0016) (.0016) (.0016) (.0015)
Post 2015 x Kaitz ratio Qua 4 .0037 .0037 .0044 .0059 .0060 .0065
(.0023) (.0021) (.0021) (.0024) (.0023) (.0023)
Unemployment t-1 .0024 .0010 .0025 .0012
(.0013) (.0011) (.0014) (.0011)
Vacancies helper t-1 .0002 .0002 .0002 .0003
(.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001)
Vacancy skilled t-1 −.00004 −0.000000 −.00003 .00002
(.0001) (.0002) (.0001) (.0001)
Asylum seekers t-1 −.00002 −.00002 −.00002 −.00002
(.00003) (.00003) (.00003) (.00003)
In-migration t-1 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001
(.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001)
Out-migration t-1 −.0001 −.0001 −.0001 −.0001
(.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001)
Sector 1 t-1 .0008 .0009
(.0023) (.0022)
Sector 2 t-1 .00002 .00002
(.0003) (.0003)
Transfers t-1 .00001 .00001
(.000005) (.000005)
Social security t-1 .0027 .0027
(.0011) (.0011)
Gross local product t-1 −.0002 −.0002
(.0001) (.0001)
Wage implied by: Gross earnings Gross earnings Gross earnings Median income Median income Median income
Fixed effects County County County County County County
State X year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,394 2,390 2,382 2,394 2,390 2,382
Table 1.A.3: Minimum wage bite quartile and dropout rates. Notes. This table reports
estimates of the minimum wage introduction on dropout rates. This interaction effect estimates are repro-
duced in Figure 1.4. “Post 2015” is an indicator for years 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2018. Counties are grouped
into quartiles based on their quartile of minimum wage bite. Indicators for quartiles are interacted with the
“Post 2015” indicator. The Kaitz-ratio is constructed from gross earnings (columns 1-3) or median income
(columns 4-6). The specifications in columns one and four do not contain any time-varying covariates. The
specifications in columns two and four contains the set of controls that can be found in columns two and
four of Table 1.2. The set of controls in columns three and six is equivalent to the respective controls in
the same columns of Table 1.2. Refer to the table notes of Table 1.2 for definitions of the variables. Each
specification includes county and state-by-year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the county level
are reported in parentheses.
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Dependent variable: dropout rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post 2015 .0081 .0102 .0076 .0076 .0095 .0069
(.0030) (.0035) (.0035) (.0031) (.0035) (.0037)
Post 2015 x 1[above median Kaitz-ratio] .0030 .0027 .0031 .0031 .0031 .0035
(.0015) (.0014) (.0014) (.0014) (.0013) (.0013)
Unemployment t-1 .0024 .0010 .0024 .0011
(.0013) (.0011) (.0013) (.0011)
Vacancies helper t-1 .0002 .0003 .0002 .0003
(.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001)
Vacancy skilled t-1 −.00004 .000001 −.00003 .00001
(.0001) (.0002) (.0001) (.0001)
Asylum seekers t-1 −.00002 −.00002 −.00002 −.00002
(.00003) (.00003) (.00003) (.00003)
In-migration t-1 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001
(.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001)
Out-migration t-1 −.0001 −.0001 −.0001 −.0001
(.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001)
Sector 1 t-1 .0006 .0006
(.0022) (.0022)
Sector 2 t-1 .00002 .00002
(.0003) (.0003)
Transfers t-1 .00001 .00001
(.000005) (.000005)
Social security t-1 .0026 .0027
(.0011) (.0011)
Gross local product t-1 −.0002 −.0002
(.0001) (.0001)
Wage implied by: Gross earnings Gross earnings Gross earnings Median income Median income Median income
Fixed effects County County County County County County
State X year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,394 2,390 2,382 2,394 2,390 2,382
Table 1.A.4: Above median minimum wage bite and dropout rates. Notes. This table
reports estimates of the minimum wage introduction on dropout rates. Post 2015 is an indicator for years
2015, 2016,2017 and 2018. ”Post 2015 x 1[above median Kaitz]” is an interaction term of the post 2015
indicator and a binary variable equal to one if counties’ Kaitz-ratio was larger than the median Kaitz-ratio
in 2014. The Kaitz-ratio is constructed from gross earnings (columns 1-3) or median income (columns 4-6).
The specifications in columns one and four do not contain any time-varying covariates. The specifications in
columns two and four contains the set of controls that can be found in columns two and four of Table 1.2.
The set of controls in columns three and six is equivalent to the respective controls in the same columns of
Table 1.2. Refer to the table notes of Table 1.2 for definitions of the variables. Each specification includes
county and state-by-year fixed effects. The 95 percent confidence interval based on standard errors clustered
at the county level is reported in parentheses.
150
Chapter 1 – Appendix A
Dependent variable: dropout rate
Male Female
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Post 2015 −.0045 −.0105 .00004 −.0065 −.0034 −.0021 −.0021 −.0013
(.0088) (.0088) (.0087) (.0088) (.0068) (.0070) (.0068) (.0069)
Post 2015 x Kaitz ratio .0333 .0405 .0312 .0414 .0148 .0137 .0154 .0153
(.0138) (.0133) (.0166) (.0162) (.0100) (.0095) (.0122) (.0116)
Umemployment t-1 .0007 .0008 .0017 .0017
(.0016) (.0016) (.0011) (.0011)
Vacancies helper t-1 .0002 .0002 .0003 .0003
(.0002) (.0002) (.0001) (.0001)
Vacancy skilled t-1 −.0001 −.0001 .0001 .0001
(.0002) (.0002) (.0001) (.0001)
Asylum seekers t-1 −.00005 −.00004 .00001 .00001
(.00004) (.00004) (.00002) (.00002)
In-migration t-1 .0001 .0001 .000001 .000003
(.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001)
Out-migration t-1 −.00001 −.00002 −.0001 −.0001
(.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001)
Sector 1 t-1 −.00003 .0003 .0023 .0024
(.0032) (.0032) (.0026) (.0026)
Sector 2 t-1 .00003 .00003 −.00001 −.00001
(.0004) (.0004) (.0002) (.0002)
Transfers t-1 .00001 .00001 .00001 .00001
(.00001) (.00001) (.000005) (.000005)
Social security t-1 .0041 .0041 .0012 .0012
(.0015) (.0015) (.0009) (.0009)
Gross local product t-1 −.000001 −.00003 −.0002 −.0002
(.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001)
Wage implied by: Gross earnings Gross earnings Median income Median income Gross earnings Gross earnings Median income Median income
Time-varying controls None Extended None Extended None Extended None Extended
Fixed effects County County County County County County County County
State x year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,393 2,381 2,393 2,381 2,393 2,381 2,393 2,381
Table 1.A.5: Minimum wage bite and dropout rates by gender. Notes. This table reports
estimates of the minimum wage introduction on dropout rates by gender. dropout rates are calculated for
males (columns one to four) and females (columns five to eight) separately. “Post 2015” is an indicator
for years 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2018. “Post 2015 x Kaitz-ratio” is an interaction term of this indicator and
the Kaitz-ratio at the county level. The Kaitz-ratio is constructed from gross earning (columns 1,2,5 and
6) or median income (columns 3,4,7 and 8). The specifications in columns 1,3,5 and 7 do not contain any
time-varying covariates. The specifications in columns 2,4,6 and 8 contain the set of controls that can be
found in columns 3 and 6 of Table 1.2. Refer to the table notes of Table 1.2 for definitions of the variables.
Each specification includes county and state-by-year fixed effects. The 95 percent confidence interval based
on standard errors clustered at the county level is reported in parentheses.
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Dependent variable: dropout rate
Male Female
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Post 2015 .0102 .0080 .0102 .0080 .0034 .0040 .0034 .0040
(.0037) (.0044) (.0037) (.0044) (.0039) (.0044) (.0039) (.0044)
Post 2015 x Kaitz ratio Qua 2 .0010 .0010 .0010 .0010 .0012 .0014 .0012 .0014
(.0017) (.0017) (.0017) (.0017) (.0012) (.0012) (.0012) (.0012)
Post 2015 x Kaitz ratio Qua 3 .0046 .0053 .0046 .0053 .0017 .0017 .0017 .0017
(.0023) (.0022) (.0023) (.0022) (.0014) (.0013) (.0014) (.0013)
Post 2015 x Kaitz ratio Qua 4 .0079 .0089 .0079 .0089 .0034 .0035 .0034 .0035
(.0033) (.0032) (.0033) (.0032) (.0022) (.0021) (.0022) (.0021)
Umemployment t-1 .0008 .0008 .0017 .0017
(.0016) (.0016) (.0012) (.0012)
Vacancies helper t-1 .0002 .0002 .0003 .0003
(.0002) (.0002) (.0001) (.0001)
Vacancy skilled t-1 −.0001 −.0001 .0001 .0001
(.0002) (.0002) (.0001) (.0001)
Asylum seekers t-1 −.00004 −.00004 .00001 .00001
(.00004) (.00004) (.00002) (.00002)
In-migration t-1 .0001 .0001 .000003 .000003
(.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001)
Out-migration t-1 −.00002 −.00002 −.0001 −.0001
(.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001)
Sector 1 t-1 −.0004 −.0004 .0022 .0022
(.0032) (.0032) (.0026) (.0026)
Sector 2 t-1 .00004 .00004 −.00001 −.00001
(.0004) (.0004) (.0002) (.0002)
Transfers t-1 .00001 .00001 .00001 .00001
(.00001) (.00001) (.000005) (.000005)
Social security t-1 .0040 .0040 .0012 .0012
(.0015) (.0015) (.0009) (.0009)
Gross local product t-1 −.0001 −.0001 −.0002 −.0002
(.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001)
Wage implied by: Gross earnings Gross earnings Median income Median income Gross earnings Gross earnings Median income Median income
Time-varying controls None Extended None Extended None Extended None Extended
Fixed effects County County County County County County County County
State x year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,393 2,381 2,393 2,381 2,393 2,381 2,393 2,381
Table 1.A.6: Minimum wage bite quartile and dropout rates by gender. Notes. This
table reports estimates of the minimum wage introduction on dropout rates by gender. This interaction
effect estimates are reproduced in Figure 1.4. “Post 2015” is an indicator for years 2015, 2016, 2017 and
2018. Counties are grouped into quartiles based on their quartile of minimum wage bite. Indicators for
quartiles are interacted with the “Post 2015” indicator. The Kaitz-ratio is constructed from gross earnings
(columns 1-3) or median income (columns 4-6). The specifications in columns one and four do not contain
any time-varying covariates. The specifications in columns two and four contains the set of controls that can
be found in columns two and four of Table 1.2. The set of controls in columns three and six is equivalent to
the respective controls in the same columns of Table 1.2. Refer to the table notes of Table 1.2 for definitions
of the variables. Each specification includes county and state-by-year fixed effects. The 95 percent confidence
interval based on standard errors clustered at the county level is reported in parentheses.
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Dependent variable: dropout rate
Male Female Male Female
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Post 2015 −.0020 −.0067 −.0048 −.0032 .0001 −.0056 −.0051 −.0041
(.0104) (.0103) (.0077) (.0079) (.0112) (.0111) (.0083) (.0083)
Post 2015 X rural −.0016 −.0061 −.0015 −.0041 .0069 .0041 .0017 −.0002
(.0131) (.0129) (.0088) (.0085) (.0122) (.0116) (.0072) (.0070)
Post 2015 x Kaitz ratio .0270 .0317 .0188 .0171 .0286 .0373 .0234 .0231
(.0185) (.0177) (.0124) (.0122) (.0238) (.0230) (.0164) (.0157)
Post 2015 x Kaitz ratio x rural .0053 .0132 .0004 .0045 −.0104 −.0052 −.0062 −.0028
(.0238) (.0234) (.0159) (.0155) (.0262) (.0248) (.0152) (.0147)
Umemployment t-1 .0007 .0018 .0007 .0018
(.0016) (.0011) (.0016) (.0011)
Vacancies helper t-1 .0002 .0004 .0002 .0004
(.0002) (.0001) (.0002) (.0001)
Vacancy skilled t-1 −.0001 .0001 −.0001 .0001
(.0002) (.0001) (.0002) (.0001)
Asylum seekers t-1 −.00005 .00001 −.00005 .00001
(.00004) (.00002) (.00004) (.00002)
In-migration t-1 .0001 .00001 .0001 .00001
(.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001)
Out-migration t-1 −.00001 −.0001 −.00001 −.0001
(.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001)
Sector 1 t-1 −.00001 .0025 −.00002 .0026
(.0032) (.0026) (.0032) (.0026)
Sector 2 t-1 .00003 −.00002 .00004 −.00001
(.0004) (.0002) (.0004) (.0002)
Transfers t-1 .00001 .00001 .00001 .00001
(.00001) (.000005) (.00001) (.000005)
Social security t-1 .0042 .0012 .0041 .0012
(.0015) (.0009) (.0015) (.0009)
Gross local product t-1 −.00001 −.0002 −.00004 −.0002
(.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001)
Wage implied by: Gross earnings Gross earnings Gross earnings Gross earnings Median income Median income Median income Median income
Time-varying controls None Extended None Extended None Extended None Extended
Fixed effects County County County County County County County County
State X year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,393 2,381 2,393 2,381 2,393 2,381 2,393 2,381
Table 1.A.7: Minimum wage bite and gender-specific dropout rates by rural vs urban.
Notes. This table reports estimates of the minimum wage introduction on dropout rates by gender; male
students’ dropout rates in columns 1 through 4, and females’ columns 5 through 8. “Post 2015” is an
indicator for years 2015, 2016 and 2017. “Post 2015 x Kaitz-ratio” is an interaction term of this indicator
and the Kaitz-ratio at the county level. “Rural” is an indicator equal to one if the county is classfied as
urban, and 0 otherwise. The Kaitz-ratio is constructed from gross earning (columns 1 through 4) or median
income (columns 5 through 8). The specifications in columns 1,3,5 and 7 do not contain any time-varying
covariates. Precise definitions of control variables can be found in the notes to Table 1.2.Each specification
includes county and state-by-year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the county level are reported in
parentheses.
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Pearson's r =  0.889



























Figure 1.A.1: Comparison of minimum wage bite measures. Notes. This figure plots the
ranks of counties based on their Kaitz-ratios implies by gross earnings (x-axis) and median income (y-axis).
The dashed line indicates the 45deg which would suggest perfect rank dependence. Higher ranks indicate
higher values of the Kaitz-ratio which implies lower hourly wages in 2014.
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Figure 1.A.2: Hours worked across states in 2014. Notes. This figure plots average labor
hours across German states (ger: Bundeslaender) for April 2014 from the labor earnings survey (ger: *Ver-
dienststrukturerhebung*). The grey bars indicate the average hours worked in a given week for an employee
in a given state. The precise number if the label inside the bar. The error bars report the minimum and
maximum hours worked across sectors in that particular state. Maximum hours are typically worked in
mining and agriculture while minimum hours are in the energy sector and manufacturing. There is a total
of 19 sectors.
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Wages implied by gross income Wages implied by median earnings











Figure 1.A.3: Kaitz-ratios in 2014. Notes. This figure plots distributions of observed Kaitz-ratios
of all German states in 2014 (see Table 1.1). The distributions are based on wages implied by gross income
(left) or median earnings (right).
156



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1.A.5: Immigration correlates of dropout rates. Notes. This figure plots coefficients
from a regression in which the dependent variable is a county’s dropout rate in year t, and the independent
variable of interest is either a county’s share of inhabitants aged 6-18, its share of foreigners, its share of those
seeking protection or its share of those granted asylum. Point estimates labeled “univariate” are obtained
from each variable separately; “multivariate” means that all variables are included at once. Each regression
includes state by year and county fixed effects. The models depicted in the left-hand panel are estimated
in levels while those on the right hand were estimated in first differences. The error bars show 95 percent
confidence intervals based on standard errors clustered at the county level.
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Median split, gross income Median split, median earnings
Kaitz−ratio, gross income Kaitz−ratio, median earnings
−0.002 0.000 0.002 0.004 −0.002 0.000 0.002























Figure 1.A.6: Randomization distributions of key quantities. Notes. This figure plots the
randomization distributions for four “treatment effects”: The two upper graphs show distributions in which
treatment is a county’s Kaitz-ratio in 2014, as implied by either gross income or median earnings. In the
lower graphs, treatment is based on a median split on those quantities. The vertical, dashed lines indicate
the observed effect in each of those four scenarios.
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Appendix B to Chapter 1: Robustness checks
Dependent variable: dropout rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post 2015 −.0072 −.0083 −.0097 −.0022 −.0036 −.0055
(.0051) (.0049) (.0047) (.0042) (.0041) (.0040)
Post 2015 x Kaitz ratio .0064 .0084 .0125 −.0030 −.0001 .0056
(.0092) (.0089) (.0085) (.0089) (.0087) (.0084)
Unemployment t-1 .0023 −.0002 .0022 −.0002
(.0010) (.0010) (.0010) (.0010)
Vacancies helper t-1 .0001 .0002 .0001 .0002
(.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001)
Vacancy skilled t-1 −.0001 −.0001 −.0001 −.0001
(.0002) (.0002) (.0002) (.0002)
Asylum seekers t-1 −.00003 −.00001 −.00003 −.00001
(.00002) (.00002) (.00002) (.00002)
In-migration t-1 −.00005 −.000001 −.00004 .000004
(.00004) (.00005) (.00004) (.00005)
Out-migration t-1 .0001 .00003 .0001 .00002
(.00005) (.0001) (.00005) (.0001)
Sector 1 t-1 −.0030 −.0030
(.0027) (.0027)
Sector 2 t-1 −.0001 −.0001
(.0003) (.0003)
Transfers t-1 .000002 .000002
(.000005) (.000005)
Social security t-1 .0037 .0037
(.0009) (.0009)
Gross local product t-1 −.0001 −.0001
(.0001) (.0001)
Wage implied by: Gross earnings Gross earnings Gross earnings Median income Median income Median income
Fixed effects County County County County County County
State-linear trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,394 2,390 2,382 2,394 2,390 2,382
Table 1.B.1: Continuous bite and state-specific linear trends. Notes. This table reports
estimates of the minimum wage introduction on dropout rates. Variable definitions follow exactly from Table
1.2. In contrast to the main specification, these specifications include state-specific linear time trends for the
period 2013-2018. Each specification further includes county fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the
county level are reported in parentheses.
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Dependent variable: dropout rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post 2015 −.0045 −.0045 −.0040 −.0048 −.0047 −.0043
(.0011) (.0011) (.0011) (.0012) (.0012) (.0011)
Post 2015 x Kaitz ratio Qua 2 .0011 .0011 .0012 .0010 .0009 .0011
(.0012) (.0012) (.0012) (.0012) (.0012) (.0012)
Post 2015 x Kaitz ratio Qua 3 .0019 .0018 .0023 .0027 .0025 .0030
(.0016) (.0016) (.0015) (.0015) (.0015) (.0015)
Post 2015 x Kaitz ratio Qua 4 .0002 .0007 .0016 .0007 .0011 .0020
(.0019) (.0018) (.0018) (.0019) (.0019) (.0018)
Unemployment t-1 .0022 −.0003 .0021 −.0003
(.0010) (.0010) (.0010) (.0010)
Vacancies helper t-1 .0001 .0002 .0001 .0002
(.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001)
Vacancy skilled t-1 −.0001 −.0001 −.0001 −.0001
(.0002) (.0002) (.0002) (.0002)
Asylum seekers t-1 −.00003 −.00001 −.00003 −.00001
(.00002) (.00002) (.00002) (.00002)
In-migration t-1 −.00004 .000001 −.00004 .000002
(.00004) (.00005) (.00004) (.00005)
Out-migration t-1 .0001 .00002 .0001 .00002
(.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001)
Sector 1 t-1 −.0034 −.0034
(.0027) (.0028)
Sector 2 t-1 −.0001 −.0001
(.0003) (.0003)
Transfers t-1 .000002 .000002
(.000005) (.000005)
Social security t-1 .0037 .0037
(.0009) (.0009)
Gross local product t-1 −.0001 −.0001
(.0001) (.0001)
Wage implied by: Gross earnings Gross earnings Gross earnings Median income Median income Median income
Fixed effects County County County County County County
State-linear trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,394 2,390 2,382 2,394 2,390 2,382
Table 1.B.2: Quartile bite and state-specific linear trends. Notes. This table reports
estimates of the minimum wage introduction on dropout rates. Variable definitions follow exactly from
Table 1.2. In contrast to the main specification, these specifications include state-specific linear time trends
for the period 2013-2018. Each specification further includes county fixed effects. Standard errors clustered
at the county level are reported in parentheses.
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Dependent variable: dropout rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post 2015 −.0155 −.0174 −.0287 −.0126 −.0139 −.0258
(.0066) (.0066) (.0062) (.0064) (.0065) (.0061)
Post 2015 x Kaitz ratio .0248 .0249 .0382 .0242 .0230 .0405
(.0108) (.0107) (.0100) (.0128) (.0127) (.0121)
Unemployment t-1 −.0026 −.0049 −.0027 −.0050
(.0007) (.0008) (.0007) (.0008)
Vacancies helper t-1 .0004 .0003 .0004 .0003
(.0002) (.0002) (.0002) (.0002)
Vacancy skilled t-1 −.0001 −.00002 −.0001 −.00004
(.0002) (.0002) (.0002) (.0002)
Asylum seekers t-1 −.00003 −.00001 −.00003 −.00001
(.00002) (.00002) (.00002) (.00002)
In-migration t-1 −.0001 −.00001 −.0001 −.00001
(.00005) (.00005) (.00005) (.00005)
Out-migration t-1 .0002 .0001 .0002 .0001
(.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001)
Sector 1 t-1 −.0021 −.0018
(.0026) (.0025)
Sector 2 t-1 −.0004 −.0004
(.0002) (.0002)
Transfers t-1 .00001 .00001
(.000005) (.000005)
Social security t-1 .0051 .0051
(.0009) (.0009)
Gross local product t-1 .0004 .0004
(.0002) (.0002)
Wage implied by: Gross earnings Gross earnings Gross earnings Median income Median income Median income
Fixed effects County County County County County County
State X post FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,394 2,390 2,382 2,394 2,390 2,382
Table 1.B.3: Continuous bite and state post-2015 fixed effects. Notes. This table reports
estimates of the minimum wage introduction on dropout rates. Variable definitions follow exactly from Table
1.2. In contrast to the main specification, these specifications include state post-2015 fixed effects; that is,
a dummy for each interaction of a state and the “post 2015” indicator. Each specification further includes
county fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the county level are reported in parentheses.
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Dependent variable: dropout rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post 2015 −.0037 −.0054 −.0104 −.0045 −.0063 −.0113
(.0022) (.0023) (.0024) (.0021) (.0023) (.0024)
Post 2015 x Kaitz ratio Qua 2 .0008 .0007 .0015 .0010 .0012 .0022
(.0012) (.0012) (.0012) (.0012) (.0012) (.0012)
Post 2015 x Kaitz ratio Qua 3 .0033 .0032 .0047 .0032 .0033 .0050
(.0017) (.0017) (.0016) (.0016) (.0016) (.0015)
Post 2015 x Kaitz ratio Qua 4 .0037 .0036 .0060 .0059 .0056 .0075
(.0022) (.0022) (.0021) (.0024) (.0024) (.0024)
Unemployment t-1 −.0027 −.0051 −.0027 −.0050
(.0007) (.0008) (.0007) (.0008)
Vacancies helper t-1 .0004 .0003 .0004 .0003
(.0002) (.0001) (.0002) (.0001)
Vacancy skilled t-1 −.0001 −.00003 −.0001 −.00002
(.0002) (.0002) (.0002) (.0002)
Asylum seekers t-1 −.00003 −.000004 −.00003 −.00001
(.00002) (.00002) (.00002) (.00002)
In-migration t-1 −.0001 −.00001 −.0001 −.00001
(.00005) (.00005) (.00005) (.00005)
Out-migration t-1 .0002 .00005 .0002 .00005
(.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001)
Sector 1 t-1 −.0024 −.0024
(.0026) (.0026)
Sector 2 t-1 −.0004 −.0004
(.0002) (.0002)
Transfers t-1 .00001 .00001
(.000005) (.000005)
Social security t-1 .0052 .0051
(.0009) (.0009)
Gross local product t-1 .0004 .0004
(.0002) (.0002)
Wage implied by: Gross earnings Gross earnings Gross earnings Median income Median income Median income
Fixed effects County County County County County County
State X post FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,394 2,390 2,382 2,394 2,390 2,382
Table 1.B.4: Quartile bite and state post-2015 fixed effects. Notes. This table reports
estimates of the minimum wage introduction on dropout rates. Variable definitions follow exactly from
Table 1.2. In contrast to the main specification, these specifications include state post-2015 fixed effects;
that is, a dummy for each interaction of a state and the “post 2015” indicator. Each specification further
includes county fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the county level are reported in parentheses.
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Dependent variable: dropout rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post 2015 −.0144 −.0213 −.0124 −.0200
(.0067) (.0068) (.0065) (.0068)
Post 2015 x Kaitz ratio .0308 .0380 .0334 .0437
(.0101) (.0103) (.0121) (.0125)
Umemployment .0029 .0013 .0029 .0014
(.0013) (.0013) (.0013) (.0013)
Vacancies helper .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001
(.0002) (.0002) (.0002) (.0002)
Vacancy skilled −.00001 .00002 −.00002 .000003
(.0002) (.0002) (.0002) (.0002)
Asylum seekers .00003 .00003 .00003 .00003
(.00002) (.00002) (.00002) (.00002)
In-migraton .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001
(.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001)
Out-migration −.0001 −.0001 −.0001 −.0001
(.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001)
Sector 1 .0036 .0041
(.0026) (.0026)




Social security .0026 .0027
(.0010) (.0010)
Gross local product .0001 .0001
(.0001) (.0001)
Wage implied by: Gross earnings Gross earnings Gross earnings Median income
Fixed effects County County County County
State X year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,991 1,983 1,991 1,983
Table 1.B.5: Continuous bite and with contemporaneous time-varying covariates.
Notes. This table reports estimates of the minimum wage introduction on dropout rates. Variable defini-
tions follow exactly from Table 1.2. In contrast to the main specification, these specifications include the
contemporaneous level of the control variables. This also accounts for the loss of 323 observations compared
to Table 1.2 as the year 2018 cannot be considered due to incomplete schooling records. Each specification
further includes county fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the county level are reported in parentheses.
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Dependent variable: dropout rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post 2015 .00005 −.0031 −.0009 −.0039
(.0032) (.0033) (.0033) (.0033)
Post 2015 x Kaitz ratio Qua 2 .0016 .0021 .0012 .0016
(.0013) (.0013) (.0012) (.0012)
Post 2015 x Kaitz ratio Qua 3 .0039 .0045 .0042 .0049
(.0017) (.0017) (.0017) (.0017)
Post 2015 x Kaitz ratio Qua 4 .0049 .0064 .0078 .0084
(.0021) (.0022) (.0024) (.0024)
Umemployment .0028 .0012 .0029 .0014
(.0013) (.0013) (.0013) (.0013)
Vacancies helper .0001 .0001 .0002 .0002
(.0002) (.0002) (.0002) (.0002)
Vacancy skilled −.00001 .00001 .00001 .00004
(.0002) (.0002) (.0002) (.0002)
Asylum seekers .00003 .00003 .00003 .00003
(.00002) (.00002) (.00002) (.00002)
In-migraton .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001
(.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001)
Out-migration −.0001 −.0001 −.0001 −.0001
(.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001)
Sector 1 .0034 .0032
(.0027) (.0026)




Social security .0026 .0025
(.0010) (.0010)
Gross local product .00005 .0001
(.0001) (.0001)
Wage implied by: Gross earnings Gross earnings Gross earnings Median income
Fixed effects County County County County
State X year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,991 1,983 1,991 1,983
Table 1.B.6: Quartile bite and with contemporaneous time-varying covariates. Notes.
This table reports estimates of the minimum wage introduction on dropout rates. Variable definitions follow
exactly from Table 1.2. In contrast to the main specification, these specifications include the contempora-
neous level of the control variables. This also accounts for the loss of 323 observations compared to Table
1.2 as the year 2018 cannot be considered due to incomplete schooling records. Each specification further
includes county fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the county level are reported in parentheses.
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Dependent variable: dropout rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post 2015 −.0020 −.0033 .0009 −.0001
(.0075) (.0072) (.0072) (.0070)
Post 2015 x Kaitz ratio .0211 .0210 .0197 .0190
(.0108) (.0106) (.0128) (.0127)
Umemployment t-2 .0005 −.0003 .0005 −.0002
(.0013) (.0012) (.0013) (.0012)
Vacancies helper t-2 −.00004 −.00003 −.00005 −.00003
(.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001)
Vacancy skilled t-2 −.00002 −.00001 −.00003 −.00002
(.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001)
Asylum seekers t-2 .00002 .00002 .00002 .00002
(.00002) (.00002) (.00002) (.00002)
In-migration t-2 .0002 .0002 .0002 .0002
(.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001)
Out-migration t-2 −.0002 −.0002 −.0002 −.0002
(.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001)
Sector 1 t-2 −.0007 −.0005
(.0028) (.0028)
Sector 2 t-2 −.0001 −.0001
(.0003) (.0003)
Transfers t-2 .00001 .00001
(.000005) (.000005)
Social security t-2 .0016 .0015
(.0012) (.0012)
Gross local product t-2 .00001 −.00001
(.0001) (.0001)
Wage implied by: Gross earnings Gross earnings Gross earnings Median income
Fixed effects County County County County
State X year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,391 2,391 2,391 2,391
Table 1.B.7: Continuous bite and with second lag of time-varying covariates. Notes.
This table reports estimates of the minimum wage introduction on dropout rates. Variable definitions follow
exactly from Table 1.2. In contrast to the main specification, these specifications include the second lag level
of the control variables. Each specification further includes county fixed effects. Standard errors clustered
at the county level are reported in parentheses.
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Dependent variable: dropout rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post 2015 .0081 .0068 .0074 .0060
(.0037) (.0036) (.0036) (.0036)
Post 2015 x Kaitz ratio Qua 2 .0005 .0004 .0006 .0006
(.0012) (.0012) (.0012) (.0012)
Post 2015 x Kaitz ratio Qua 3 .0030 .0030 .0027 .0028
(.0017) (.0016) (.0016) (.0016)
Post 2015 x Kaitz ratio Qua 4 .0031 .0031 .0055 .0055
(.0022) (.0022) (.0024) (.0023)
Umemployment t-2 .0005 −.0003 .0006 −.0002
(.0013) (.0012) (.0013) (.0012)
Vacancies helper t-2 −.0001 −.00004 −.00004 −.00002
(.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001)
Vacancy skilled t-2 −.00003 −.00001 −.00002 −.00001
(.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001)
Asylum seekers t-2 .00002 .00002 .00002 .00002
(.00002) (.00002) (.00002) (.00002)
In-migration t-2 .0002 .0002 .0002 .0002
(.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001)
Out-migration t-2 −.0002 −.0002 −.0002 −.0002
(.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001)
Sector 1 t-2 −.0009 −.0009
(.0028) (.0028)
Sector 2 t-2 −.0001 −.0001
(.0003) (.0003)
Transfers t-2 .00001 .00001
(.000005) (.000005)
Social security t-2 .0016 .0016
(.0012) (.0012)
Gross local product t-2 −.00003 −.00001
(.0001) (.0001)
Observations 2,391 2,391 2,391 2,391
Table 1.B.8: Quartile bite and with second lag of time-varying covariates. Notes.
This table reports estimates of the minimum wage introduction on dropout rates. Variable definitions follow
exactly from Table 1.2. In contrast to the main specification, these specifications include the second lag level
of the control variables. Each specification further includes county fixed effects. Standard errors clustered
at the county level are reported in parentheses.
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Figure 1.B.1: Alternative cluster specifications. Notes. This figure plots the benchmark
estimate from columns three and six of Table 1.2 of the interaction term of the post-2015 period and the
2014 minimum wage bite. The error bars indicate 95 percent confidence intervals based on different ways of
specifying clusters in the variance-covariance matrix computation.
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Appendix A to Chapter 2: Additional tables and figures
Start date Country Disaster type # casualties # affected Damage (in $) End date Total relief
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
25/04/2015 Nepal Earthquake 8, 969 5, 642, 150 5, 174, 000 25/04/2015 865, 055
/01/2015 India Drought 0 330, 000, 000 3, 000, 000 /12/2016 2, 678
08/11/2013 Philippines (the) Storm 7, 354 16, 106, 870 10, 000, 000 08/11/2013 564, 058
12/06/2013 India Flood 6, 054 504, 473 1, 100, 000 27/06/2013 150
21/03/2014 Liberia Epidemic 4, 810 10, 682 0 14/01/2016 110, 139
10/03/2014 Sierra Leone Epidemic 3, 956 14, 124 0 /08/2015 151, 478
29/06/2015 France Extreme temperature 3, 275 0 0 09/08/2015 0
/02/2014 Guinea Epidemic 2, 544 3, 814 0 29/12/2015 5, 951
23/01/2016 United States of America (the) Storm 50 85, 000, 012 550, 000 26/01/2016 0
20/05/2015 India Extreme temperature 2, 248 0 0 31/05/2015 0
(a) Top 10 by severity index
Start date Country Disaster type # casualties # affected Damage (in $) End date Total relief
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
25/04/2015 Nepal Earthquake 8, 969 5, 642, 150 5, 174, 000 25/04/2015 865, 055
08/11/2013 Philippines (the) Storm 7, 354 16, 106, 870 10, 000, 000 08/11/2013 564, 058
10/03/2014 Sierra Leone Epidemic 3, 956 14, 124 0 /08/2015 151, 478
21/03/2014 Liberia Epidemic 4, 810 10, 682 0 14/01/2016 110, 139
27/04/2017 Yemen Epidemic 11 180 0 03/06/2017 84, 484
/08/2015 Somalia Drought 0 4, 700, 000 0 /05/2017 60, 666
13/05/2014 Bosnia and Herzegovina Flood 25 1, 000, 000 436, 580 20/05/2014 58, 728
/02/2016 South Sudan Drought 0 3, 600, 000 0 /11/2016 36, 654
16/04/2016 Ecuador Earthquake 672 389, 364 2, 000, 000 16/04/2016 26, 197
28/09/2016 Haiti Storm 546 2, 100, 439 2, 000, 000 07/10/2016 23, 620
(b) Top 10 by total disaster relief
Start date Country Disaster type # casualties # affected Damage (in $) End date Total relief
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
07/06/2014 Argentina Flood 0 0 62, 000 30/06/2014 0
/07/2015 Botswana Drought 0 0 44, 000 /12/2015 0
24/12/2013 Switzerland Storm 0 0 0 24/12/2013 0
16/10/2016 China Storm 0 0 890, 000 19/10/2016 0
07/05/2016 Dominican Republic (the) Flood 0 0 0 08/05/2016 0
/08/2015 Panama Drought 0 0 0 /08/2015 0
07/11/2013 Palau Storm 0 0 0 07/11/2013 0
/07/2016 Paraguay Drought 0 0 0 /08/2016 0
02/12/2014 United States of America (the) Flood 0 0 90, 000 05/12/2014 0
28/09/2017 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines Storm 0 0 0 29/09/2017 0
(c) Bottom 10 by severity
Start date Country Disaster type # casualties # affected Damage (in $) End date Total relief
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
25/04/2015 Nepal Earthquake 8, 969 5, 642, 150 5, 174, 000 25/04/2015 865, 055
08/11/2013 Philippines (the) Storm 7, 354 16, 106, 870 10, 000, 000 08/11/2013 564, 058
13/05/2014 Bosnia and Herzegovina Flood 25 1, 000, 000 436, 580 20/05/2014 58, 728
16/04/2016 Ecuador Earthquake 672 389, 364 2, 000, 000 16/04/2016 26, 197
28/09/2016 Haiti Storm 546 2, 100, 439 2, 000, 000 07/10/2016 23, 620
08/09/2017 Mexico Earthquake 328 2, 069 2, 000, 000 08/09/2017 16, 058
24/08/2016 Italy Earthquake 297 7, 881 5, 000, 000 24/08/2016 12, 859
12/04/2014 Chile Wildfire 12 11, 000 34, 000 21/04/2014 7, 598
20/02/2016 Fiji Storm 44 350, 000 600, 000 21/02/2016 6, 381
05/10/2017 Nicaragua Storm 15 39, 200 0 06/10/2017 3, 141
(d) Top 10 precise onset events by total disaster relief
Table 2.A.1: Top and bottom 10 disaster-country events. Notes. This table reports the ten
worst disaster-country events, from 2013-2017, as ranked i) in descending order of severity as measured by
the normalized index of deaths and number of affected described in Section 2.5.2, Panel (a), ii) in descending
order of total disaster relief donations generated on Betterplace, Panel (b), iii) in ascending order of the
severity index, Panel (c), and, iv) in descending order of total disaster relief donations after removing events
with unknown start dates and epidemics, heat waves as well droughts, Panel (d). 41 ties (generated by no
deaths and no affected) in iii) are broken randomly.
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# fundraising pages Requested amount in e # charities # German charities
(2) (3) (4) (5)
All years 19, 474 97, 860, 498 15, 583 12, 012
2013 2, 642 12, 160, 062 2, 082 1, 627
2014 3, 263 16, 084, 026 2, 699 1, 799
2015 4, 725 25, 772, 442 3, 861 2, 555
2016 4, 912 25, 045, 182 3, 882 3, 009
2017 3, 932 18, 798, 787 3, 059 3, 022
(a) Funraising pages




(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
All 52 215 20 9 50 3 100 680,988 35,187,000
2013 26 117 10 5 20 2 50 126,083 3,234,657
2014 44 180 18 6 38 3 100 88,773 3,900,751
2015 55 203 20 10 50 5 100 137,383 7,615,323
2016 63 234 20 10 50 5 100 148,186 9,361,824
2017 61 266 20 10 50 5 100 180,563 11,074,445
(b) Donations
Table 2.A.2: Yearly summary statistics of demand and supply on Betterplace. Notes.
Panel (a): This table reports summary statistics about the number and characteristics of fundraising pages
created on Betterplace by year and overall. It shows the total number; the total amount requested through
these fundraising pages; the total number of distinct charities that created the pages; and the total number
of these charities that are headquartered in Germany. Panel (b): This table reports the mean; standard
deviation; median; the 10th, 25th, 75th and 90th percentile; the number of individual donations; and the
total amount of donations.
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Log total disaster relief
OLS
Restricted sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log # casualties .02 .022 1.7 .11
(.007) (.007) (.25) (.045)
Log # affected .011 .011 1.3 .062
(.0033) (.003) (.087) (.019)
Log # of tweets .12 .12 3.3 1.2
(.017) (.017) (.63) (.18)
Log # of active NGOs .012 .02 1.8 .075
(.0047) (.0059) (.41) (.033)
Log of trade with GER -.01
(.0025)
Distance from capital to Berlin [1000km] -.0049
(.0015)
Freedom of press [/ 100] -.014
(.029)
Ease of doing business [/ 100] .03
(.077)
Corruption perception [/ 100] .051
(.048)
Basic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter-of-year FE No Yes No Yes
# positives dep var 67 62 62 51
Pse/Adj R-sq .2 .22 .42 .28
N. of observations 1720 1604 1604 1604
Table 2.A.3: Correlates of disaster relief fundraising activity and giving on Better-
place, additional specifications I. Notes. This table presents additional parameter estimates for
Equation (2.1). The dependent variable in columns 1, 2 and 3 is an indicator equal to one if at least one
fundraising page for a given natural disaster was created on Betterplace, and zero otherwise. In column
4, the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of total disaster relief for a given event. We show odds
ratios from logit models in columns 1, 2 and 3 and OLS estimates in column 4. The estimation sample in
column 1 is the full set of natural disasters in the observation window; in columns 2,3 and 4, the sample
is restricted to those events for which we observe all covariates included in the specifications of columns 2
and 4 of Table 2.4. See Section 2.3.4 for definitions of variables. We report standard errors clustered at the
country level in parentheses.
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Chapter 2 – Appendix A
1[Any fundraising]
Logit odds ratios LPM
(1) (2)
Log # of NGOs active in 2011 2.1 .017
(.47) (.0064)
Log # casualties 1.5 .024
(.22) (.0068)
Log # affected 1.5 .0068
(.11) (.0018)
Log # of tweets 4.5 .12
(1.2) (.021)
Log of trade with GER .69 -.0082
(.071) (.0027)
Distance from capital to Berlin [1000km] .77 -.0049
(.062) (.0016)
Freedom of press [/ 100] .2 -.032
(.41) (.035)
Ease of doing business [/ 100] 3.7 .027
(11) (.075)
Corruption perception [/ 100] .65 .021
(1.9) (.05)
Basic controls Yes Yes
Quarter-of-year FE Yes Yes
Pse/Adj R-sq .5 .21
N. of observations 1346 1346
Table 2.A.5: Disaster relief fundraising activity—first stage estimates. Notes. This
table presents the first stage of the 2SLS estimations in Table 2.5. Column 1 is a logit specification whereas
column 2 is a linear probability model (OLS). The dependent variable—and thus the endogenous regressor
of the analysis in Section 2.6—is an indicator for whether there was any fundraising activity on Betterplace
for a given disaster event, and zero otherwise. The exogenous regressor—and thus the instrument—is “Log
# of active charities in 2011”, the natural logarithm of number of charities active in a country in 2011.
“χ2/F first stage” reports the test statistic of instrument relevance in the first stage. See Section 2.3.4 for
definitions of variables. We report standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses.
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Figure 2.A.1: Casualties from natural disasters. Notes. This figure depicts the empirical
cumulative density of the number of casualties across the 1,720 events in the sample. The most severe event
is marked by the dotted vertical line—the earthquake in Nepal in 2015 which caused 8,969 casualties.
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share female = 0.60
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Age
(a) Donors on Betterplace
share female = 0.47












18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+
Age
(b) Donors in German Philanthropy Market
Figure 2.A.2: Users on Betterplace vs. donor population in Germany. Notes. Panel (a)
shows a bar chart with the age distribution of users on Betterplace and the share of donors that are female
or male. The data comes from Google analytics and is i) only available for June through October 2018, and
ii) only for 51% of users. Panel b) shows a bar chart with the age distribution of donors in Germany and the
share of donors that are female and male. This figure is based on data from the 2015 wave of the German
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(b) Top 2 events
Figure 2.A.3: Crowding out of demand by the top 10 and top 2 events. Notes. Panels (a)
and (b) depict the daily fundraising activity, measured as the number of new non-disaster relief fundraising
project pages posted on the platform after a disaster event. In Panel (a) we consider the ten events that
raised most disaster relief donations on Betterplace; in Panel (b) we consider the top two events. The
underlying data structure and the model are described just before and in the beginning of Section 2.5.1. The
error bands show the 95% confidence interval.
177











































(b) 1:1 matching, full covariates
Figure 2.A.4: Matched event sample balance. Notes. This figure shows boxplots of the
propensity scores in the matched samples of events. Panel (a) results from the matching procedure matching
five controls to each treated event, controlling only for event severity. Panel (b) results from the matching
procedure from matching one treated observation to five control observations controlling for the extensive
set of covariates used in column 2 of Table 2.4. We detail the matching procedure in Section 2.5.2. In
the boxplot, the bold solid bar shows the median of the distributions, while the lower and upper hinges
correspond to the 25th and 75th percentile. The upper (lower) whisker extends from the hinge to the largest
(smallest) value no further than 1.5 times the inter-quartile range from the hinge. Data beyond the end of
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(b) Outside two month window
Figure 2.A.5: Media fatigue. Notes. This figures compares media coverage for events within two
months—Panel (a)—of Typhoon Haiyan and the Nepal earthquake to that of a matched sample of events
outside that two month window—Panel (b). We measure media coverage by the daily number of tweets
related to a disaster (see Section 2.3.4). The matched sample contains five control events for each treated
event using propensity scores based on events’ severity. The procedure is detailed in Section 2.5.2. The
underlying data structure and the model are described just before and in the beginning of Section 2.5.1. The
error bands show the 95% confidence interval.
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(d) Donations outside 2-month window
Figure 2.A.6: Disaster fatigue: Fundraising and donations to other disasters (1:1
matched sample) Notes. This figures compares fundraising activity for and disaster relief donations
to events within two months—Panels (a) and (c)—of Typhoon Haiyan and the Nepal earthquake to that
of a matched sample of events outside that two month window—Panels (b) and (d). Panels (a) and (b)
show fundraising activity, measured as the number of new disaster relief fundraising project pages posted
on the platform in response to disaster events. Panel (b) shows the daily disaster relief donations response,
measured as total donations going to disaster relief fundraising projects. The matched sample contains
one control event for each treated event using propensity scores based the extensive list of covariates used
in column 2 of Table 2.4. The procedure is detailed in Section 2.5.2. The underlying data structure and
the model are described just before and in the beginning of Section 2.5.1. The error bands show the95%
confidence interval.
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Figure 2.A.8: First stage predictions. Notes. This figure shows the predicted probabilities of there
being any fundraising activity in the wake of a natural disaster on Betterplace. The estimates are obtained
from the logit regression in the first step of the IV procedure described in Section 2.6.1. The histogram is
constructed using a fixed bin width of .025. Note that the y-axis is shown in log-10 scale.
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Appendix B to Chapter 2: Matching Projects to Disasters
This section provides a detailed description of the procedure used to match
fundraising pages from Betterplace to disaster events in the EMDAT database. Upon
registration of the project page, the charitable organization provides detailed infor-
mation on the project. Firstly, each charity describes the goal of the project in the
project description, which should entail a detailed description of the project’s aims,
the project plan, desired project volume, the time frame and the project location.
Other data entries that are required are details regarding the charity itself, such as
location, and name. Additionally, the charities can create “needs”, which are project
elements to which donors can donate and which are earmarked for a particular ele-
ment of the project. This data is entered by the charities and Betterplace stores the
most recent data entry. Because funding is earmarked and project managers have
to clearly mark changes in their project descriptions, major changes in project aims
tend to be rare.1 Betterplace also stores the creation date of the project, the date
the project became visible on the platform, which happens when the project has
received its first e250 in donations.
The project location is not always the same as the location of the charitable activ-
ity. This is because some projects target multiple countries, or for some projects the
location is indicated to be the charity’s headquarters although activities take place
in another country. For example, a fundraising page could be hosted in Germany
but utilize the funds to build a water purification system somewhere in Africa. The
majority of donations, over e20 million, go to projects hosted in Germany, followed
by Kenya and Nepal, each receiving around e1 million Euro. In terms of donation
volume per target country, Germany still receives the bulk of donations but now
Syria follows with about e1.75 million. Overall, 59.3% of donations on Betterplace
go to projects hosted in Germany, but only 56.9% of these donations are used for
causes located in Germany. To match projects to disaster events, we use the country
where the project is carried out.
We match all projects which were visible on Betterplace from 2013-2017, and all
projects created from 2013-2017. This comprises projects that were created prior to
1 Charities can change the project description, although these changes have to be clearly marked
and donations received before the change have to be used for the purpose previously stated. Accord-
ing to Betterplace, due to these regulations projects rarely change their focus completely, although
new elements may be added and old ones removed. Additionally, the costs of creating a new project
are low and it is therefore more likely that charities create new projects to support new causes
instead of changing old projects.
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2013, too. In total there are 24,151 projects, which have all been classified, regard-
less of whether the project received any donations. The projects were distributed in
four equally sized batches (of around 6,000 projects), and this was done twice with
random assignment of projects to each batch. Each of the eight batches thus con-
tained a different combination of projects and each project was included in exactly
two separate batches. The information provided in these batches was the project
description, the location and the charity’s name.
To physically match fundraising pages to events, we contracted four individuals.
These people were unaffiliated to the university or the research team in any way. The
contractors were paid a fixed salary, and conducted the matching process according
to the following steps:
Step 1
Each batch is assigned to a different individual. The contractor carefully reads
through and classifies projects using a broad set of categories. These categories are
natural disaster, conflict, refugee and other. For the main categories “other” and
“refugees”, a more detailed subcategory had to be selected using a drop-down menu.
Step 2
When the project was related to natural disasters, additional information had to
be completed to capture disaster-specific characteristics. This was done in order to
later aid the matching process with disaster entries in the EMDAT database. First,
when host and target country differed, the country code of the country where the
disaster happened had to be recorded (see above). If the project targeted multiple
countries an additional indicator variable was recorded. For example, a fundraising
page could collect funds for Ebola epidemic relief in the Horn of Africa. Second, the
disaster type had to be chosen from a set of predefined disaster types that matched
the disaster types in the EMDAT database. If applicable, the name of the disaster
was entered, e.g. Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines.
Step 3
Since all projects were classified by two separate individuals, the classifications
were cross-checked. Whenever classifications differed (on the basis of the main cat-
egory, but also differences in disaster characteristics) the project was carefully read
183
Chapter 2 – Appendix B
again by a third person to decide upon the final classification. In total there were
2113 projects where classifications did not agree and were classified by a third person.
Step 4
In the final step, the disaster relief projects were matched to entries in the EM-
DAT database, based on the location stamp, time stamp, disaster type and name
(if applicable). Some projects targeted multiple disasters at the same time. For
example, the Nepal earthquake on April 25th, 2015 was followed by another major
earthquake on May 12th, 2015; several projects mentioned both in their descriptions.
These events are recorded as separate disasters in the EMDAT database and there-
fore these projects were assigned two disaster matches. In general, when projects
targeted multiple disasters at once, they were matched with all respective event en-
tries. Some projects, such as the red cross, were classified as general disaster relief.
Individual donating to this type of projects support the operations of these charities
without funding being earmarked. Often, these charities also have separate projects
to target specific events.
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Appendix C to Chapter 2: Using regularization to select predictive covariates
The analysis presented in Table 2.4 is complicated by two characteristics of the
data. First, the response data is skewed in the sense that only 3.9% of projects
generated a fundraising response in the first place. A predictive model which would
predict “no project” for all events would thus tend to be correct in over 96% of
cases. Second, the list of covariates presented in Table 2.4 could be further extended
to include various sub-indices of the measures of countries’ socio-political climate.
In the regressions we include variables which, based on previous literature, seem
pertinent in explaining heterogeneity.
In this section, we discuss an alternative approach to understanding the hetero-
geneity in responses to events. We employ regularized (also referred to as penalized
regression) which i) may outperform standard OLS in terms of predictive perfor-
mance as it avoids over-fitting, and, ii) can be employed to select the most predic-
tive covariates. Since we are not interested in making out of sample predictions, the
latter rationale motivates our use of regularized regression. In particular, we would
like to answer the following question: Given the wide set of possible correlates of
supply and demand of charitable giving, which ones are most predictive of there
being fundraising activity for an event on Betterplace?
Estimation approach
Specifically, we employ the lasso—least absolute shrinkage and selection operator—
estimator (Tibshirani, 1996). In the simple case of a linear model, the lasso estimator








where i indexes event and K the number of variables, i.e., the number of columns in
the matrix X. The first term corresponds to the sum of squared residuals, which is
the standard OLS objective function. The second term however penalizes the sum
of absolute coefficient estimates using a parameter λ. Given a value of λ, larger co-
efficients will lead to a higher penalty. Similarly, given coefficient estimates a higher
value of λ will cause a stronger penalty. Note that a variable xk is only “used” to
explain variation in Y if βk 6= 0. Thus, the lasso balances the increasing explana-
tory power from including more variables—achieved by reducing the sum of squared
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residuals—with a higher penalty incurred as a consequence of more variables having
non-zero coefficients. The key advantage of the lasso estimator over other regular-
ization techniques is the fact it will shrink estimates to exactly zero, rather than
towards zero. Therefore, the vector β̂ which minimizes the optimization problem
above is likely to have a number of entries that are exactly zero. This indicates little
explanatory power of the respective variables. This approach can be extended to
other estimation methods, and indeed, we will apply it to a standard logit model as
well.
One key aspect of lasso estimation is the degree of regularization, i.e., the value
of λ. We choose λ through tenfold cross validation. To ascertain that each validation
fold contains a non-zero number of “yes” events, we apply the following procedure.
First, split the set of events into those with fundraising activity and those without.
Second, randomly sample with replacement integers from one through ten within
both subsets. Third, recombine those subsets. Now, each event (regardless of project
status) is associated with exactly one value of sequence from one through ten which
denotes its cross validation fold membership. The cross validation then proceeds by
in turn using nine folds to estimate a number of lasso models across a wide range of
candidate values for λ, and evaluates their predictive performance using the tenth,
held out, fold as the test set. In the end, the value of λ which achieves minimum
out of sample error is the one that is chosen.
We consider three models using lasso estimation. We apply a lasso to a linear
probability model (outcome is whether or not fundraising activity takes place) and
use mean squared error as the cross validation criterion. Moreover, we apply a lasso
to the analogous logit model and use the misclassification rate as the cross validation
criterion. Finally, we apply a lasso to the linear model where the outcome is the log
of total disaster relief, and evaluate using mean squared error.
Results
We first compare the predictive performance of different estimators as to their
ability to classify events into whether fundraising activity took place. Specifically,
we compare i) simple OLS (LPM), ii) standard logit, iii) lasso OLS, and iv) lasso
logit. We consider a prediction to be a “yes” when Pr(Y = 1|X) > .5. Note that
we include all available covariates in X of which those considered in Table 2.4 are
a strict subset. In Table 2.C.1, we present the predictive power of various models
vis-a-vis fundraising activity and total amount donated. The results demonstrate
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that the logit model outperforms the LPM by a considerable margin. Further, lasso
estimators perform comparatively well despite their (mechanical and desired) spar-
sity but are not able to capture the complexity as accurately as the standard logit
model. Overall, the models find it difficult to accurately predict “yes fundraising ac-
tivity” given the long tail of smaller disasters, of which only a tiny fraction received
funding. We take these results as reason to consider logit models the preferred first
stage specification in the IV analysis of Section 2.6.1.
Recall that these models differ from those in Table 2.4 in that they use even more
covariates. For comparison, the model in column 2 of Table 2.4 correctly predicts 24
“yes”, and 1534 “no”, out of 1604 cases while the model with additional covariates
correctly predicts 25 “yes” and also 1534 “no”. Hence, the full set of covariates
contains elements which help the model make one more correct prediction.2
Despite not being able to capture the complexity of disaster relief demand as
well as the standard logit model, the lasso results are informative since they point
out the most predictive covariates. In Figure 2.C.1, we present the coefficients
that the lasso estimator did not shrink to zero, i.e. those most helpful ones in
predicting a demand response on Betterplace.3 Three key findings emerge from this
analysis. First, the severity of the event is the most powerful predictor a response,
and the number of affected matters more than the number of casualties. Second,
existing charity presence on the ground matters and is strongly predictive of demand
for disaster relief. Third, media attention is also strongly predictive of a demand
response. Finally, the analogous exposition for predictive covariates of donation
supply indicates that media attention is the most powerful predictor while severity
in terms of the number of affected is second most important.
2 Note that the results displayed in Table 2.1, Table 2.A.4, and Table 2.A.3 would not substan-
tively change if those additional covariates were included. The magnitudes and signs as well as the
estimates’ precision are hardly affected. These results are not reported and are available on request.
The IV analysis in Section 2.6.1 would not be affected in a substantive way either.
3 The lasso estimation also included the quarter-of-year dummies, which are not included in the
exposition. Some of those were not shrunk to zero but are not reported in Figure 2.C.1.
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Target variable: 1[Any fundraising]
Loss: MSE Loss: misclassification error
OLS Logit Lasso OLS - min Lasso OLS - 1 SD Lasso logit - min Lasso logit - 1 SD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Predicts no (n = 1542) 1596 1570 1597 1604 1576 1599
Fraction correct 1 0.99 1 1 1 1
Predicts yes (n = 62) 8 34 7 0 28 5
Fraction correct 0.13 0.40 0.11 0 0.35 0.080
Overall accuracy 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.97 0.96
Target variable: log total amount donated
Loss: mean squared error (MSE)
Mean squared error 3.22 1.26 1.44
Table 2.C.1: Model performance. Notes. This table compares the models estimated in Sections
2.4.3 to those estimated using lasso regression. The top part of the table evaluates models in which the
dependent variable is a binary indicator equal to one if there was any fundraising activity in response to
a natural disaster on Betterplace, and zero otherwise. The dependent variable in the bottom part is the
natural logarithm of total disaster relief for an event on Betterplace. “‘Lasso - min” denotes proceedings from
lasso models in which the penalty that minimizes the loss function is chosen via cross validation. “Lasso - 1
SD” is the model implied by the penalty term within one standard deviation of the loss function minimizing
penalty term, that results in the lowest value of the loss function. In the top half, “Predicts no/yes” counts
the number of cases a model predicts no/some fundraising activity takes place after an event. “Fraction
correct” is the fraction correctly predicted among those events without activity. “Overall accuracy” is the
total fraction of correctly predicted cases using a threshold of .5. “MSE” reports the implied mean squared




























































































Figure 2.C.1: Non-zero coefficients in lasso models. Notes. This figure reports non-zero
coefficients from a lasso estimator with the dependent variable being a binary indicator equal to one if there
was any fundraising activity in response to a natural disaster on Betterplace, and zero otherwise. Refer to
the text of Appendix Section 4.6 for the full set of predictors included. All variables were normalized and the
coefficients should not be interpreted numerically. The lasso penalty was chosen via tenfold cross validation.
These coefficients are obtained from the “Lasso - min” model described in the notes to Table 2.C.1.
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Appendix A to Chapter 3: Construction of outcome indices
Table 3.1 provides an overview of the hypotheses. In the following, we detail
which variables are used to construct those indices. Note that we spell out win-
sorization and transformation in Section 3.4.3, the creation of indexes based on
z-scores in Section 3.3.2.
1. Entrepreneurship training study
1.1. Economic outcomes (four hypotheses)
1 Business creation
• Business exists (yes/no)




3 Capital and labor input
• Value of physical assets
• Value of inventory
• Capital investment over past 3 months
• Number of full-time employees
• Number of part-time employees
• Number of partners in business
4 Economic self-sufficiency
• Earnings from self-employment (monthly profits)
• Earnings from wage employment
• Earnings from other sources
1.2 Business and personal input (eight hypotheses)
1 Business practices
• Share of business practices employed
2 Financial professionalization
• Taken out a loan (yes/no)
• Size of loan
• Business registration
• Local trade licenses
• Knowledge about funding initiatives
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• Actual funding from initiatives
• Received equity investment
• Banking account
• Emergency borrowing
• Business banking account
• Hours of consulting services
3 Marketing
• Number of marketing channels used
4 Innovation
• Introduction of a new product (yes/no)
• Number of new products
• Main new product is a new product line (yes/no)
• Product improvement (yes/no)
• Product new to neighborhood (yes/no)
• Origin of idea (own idea vs. inspired vs. purchased/others idea)
• Process improvement (yes/no)
• Introduced a new method for pricing (yes/no)
• Website with functioning URL (yes/no)
5 Networks
• Number of contacts in friends and family
• Number of contacts in ”other”
• Scope of potential advice
• Scope of advice used




• Entrepreneurial self-efficacy (general and task-specific, separately)
• Entrepreneurial future
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• Subjective risk preferences
• Loss aversion
• Time preferences
• Subjective time preferences
2. Selection study
2.1 Selection into entrepreneurship among those with interest (four hypotheses)
1 Submitted application
2 Cognitive ability





• Believes about becoming a successful entrepreneur,
• Subjective rank of entrepreneurial ability,
2.2.1 Economic outcomes (non-experimental) [identical to 1.1 ]
2.2.2 Business and personal input (non-experimental) [identical to 1.2 ]
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Appendix B to Chapter 3: Marketing themes
Section 3.2.2 describes how our design allows us to study selection into en-
trepreneurship. In order to apply to the entrepreneurship training program, stu-
dents ought to attend information sessions where application forms can be obtained.
We randomly vary the content of those information sessions by emphasizing either
that entrepreneurship offers the possibility of achieving financial independence, or
that entrepreneurship offers the freedom to be creative. Information sessions take ap-
proximately 15-20 minutes and the content is presented by a member of our partner
organization. In each session, a presenter went through 12 presentation slides and
two videos.
The videos constituted the main source of variation in the presentation. This
guaranteed that students across sessions are exposed to the identical content. The
first video differed in both visual and audio content. It was was 3 minutes 57 seconds
in the profit condition, and 3 minutes 38 seconds in the creative freedom condition.
The difference stems from the voice over being longer in the former. The second
video only differed in audio content, and took 1 minute 53 seconds in both treat-
ment conditions. Videos were embedded in the presentations to reduce technological
complexity. The first video was presented on slide seven, while the second video was
presented on the last slide. In between, slide nine presented different content.
In Figure 3.B.1 we show examples of different content across the two treatments.
In panels (a) and (b), we show a still frame of the first video’s first slide. Two of
three statements differ, and the voice over emphasized the differences between the
two treatments. Note that not entire presentation was kept in this black and white
layout. In panels (c) and (d) we show the first frame of the second video. Again,
the voice over emphasized the differences. Finally, we show the slide in which the
presentations further differed in panels (e) and (f).
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(a) First video, profit (b) First video, creative freedom
(c) Second video, profit (d) Second video, creative freedom
(e) Slide nine, profit (f) Slide nine, creative freedom
Figure 3.B.1: Example for treatment variation in information sessions. Notes. The
figures illustrates three instances of how the information session presentation differed between profit and
creativity treatment. Panels (a), (c) and (e) show slides that emphasize the profit motive of becoming an
entrepreneur. Panels (b), (d) and (f) show the corresponding slide in the creative freedom treatment. The
images (a) through (d) are obtained from screen shots of videos that were shown during the information
sessions. Note that students were able to only see one deck of slides—either the profit or the creativity
theme.
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Appendix A to Chapter 4: Additional tables and figures.
Mean S.D. Median 25th 75th N
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
# employees 116 114 85 56 130 463
Sales [’000 EUR] 28639 74308 10000 5000 21941 289
Year plant opened 1970 25 1976 1961 1986 456
% for export 27 28 15 2 45 438
Produces consumer good .5 .5 1 0 1 458
Produces intermediate good .29 .45 0 0 1 458
Produces capital good .22 .41 0 0 0 458
Shared ownership .67 .47 1 0 1 463
Limited liability .27 .44 0 0 1 463
Other ownership .063 .24 0 0 0 463
Table 4.A.1: Summary statistics of firms survey characteristics. Notes. This table reports
summary statistics of survey-level variables used in the analysis of correlates of firm’s Style 2 intensity of
Table 4.3. Column 2 reports the standard deviation, while columns 4 and 5 report the 25th and 75th
percentile, respectively. “% for export” is a firm’s self-reported share of output that is exported abroad.
“Produces consumer/intermediate/capital good” are indicator variables equal to one when the firm produces
the respective output category, and zero otherwise. “Shared ownership”, “limited liability” and “Other
ownership” are indicators equal to one when a firm is organized according to the respective ownership
structure.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mgt style 2 .3 .24 .25 .3 .23 .24
(.092) (.093) (.093) (.11) (.11) (.11)
1[consumer good] .071 .13
(.078) (.098)
1[intermediate good] .18 .24
(.082) (.095)
Sector FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Region FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Adj R-squared .029 .16 .17 .021 .13 .15
N. of cases 288 288 285 288 288 285
Table 4.A.2: Management style and firms’ TFP before the crisis—full panel struc-
ture. Notes. This table reports the results of estimating Equation (4.4) using OLS, and limiting the sample
to those firms for which the full panel to estimate TFP is available—see Section 4.4.1. “Mgt style 2” is a
variable between 0 and 1 and indicates style 2 intensity. “1[consumer good]” and “1[intermediate good]” are
indicators for firms that are located in the respective location along the value chain. The omitted category is
firms producing capital goods. Columns 2,3,5 and 6 contain sector and region fixed effects. Standard errors
clustered at the three-digit industry level are reported in parentheses.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1[sytle 2 > 23 ] .19 .15 .16 .19 .15 .16
(.056) (.053) (.053) (.06) (.059) (.06)
1[13 < sytle 2 ≤
2
3 ] .09 .11 .1 .094 .12 .11
(.05) (.049) (.049) (.055) (.056) (.056)
1[consumer good] .065 .097
(.065) (.08)
1[intermediate good] .12 .16
(.064) (.073)
Sector FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Region FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
p: mid vs top tertile .068 .37 .28 .097 .52 .41
Adj R-squared .02 .13 .13 .015 .1 .11
N. of cases 385 385 379 385 385 379
Table 4.A.3: Management style tertiles and firms’ TFP before the crisis. Notes. This
table reports the results of estimating Equation (4.4) using OLS. The dependent variable is a firm’s estimated
TFP; 95% winsorized in columns 1-3 and non-winsorized in columns 4-6. The indicators bin management
style intensity into tertiles; the omitted category is the bottom third of style 2 intensity. “1[consumer good]”
and “1[intermediate good]” are indicators for firms that are located in the respective location along the value
chain. The omitted category is firms producing capital goods. Columns 2,3,5 and 6 contain sector and region
fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the three-digit industry level are reported in parentheses.
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Chapter 4 – Appendix A
Mean S.D. Median 25th 75th N
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sales 2001-2006 17558 29778 9768 5332 19386 499
Log sales 2001-2006 9.2 .98 9.2 8.6 9.9 499
Total assets 2001-2006 15563 22062 8520 4374 17428 505
Log total assets 2001-2006 9.1 1.1 9.1 8.4 9.8 505
# employees 2001-2006 102 84 77 53 118 452
Log # employees 2001-2006 4.4 .73 4.3 4 4.8 452
Sales 2007-2010 19554 29809 10182 4813 21064 473
Log sales 2007-2010 9.2 1.1 9.2 8.5 10 473
Total assets 2007-2010 21371 39522 10600 4754 23869 479
Log total assets 2007-2010 9.2 1.3 9.3 8.5 10 479
# employees 2007-2010 100 89 73 47 124 439
Log # employees 2007-2010 4.3 .84 4.3 3.9 4.8 439
Table 4.A.4: Summary statistics of TFP inputs. Notes. This table provides summary statistics
for (time aggregated) inputs to the TFP estimation. The variables are averaged over the corresponding time
horizon. “25th” and “75th” denote the respective percentile of the distribution. “Log” refers to the natural
logarithm.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mgt style 2 -.14 -.13 -.13 -.1 -.092 -.09
(.069) (.064) (.066) (.081) (.077) (.077)
Pre-crisis TFP -.36 -.4 -.38 -.38 -.42 -.4
(.061) (.066) (.061) (.09) (.088) (.084)
1[consumer good] -.018 -.012
(.057) (.062)
1[intermediate good] .026 .024
(.053) (.056)
Sector FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Region FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Adj R-squared .2 .27 .28 .22 .28 .29
N. of cases 341 341 336 341 341 336
Table 4.A.5: Management style and difference in firm productivity. Notes. This table
shows results of regressions in which the outcome is the difference between a firm’s productivity calculated
from 2007-2010 data and its productivity calculated from 2001-2006 data. Both quantities are 95 percent
winsorized prior to calculating the difference. “Mgt style 2” is a variable between 0 and 1 and indicates style
2 intensity. “Pre-crisis TFP” is a firm’s productivity calculated from 2001-2006 data. “1[consumer good]”
and “1[intermediate good]” are indicators for firms that are located in the respective location along the value
chain. The omitted category is firms producing capital goods. Standard errors clustered at the three-digit
industry level are reported in parentheses.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mgt style 2 -.18 -.17 -.19 -.081 -.05 -.051
(.091) (.095) (.097) (.081) (.081) (.083)
Pre-crisis TFP .75 .67 .73 .55 .5 .52
(.079) (.096) (.094) (.067) (.065) (.065)
1[consumer good] .13 -.0083
(.1) (.083)
1[intermediate good] .14 .065
(.098) (.077)
Sector FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Region FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
N. of cases 385 385 379 385 385 379
Table 4.A.6: Management style and firm productivity during the crisis - robustness.
Notes. This table shows results of regressions which use imputed data to account for possibly endogenous firm
exit during the Great Recession. The dependent variable in columns 1-3 is i) a firm’s observed productivity
level using 2007 to 2010 data, or ii) the productivity level of the least productive firm in that period for those
firm we do not observe in that period but do observe in the prior period. The dependent variable in columns
4-6 differs in that we use the firm at the fifth percentile to impute missing values (rather than the least
productive). We estimate quantile regressions for the median in column 1-3 and bootstrap standard errors.
The bootstrap procedure is replicated 1,000 and draws cluster-robust samples. Standard errors in column
4-6 are analytic and clustered at the three-digit industry level, too. “Mgt style 2” is a variable between 0 and
1 and indicates style 2 intensity. “Pre-crisis TFP” is a firm’s productivity calculated from 2001-2006 data.
“1[consumer good]” and “1[intermediate good]” are indicators for firms that are located in the respective
location along the value chain. The omitted category is firms producing capital goods. All standard errors
are reported in parentheses.
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Figure 4.A.1: Cumulative % of variance explained. Notes. This figure shows the cumulative
percentage of variation explained by the 272 management practice indicators. The results were obtained from
running Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) using all indicators. The x-axis contains all indicators
ranked from the most to the least explanatory dimension.
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Figure 4.A.2: Cross-validating the number of latent styles. Notes. This figure plots the
perplexity of cross-validated LDA models which vary only in the number of latent styles they estimate.
Perplexity is a quantity that measures out-of-sample fit and higher values show better fit. The results are
obtained from randomly splitting the sample into ten cross-validation folds. Then nine of those ten folds
are used to estimate the model which is then tested on the held-out fold. This procedure is repeated ten
times such that each fold is in the training sample exactly nine times, and in the test sample exactly one.
The dots show the average perplexity across these ten repetitions for ach number of latent styles. The upper
and lower end of the error bars show the maximum and minimum perplexity, respectively. The dashed red
line shows the average perplexity obtained with the preferred model with two latent styles. The remaining
parameters of the estimation are left unchanged and are described in Section 4.3.1.
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(b) Differences between styles.
Figure 4.A.3: Style-over-practice distributions. Notes. In this figure we visualize differences
in practices’ loadings across both latent style distributions. The distributions were estimates using the the
single-plant sample alone. Each style is a distribution across 272 observed practices with each practice having
a positive weight, and with the sum of weights summing to one. In panel (a),the practices are ordered such
that the practice with the highest loading on style 1 is the far left of the x-axis. The y-axis shows the
respective loadings of practices. In panel (b), we plot the quotient in loadings of the same practice across
styles. A high value results from a case in which a practice’s loading is higher in style 1 than in style 2, and
vice versa. We plot the 20 highest ranks on either side breaking ties using the average.
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Figure 4.A.4: Firms’ style 2 intensities. Notes. This figure plots the observed Style 2 intensities
for all single-plant firms. These intensities were estimated using the single-plant sample alone. Panel (a)
presents a histogram in which the unit interval was binned into 50 equidistant intervals. Panel (b) plots the
cumulative density across those same 50 intervals.
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Figure 4.A.5: Style 2 intensity and firms’ number of employees. Notes. This figure plots
the simple univariate relationship between a firm’s Style 2 intensity, and its self-reported number of employees
from the survey. 11 firms with over 400 employees were winsorized for visual ease; they are represented with
triangles rather than circles. The dotted blue line shows the line of linear best fit. Grey dots on the far left
of the figure indicate firms that report less than 50 employees.
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Figure 4.A.6: Style 2 intensity and firms’ position in the value chain. Notes. This figure
shows a box-and-whisker plot of Style 2 intensity relative to firms’ position in the value chain. Firms indicate
to be producing one of “consumption”, “intermediate” or “capital” good in the survey. The horizontal bar
within a box represents the median; the upper and lower hinge report the largest and small value within 1.5
times the interquartile range, respectively. Dotted values report values beyond the hinges but smaller than
three times the interquartile range.
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Figure 4.A.7: Sectoral and regional variation in style 2 intensity. Notes. This figure
plots the observed Style 2 intensities across sectors and regions. Panel (a) shows a box-and-whisker plot of
Style 2 intensity relative to firms’ sector of operation. Firms self-report in which sector they are active. The
horizontal bar within a box represents the median; the upper and lower hinge report the largest and small
value within 1.5 times the interquartile range, respectively. Dotted values report values beyond the hinges
but smaller than three times the interquartile range. Panel (b) shows a map of Spanish region with color
intensity reflecting firms’ average Style 2 intensity. 205











Figure 4.A.8: Firms’s total factor productivity 2001-2006. Notes. This figure shows a
histogram of firms’ total factor productivity before the Great Recession using data from 2001-2006. We plot
the predicted value of α obtained from estimating Equation (4.2). The histogram is constructed using a
constant binwidth of 0.04. The vertical lines mark the 2.5th and the 97.5th percentile of the distribution.
We use these values to winsorize the distribution in some specifications.
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Figure 4.A.9: The Great Recession’s impact on GDP growth for select countries.
Notes. This figure plot year-to-year GDP growth (in percent) for Germany, Spain and the United States.
The data on which this figure is based is taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.
207


































(b) ∆ TFP relative to pre-crisis levels.
Figure 4.A.10: TFP during the Great Recession.. Notes. This figure presents firms’ estimated
TFP using data from 2007-2010. In panel (a) we show a simple histogram of firms’ TFP using a binwidth of
0.04. Panel (b) is a scatter plot where we plot firms’ TFP before the crisis (2001-2006 data) on the x-axis,
and TFP during the crisis (panel (a) quantity) on the y-axis.
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